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ABSTRACT 
 
How do two seemingly distinct ways of thinking and acting – one premised on the belief 
that some people are inherently more privileged than others and the second that endows 
each individual with equal rights and responsibilities – co-exist? Specifically, do privileged 
castes accede to demands of the democratic system, which then results in transformation 
of social order? Or do they find ways of resisting and subverting the democratic process 
which preserves social order? In this dissertation, I attempt to explain the behavior of the 
privileged by focusing on a distinct feature of the Indian caste system - untouchability – 
discrimination against lower castes which is religiously sanctioned but constitutionally 
outlawed, focusing on the western Indian state of Gujarat. 
 
I argue that the answer to this question is neither transformation nor preservation of 
untouchability, but somewhere in between. I build my argument in two parts. In the first 
part, I provide a historical understanding of the role of caste and untouchability in society. 
I argue that prior to Indian Independence, untouchability was understood to be a private 
issue and thus was outside the jurisdiction of the state. This however changed post-
Independence when untouchability became a public issue which demanded state 
intervention. Despite several provisions to address untouchability, two problems are 
identified. The first is that the Constitution did not define untouchability. Second, the 
Constitution protects the freedom to practice any religion of one’s choice, consequently 
protecting caste, but prohibits untouchability (which are caste behaviors legitimated by 
religion). 
 
This ambiguity lies at the core of the observed variation in untouchability.  As I will argue, 
this ambiguity in the law - caste legal, but caste based behaviors illegal, leads to 
ambiguities in the definition of untouchability - which in some cases is exploited to 
  xiii 
preserve untouchability and in others, to transform. The locus of change, i.e., preserve or 
transform, - lies with the village-level upper caste elites and how they interpret the law 
and bargain with the state. Specifically, I contend that untouchability is jointly produced 
by two levels of bargaining of the village-level upper-caste elites. One with the state and 
the second within their own castes in the village. I expect high levels of bargaining at both 
levels to be associated with transformation of untouchability and low levels with its 
preservation.  
 
The implications of the two parts are tested separately. For the first part, I use the Times 
of India archive from 1838 to 2005 to test hypotheses about the narrative of untouchability 
both pre and post-Independence. In the second part, I introduce a new village level 
dataset on caste discrimination and its covariates. I then develop a measure of 
untouchability. This measure treats every manifestation of untouchability as unique but 
dependent on other forms of discrimination, which is used in a regression framework to 
test my claims. 
 
I find some support for both hypotheses. Prior to Independence, untouchability is framed 
as a private problem where “upliftment” of the untouchables depended on the 
benevolence of the state and upper-castes. Post-Independence however, the 
“untouchables”, now referred to as “Dalits” are depicted as “assertive” and aware of their 
rights. In the second part of my analyses - a quantitative study of 890 villages in Gujarat, 
I find that higher levels of bargaining with the state and within caste are associated with 
low untouchability and vice-versa. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1.0 Introduction 
How do two seemingly distinct ways of thinking and acting – one premised on the belief 
that some people are inherently more privileged than others and the second that endows 
each individual with equal rights and responsibilities – co-exist? Is there a “clash of 
civilizations” such as that expected between the “East” and “West” (Huntington 1998) or 
is the answer to this question more nuanced in that there is neither a clash where one 
way of life trumps the other but both co-exist albeit in varying forms and capacities? (Sen 
2006). This dissertation is an inquiry into this question. I focus the Hindu caste system. 
The Hindu caste system creates some untouchable individuals but the extent to which 
privileged castes observe this untouchability in practice varies widely. Untouchability is 
discrimination by higher-castes towards lower castes sanctioned by religion but outlawed 
by the Indian Constitution which was declared the de jure law of the land by the liberal 
democratic system adopted in 1947. What explains this variation? Why is it that some 
villages in the same state, report lower levels of discrimination while others report higher? 
This dissertation is an attempt to provide some answers to this question. I do this by 
examining caste variation within the Indian state of Gujarat (Figure 1.1).  
 
My argument has two parts. I first provide some historical context around the issues of 
caste and untouchability. I show how prior to Independence, efforts were directed to 
privatize caste such that the caste affairs (which includes untouchability) remained 
outside the jurisdiction of the colonial state. This however was not to be the case post-
Independence. It had become clear by that time to Indian lawmakers, that untouchability 
would never be solved by the “hearts and minds” of Hindus. The state had to intervene. 
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However what seems like a clear mandate for the state to address untouchability and 
punish its practitioners, the issue continues to affect the lives of millions of people, even 
after more than seven decades of Independence. I attribute this to the inherent ambiguity 
in the law which one, does not define untouchability and two, protects the freedom to 
practice the religion of one’s choice (and consequently follow caste rules) but 
simultaneously makes illegal untouchability (which are caste rules grounded in religion). 
It is at this point that I argue that the state becomes entangled in an intractable conflict 
over the role of caste in society. While theoretically, it is easy to fragment caste into its 
private and public manifestations, in practice this fragmentation is contestable. This 
ambiguity allows for a variation of interpretations of the law by the citizens of the country. 
While some interpretations are in the direction of transformation of the social order, others 
tilt towards its preservation.  
 
This is followed by the second part of my argument where village-level caste elites are 
central to my narrative. I argue that whether untouchability is transformed or preserved 
depends how the interpretation of the law by village-level upper caste elites and their 
ability to rally their caste members in the village. Specifically, I contend that untouchability 
is jointly produced by two levels of bargaining of the village-level upper-caste elites. One 
with the state and the second with their own caste communities in the village. I expect 
high levels of bargaining to be associated with transformation of untouchability and low 
levels with its preservation.  
 
I find some support for both sets of my hypotheses. Using all articles published in/around 
Gujarat from 1838 to 2005 in The Times of India, I find that prior to Independence, 
untouchability is framed more as a private problem where the “upliftment” of the 
untouchables depends on the largesse of the state and upper-castes. Post-Independence 
however, this is no longer the case where the “untouchables” now referred to as “Dalits” 
are depicted as “assertive” and well aware of their rights. This is followed by a quantitative 
analysis of about 887 villages in Gujarat where I find that higher levels of bargaining with 
the state and within caste are associated with low untouchability and lower levels of 
bargaining are associated with high untouchability. 
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The rest of the Introduction is structured as follows: In the next section, I begin by 
describing caste and caste based discrimination. I then make a case for why this topic 
needs to be examined. This is then followed by a literature critique, where I show some 
of the dominant perspectives which could be used to explain variation in caste 
discrimination but are limited when applied to caste discrimination in Gujarat. I then 
proceed to describing my proposed theoretical framework for understanding variation in 
caste discrimination which draws insights from the literatures of state-building, distribution 
of public goods and social movements. In the last section, I describe the research design 
and methods that will be used to test the hypotheses. 
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Figure 1.1: Gujarat (shown in red)  
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1.2.0 The What and Why of Caste and Untouchability 
1.2.1 What is Caste and Untouchability? 
Caste is a system of stratification which is sanctified by sacred religious texts and which 
characterizes the social organization of the South Asian sub-continent (Jodhka and Shah 
2010). It however is not exclusive to the countries of South Asia. It has been found to 
exist in countries outside of South Asia such as among the large diaspora communities 
in the UK (Waughray 2009).  
 
As a stratification system, there are five large groups – Brahmins (educated and 
intellectual), Kshatriyas (warrior), Vaishyas (traders and businessmen) and Shudras 
(laborers). The untouchables constitute the fifth group and are associated with “unclean” 
occupations such as cleaning toilets and removing animal carcasses. Each of these 
groups is divided into thousands of smaller endogamous groups or jatis that are spread 
across the country (Srinivas 1980). Furthermore, the relationship between the jatis varies 
across both space and time. There is no one single overarching hierarchy which best 
captures the relationship among the jatis (Gupta 2000; Vaid 2015). For instance, it is 
usually assumed that the Brahmins are on the top of this caste hierarchy. But this 
assumption is based on a static view of how caste actually functions. There are three 
problems with this assumption. First, there is no one single cohesive homogenous group 
called the Brahmins. There are several hundred endogamous Brahmin jatis. Figure 1.3 in 
Appendix A (end of this chapter) shows that the 1911 census enumerated 65 Brahmin 
jatis only for the state of Baroda (part of modern day Gujarat). Secondly cases have been 
found where Brahmins are perceived to be polluting and thus avoided because of their 
association with conducting the last rites (Vaid 2014). And the third is that studies have 
been done where the lower and upper castes of one state are genetically more similar to 
each other than upper-castes across two different states (Gupta 2001).  
 
Therefore, caste as a stratification system is composed of thousands of endogamous 
jatis. The relationship between these jatis cannot be characterized a single overarching 
hierarchy that has remained static over the past thousands of years. Instead, the reality 
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of caste is more accurately described by a constant struggle at the local level between 
different jatis to negotiate their place in the Hindu social order (Gupta 2000).  
 
Untouchability is a distinct feature of caste. Untouchability are humiliating and 
discriminatory behaviors directed from upper castes towards lower castes who were 
formerly known as the untouchables. What makes these behaviors distinct are the 
elaborate rituals that accompany acts perceived as discriminatory (Gupta 2005; Vaid 
2014). Gupta (2005) writes: 
 
“But what makes caste stand apart from other forms of stratification is that in this case 
there are elaborate and ritualized rules that ordain not just how distinctions should be 
maintained, but also prescribe sanctions should the norms be violated. It is this obsessive 
attention to the slightest variation in ritual ranking that marks out caste from other forms of 
stratification” (Gupta 2005: 410). 
 
This ritualistic aspect of caste is based on a belief that some individuals are inherently 
more “pure” than others and this purity needs to be maintained. As there are no 
phenotypical differences between castes (Gupta 2005), it becomes the prerogative of the 
individual and/or community to construct and enforce rules which maintain the distinctions 
in everyday interaction. Any association or contact between a low caste and high caste 
constitutes a violation of the social order and thus in need of amends in order to restore 
the balance. These amends can be made by engaging in various rituals and sanctions 
for both the low caste and high caste. Although undeniably the sanctions are higher for 
the low caste person. For instance, one of the popular examples used to illustrate the 
obsession with rituals is of when the mere shadow of a low caste person would be enough 
to contaminate a high caste person. The latter would feel defiled and would have to 
undergo purification rituals (e.g., bath followed by prayers) in order to become clean 
again. So while untouchability clearly is targeted at lower castes, it affects both the higher 
and lower castes.  
 
1.2.2 Why Study Untouchability? 
Given the sheer magnitude of the phenomena both in amount of time (it’s been around 
for thousands of years) and the number of people affected (166 million untouchables or 
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the 1 billion Hindus if a relational view is taken), there are two other reasons that 
untouchability requires extensive research. The first is that caste is not a rigid hierarchical 
structure. As the pace of this change is slow, caste has been assumed to be fixed and 
the relationships between castes have been taken to be constant i.e., the higher castes 
always have and will dominate the lower castes. This is based on the assumption that 
there is a hierarchy and every caste or jati has accepted their place in this hierarchy. 
However this assumption does not hold in the face of data (Gupta 2005). For instance, 
one of the politically dominant groups in current day Gujarat are the Patidars. However 
there is no mention of this group in the caste census of 1911 or 1921. This does not mean 
that they did not exist. They did, however, under a different name – Kanbi. They were 
formally recognized as a distinct group i.e., as Patidars, different from Kanbi, in the case 
of census of 1931. Arguably, during the British Raj the jatis had realized that enumeration 
in the census by the British was also linked to access to government benefits which could 
then result in an increase in status and prestige (Dirks 2001; Gupta 2005). Thus 
competition between jatis has been a feature of the stratification system which has too 
often been overlooked (Gupta 2005). 
 
Second, and related to the first is that as caste is not constant, nor is its distinctive feature 
– untouchability. The liberal democratic order adopted by the country when it became 
independent in 1947, made all castes equal i.e., no caste was superior or inferior. This 
was a challenge to the socio-religious order that had managed to contain competition via 
both ideological and coercive means. However electoral democracy provided new arena 
where the competition between jatis could be played out. The question thus becomes 
what do the privileged do in such circumstances? Do they accede to the demands of 
democratic system, which then results in the transformation of the social order? Or do 
they find ways of resisting and subverting the democratic process which preserves the 
social order? What we observe is that neither the social caste order or the political 
democratic order has prevailed. Instead we witness a constant the struggle between the 
two forces and it this constant struggle between two ways of thinking and living which I 
will argue underlie variation in untouchability. 
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1.3.0 Literature Critique 
In this section, I review two perspectives which can and have been used to understand 
variation in caste discrimination. The first one - social movements - is a bottom-up view 
in that the locus of change is the aggrieved community (i.e., lower castes) and the second 
one - political institutions - is a top-down view as it focuses on the role of the government 
institutions on discrimination. For each perspective, I first describe how different scholars 
have conceptualized the effects of mobilization and also what they found. This is followed 
by evaluating their understandings specifically to the case of caste-discrimination in 
Gujarat, India.  
1.3.1 Social Movements 
Arguably, the social movements perspective can be used for understanding variation in 
caste discrimination. Oliver (2008) traces the emergence of serious scholarship on 
collective behavior and social movements (CBSM) to the high levels of social and political 
unrest in the 60s and early 70s in the United States. The founding of this field, beginning 
with resource-mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977) was to understand protest 
as strategy for social change - in the US context - a more just social order. The underlying 
belief was that collective action has the potential to change the status quo. Thus for my 
case, I would expect greater mobilization to be associated with less injustice and 
discrimination.  
 
However as Lipsky (1968) writes, changing the status quo is conditional on the social 
movement organization/s (SMO/s) gaining the support of four constituencies - the 
constituency they represent, the larger civil society within which the protest is happening 
and who are being exposed to the protest by the media, third, the targets who actually 
have the power to meet the demands of the protesters and lastly, third parties who could 
be thought of as observers whose solidarity with the protesters can be beneficial. 
Maintaining a good relationship with each of these four constituencies and ensuring that 
their interests align is difficult (Lipsky 1968).  
 
The current research can be largely divided into two camps - movement centric and target 
centric. Some scholars focus on features of the movement and propose mechanisms of 
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how those features affect the outcomes. Other scholars focus on the decision making 
calculus of those being targeted by protests and how that makes a difference to the 
outcomes. Additionally it must be made clear that all outcomes are not equivalent and 
that is why what we see is a disaggregation of outcomes where some are looking at 
political outcomes (Andrews 2001; Soule and King 2006; Wood 2003), others at economic 
outcomes (Luders 2006, King and Soule 2007), or biographical outcomes (McAdam 1989; 
Davenport and Trivedi 2013).  
1.3.1.1 Movement-centric 
Andrews (2001) proposes a “movement infrastructure” model in order to understand 
variation in government funding for anti-poverty programs across counties in Mississippi. 
Andrews argues that counties which received more funding as compared to those that 
received less, had a stronger “movement infrastructure”. These features gives the 
movement the flexibility to change their tactics contingent on the situation and thus they 
are able to exert influence through multiple channels. Such an movement does not rigidly 
adhere to a single tactic i.e., disruption or persuasion. Rather they are able to calibrate 
their view of which tactic would have the maximum effect given the prevailing 
circumstances. Additionally, with a resource base which makes substantial contributions 
in terms of labor and money, the movement is able to sustain and expand their struggle.  
 
Similar to the work by Andrews (2001), Wood’s (2003) work on the transitions to 
democracy in El Salvador and South Africa makes a case for the use of varying strategies 
- both violent and non-violent - by insurgents to bring the apartheid government to the 
bargaining table. In addition to the tactics, Wood also finds that the division among the 
elite - with some supporting apartheid and others arguing against it - contributed to the 
transition. Some of the elite solidarity can be attributed to the sustained insurgency 
increasing the cost of doing business in South Africa. This hurt the at least the business 
elite who began to view the insurgency and the consequent repression by the government 
as hurting their profits.  
 
And lastly, Soule and King (2006), use the implementation of the Equal Rights 
Amendment to show that policy implementation is a multi-stepped process. At each step 
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the factors that determine the actions of the politicians change. They find that SMOs are 
important in the agenda setting stage. However for them to get their claims on the agenda, 
they need to have some elite (politician) solidarity. But being on the agenda does not 
necessarily mean that their demands will be met. What they show is that SMOs matter 
more in getting demands on the agenda but not when it comes to the passage of law 
because by that time public opinion outweighs protests.  
 
1.3.1.2 Target-centric 
There are other scholars who have argued that instead of focusing on the internal features 
of the movement, more attention needs to be focused on the perception of the targets for 
understanding the outcomes of collective action (Luders 2006). In his work on how 
businesses in the US South responded to sit-ins, Luders lays out a theoretical framework 
which he calls an “economic opportunity structure” where the behavior of targets is a 
function of the cost of conceding to the demands of the protesters and the cost of 
disruption. There are four situations where he expects the targets to respond in distinct 
ways. When both the cost of concession and cost of disruption are low targets will conform 
to the status quo; when both the cost of concession and disruption are high, targets will 
vacillate between negotiations, concessions and repression; when the cost of concession 
is low but the cost of disruption is high, targets will concede to the demands of the 
movement and lastly the cost of concession is high but the cost of disruption is low, targets 
will oppose and may engage in repression of the movement (Luders 2006). 
 
Along similar lines, King and Soule (2007) study the effect of protests on stock prices. 
Their argument is that variation in the stock market is reflective of the faith of investors. If 
stock prices fall, that means that the investors are losing confidence and on the other 
hand if the stock prices rise, it shows greater investor confidence. They find that media 
coverage of protest against companies that allegedly violate labor laws is likely to 
decrease investor confidence and thus stock prices are likely to fall (King and Soule 
2007).  
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1.3.1.3 Limitations of the Social Movements Framework  
From the review of work which looks at either the role of the movement or the targets, we 
learn that variation in outcomes can be attributed to a few common key features. The first 
is resources but more specifically, a reliance on indigenous labor and money. The second 
is engaging in multiple strategies as all tactics are not the same. A protest maybe targeted 
more towards mobilizing public opinion while the purpose of the strike maybe to impose 
costs on the oppressors. The third is having some elite solidarity. This is seen with federal 
support for anti-poverty programs (Andrews 2001) and is also seen in the split between 
elites in South Africa with some elites supporting the insurgents while others resisting 
their demands (Wood 2003). And the last is the role that the media plays in amplifying the 
demands of the aggrieved and communicating it to the larger public (King and Soule 
2007). My review will focus on the last two features that will be shown to be either missing 
or only weakly present in understanding variation in caste discrimination in Gujarat, India. 
 
1.3.1.3.1 Elite solidarity 
Elite solidarity with the movement as expressed by the federal government’s efforts for 
expanding civil rights for African Americans in the US South, or some elites showing 
support for the demands of insurgents in South Africa (Wood 2007) or politicians taking 
hate crimes against minorities seriously in US counties when pressured (McVeigh et al 
2003), or womens’ grievances making it into the agenda of senators (Soule and Olzak 
2004; Soule and King 2006) is an important factor that is part of some dominant 
paradigms in the literature such as the political process model (McAdam 1982).  
 
Gujarat has been a different and puzzling story about the role of elites in making visible 
and ending caste discrimination. While Gandhi started the movement against 
untouchability in Gujarat, his message never really took root in the state. Starting before 
the independence movement, we witness struggles between M. K. Gandhi and Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar about the place of caste in society with the former believing in retaining certain 
aspects of it (division of labor) but getting rid of others (untouchability) while the latter 
advocating its complete annihilation (Bhatt 1970). We also see tensions on the role of 
Congress in addressing caste based issues between leader such as Sardar Vallabhbhai 
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Patel and Indulal Yagnik1. Patel was the President and Yagnik was the Secretary for the 
Congress party in Gujarat. In the early 1920s Yagnik needed funds for building schools, 
boarding houses, and paying teacher’s salary for children from the tribal and low-caste 
communities. Yagnik writes,  
 
“How can we uplift the untouchables by merely mixing with them in our meetings and processions? 
In the present meeting when the untouchables arrive, except when Gandhiji makes a special 
insistence, how close are they invited to sit? Besides, by making them sit near us for a while or by 
touching them a little bit, how can their progress be achieved? We should not have only a technical 
meaning of the removal of untouchability-it should be regarded as the first step towards realizing a 
new identity with the crores of such human beings. While holding their hands and making them 
merge with the entire people so as to cultivate their own service-minded cultured workers, we 
should get ready to establish some institutions. The foreign priests spends tens of millions of rupees 
to convert them. Could we not spend even a few thousands? Could we develop a powerful new 
nation by merging the crores of untouchable people by explaining to the caste people about the 
superficial removal of untouchability? Gandhiji had started a school for the uplift of the untouchables 
four years earlier at the time of the first Political Conference of Gujarat and now, the Congress had 
adopted a programme for their progress. Since we have started to secure national swaraj this year 
could we not run two or four such institutions like the modest lamps in our house compared to these 
sparkling institutions of the foreigners with a fund of Rs. 1.5 million? I told Vallabhai and other 
friends many such things but all of them were thinking about the entire question from the point of 
view of the Congress resolutions and realistic politics. They saw in my arguments airy utopias and 
feeble sentimentalism” (Pathak, Spodek and Wood 2011, volume 2, 23-24). 
 
Yagnik was given a tiny fraction of the amount which infuriated him deeply. He writes,  
“I became very angry when I saw that the top workers of Gujarat, repeating parrot-like Gandhiji’s 
Daridranarayan (My God I find by serving the poor), were cutting to pieces my small scheme. There 
was absolutely no scope for any argument against my colleagues, who had adopted such a poor 
policy and decided to hurl me in the pit of continued insolvency and futility. At the same time, I was 
not in the habit of subordinating myself to someone so as to maintain my institutions. When 
Vallabhbhai conveyed to me in determined words the decision of the Vidyapith to give me a paltry 
amount I conveyed to him my clear decision not to accept it” (Pathak, Spodek and Wood 2011, 
volume 2, 26). 
 
Yagnik submitted his resignation which was accepted by Gandhi and Patel at the meeting 
of the Provincial Committee. This is just one instance of the conflict over the role of caste 
but we can safely assume that in many cases there was not much conflict because the 
independence movement was dominated by the interests of the upper and middle castes 
(Shah 1987). The conflict between leaders of the freedom movement such as that 
between Gandhi and Ambedkar or between Patel and Yagnik were symptomatic of the 
underlying tensions where India wanted to become a free, modern and democratic nation 
                                               
1 I thank John Wood for telling me about Indulal Yagnik. 
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but questions of the inherently unequal and oppressive social structure of caste would 
pose a dilemma about who would reap the benefits of a free, modern and democratic 
India.  
 
The  Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis and Muslims (KHAM) alliance formed by the Congress 
party and led by Madhavsinh Solanki in the early 80s had a chance to engage in reforms 
and redistribution. This alliance included the three most marginalized populations in the 
state - tribals (adivasis), low castes (Harijans) and the Muslims. When in power Solanki 
tried to enforce the land ceiling act which would distribute land held in excess of the limits 
but his government was threatened by a breakdown of law and order if he were to do so 
(Sud 2012).  
 
When Solanki decided to increase the percentage of seats reserved in government 
educational institutes, the state witnessed the first anti-reservation riots in the country. 
This was a precursor to what would happen across the country in the 90s after the V.P. 
Singh government decided to implement the recommendations by the Mandal 
Commission Report. In summary, elite solidarity is important, however as the history of 
the state has shown, the small number of elites who did express solidarity with the 
oppressed - ranging from Indulal Yagnik in the 20s to Madhavsinh Solanki in the 80s - 
have often been sidelined and ridiculed or had to face counter-protests which often 
resulted in the dilution of the social reform agenda.  
1.3.1.3.2 Media  
Media coverage of protest by the oppressed is one of the essential factors affecting how 
the public perceives protest and the protesters. It is the coverage of movement that links 
the movement to the larger public and communicates to the latter what the people are 
protesting about (Lipsky 1968). We also know from empirical work that what the public 
thinks affects decision making by politicians. For instance, McVeigh et al. (2003) shows 
that when there is media coverage of protest, politicians have a greater incentive to pay 
attention to the issues.  
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The history of media coverage in Gujarat of movements by the marginalized have shown 
a very distinct bias i.e., ignoring or demonizing people or movements who challenge the 
social order of caste as portraying them as “anti-nationalist” or “anti-development”. Mehta 
(2010) demonstrates this bias in her work on the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). The 
NBA advocated on behalf of the tribals who would be displaced by the construction of the 
Narmada Dam in south Gujarat. They demanded adequate rehabilitation from the 
government and to that end organized several mass movements. Their work made the 
World Bank, one of the financiers of the dam, pay attention to the rehabilitation policy and 
when the Bank found that the government was violating the policy, they retracted their 
loans. Countering the NBA’s efforts, were mass movements led by non-state actors such 
as religious gurus and caste leaders (Mehta 2010). 
 
Given that resources (labor and time) are scarce, strategies constrained by ideologies, 
lack of elite support and a media that seems to reinforce and support the dominant 
narrative, I have tried to persuade the readers that the social movements perspective is 
inadequate for understanding variation in caste discrimination.  
 
1.3.2 Features of the Political System  
In this section I present an overview of research that investigates features of the political 
system to understand variation in outcomes such as the importance attached to ethnic 
differences and variation in ethnic conflict. While both ethnic differences or ethnic conflict 
are not the same as ethnic/caste discrimination, the perception of difference is necessary 
for discrimination.  
 
The research in this section covers different features of the political system and how they 
could account for varying levels of caste discrimination. The work can be largely divided 
into three broad areas. The first covers those who see elections as a means of 
reconfiguring relationships between groups in order to consolidate a winning coalition. 
Elections in this line of argumentation are seen to provide incentives for the creation of a 
new identity and the simultaneous undermining of the old mostly parochial identities. If 
this is successful, not only does a new identity emerge but those responsible for the 
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mobilization win elections and gain access and control over the distribution of public 
resources (Kothari and Maru 1965; Posner 2004). The second investigates the role that 
constitutionally mandated rules such as reservations/quotas have on caste 
discrimination. These quotas were instituted right after independence when the laws of 
the nation were being formalized. They were meant to alleviate disparities between 
disparate groups which were caused by institutionalized forms of discriminations 
(Chauchard 2014). And lastly, there are others who argue that to understand patterns of 
discrimination we need to go beyond proximate causes of variation such as political 
competition. They say that discrimination and conflict predate elections so we need to 
think about more long term historical processes such as the enduring impact of 
colonialism (Verghese 2016). I will review each one these lines of thought in detail below. 
 
1.3.2.1 Political competition 
There are some scholars who emphasize the role that political competition plays in how 
much weight people give to different identities. Identities in such research are not 
assumed to be static. Rather, identities are constructed and given meaning by people 
(Posner 2004).  
 
The malleability of identities is mostly compellingly documented in Dan Posner’s work. 
Posner argues that politics is organized on the basis of ethnicity in Malawi but not in 
Zambia because electoral rules incentivize the formation of groups which can effectively 
compete in elections. Using the case of Chewas and Tumbukas on both the countries he 
shows that in Malawi, they each constitute a substantial size relative to national electoral 
arena but not in Zambia. Now elections are hotly contested because holding office gives 
access to a several benefits such as the allocation of jobs in the government to distribution 
of contracts for public projects such as building roads, highways, and bridges, 
scholarships among other benefits. Thus relative group size affects how the two groups 
view each other - adversaries in Malawi and allies in Zambia.  
 
Posner’s “cultural demography” logic is a simple yet powerful explanation for 
understanding the circumstances under which certain identities become the basis for 
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political competition such that the perception of the groups in question is altered to view 
some as friends and others as foes. Furthermore, what Posner shows is the spillover of 
the friends/foes perception into the private lives of people i.e., his logic is not 
circumscribed by the electoral domain. For example, 55.2% of the respondents in Malawi 
said they would not marry a person from the other group as compared to 23.8% in Zambia 
and 37.6% say marriage to members of other groups is frowned up in Malawi as 
compared to 6.1% in Zambia. 
 
Given that identities are constructed, there are two instructive examples which look at the 
actual behavior associated with the creation of an identity. Using the case of the Gujarat 
Kshatriya Sabha (GKS) in Gujarat, a caste association which represented “many castes 
and lineage groups, most of them drawn from the economically depressed communities 
of cultivators” (35), Kothari and Maru (1965) show the efforts to overcome caste 
differences in order to create a new identity. This new identity which would subsume all 
differences under one umbrella would be the “Kshatriya” identity which included groups 
“ranging all the way from Rajputs who are the highest in the Kshatriya hierarchy, to Bhils 
who are semi-tribal, with Bariyas (a Koli caste) middle on the way” (35). They write of the 
process by which the disparate groups were assimilated into the “Kshatriya” fold, 
 
There was a conscious and deliberate attempt on the part of the leaders of the movement to break 
with the tradition. Symbols of caste pollution were deliberately discarded. One of the first to go was 
the eating restriction, and high and low were made to sit together at common feasts” (Kothari and 
Maru 1965: 35).  
 
What the case of the GKS demonstrates is that competition for power can induce those 
with more to “give up” some of their behaviors such that they can interact with lower 
castes. Thus it would be expected that in places where the socially dominant group needs 
the votes of the lower castes, there would fewer restrictions on interaction and also we 
would expect lower levels of discrimination.  
 
Both the above mentioned pieces of research show that political competition is necessary 
to induce the dominant group into changing their behavior towards minorities. 
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1.3.2.2 Colonial Legacies 
There are others who attribute variation in the salience of identities it to colonial legacies 
(Dirks 2001; Verghese 2016). Ajay Verghese (2016) asks why conflict revolves around 
one identity as compared to another identity? For instance, why does conflict take mainly 
religious overtones in one area as compared to being imbued with caste or language or 
tribe in other areas? Moving beyond electoral incentives (Kothari and Maru 1965; Posner 
2004) Verghese probes deeper and attributes the variation in the selected cleavage 
around which conflict revolves to colonial legacies. 
 
Verghese shows that British areas experience more caste conflict and non-British, i.e., 
princely areas experience more religious conflict. He attributes this to the bases of of 
power which legitimized different forms rule. The British used caste as a basis for training 
and recruiting natives in order to administer and rule portions of India. By default they 
selected people who could read and write and this coincided with members belonging to 
higher castes such as the Brahmins and Baniyas. The recruitment of educated members 
from these castes into administrative services made caste salient. Furthermore the British 
relied on these castes to learn and document about the other castes populating their 
territories. On the other hand, rule by the princes was religiously legitimized. A 
consequence of this was favoritism towards co-religionists and discrimination towards 
non-co-religionists.  
 
1.3.2.3 Reservations 
Chauchard (2014) is his study makes an argument that the political institution of 
reservation affects how villagers behave with lower-castes. He argues that when a low-
caste person becomes the sarpanch, he or she brings in with him the laws of the state 
which make untouchability punishable under law. This awareness instills a sense of fear 
in the non-SC people and makes them less likely to treat SC members in a less 
discriminatory way as compared to villages where the post of the sarpanch is not 
reserved. What Chauchard makes clear is that upper-castes do not think change how 
they think about lower-castes or change their beliefs, but what changes is the perception 
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of what constitutes publicly acceptable behavior and the legal ramifications of deviating 
from the prescribed behavior. 
 
1.3.2.4 Limitations of the Aspects of the Political System  
From the review of research on different aspects of the political system and how they 
could account for variation in levels of discrimination, we learn that the variation can be 
the outcome of a few features - political competition to consolidate votes, colonial legacies 
and constitutionally mandated reservations. Now each of the aspects will be shown to be 
either missing or only weakly present in understanding variation in caste discrimination in 
Gujarat. 
 
1.3.2.4.1 Political competition 
Elections have been argued to have an effect on the salience of identities such as caste 
and religion. The effects that have been studied range from altering discriminatory 
behavior (Kothari and Maru 1965) to perceived differences (Posner 2004) to conflict and 
violence (Wilkinson 2004). The assumption underlying these studies is that the 
competitive nature of the electoral process motivates political entrepreneurs to mobilize 
people along existing cleavages which will maximize the chances of winning the election 
by building the largest possible winning coalition. The competition to consolidate people 
or votes can lead people to either view each other as friends or foes. Evidence for 
friendship comes from the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha where leaders encouraged their 
members to set aside caste rules and bring into their ambit lower castes to create the 
KHAM alliance (Kothari and Maru 1965). On the other hand, Posner (2004) present proof 
of when an identity can be mobilized such that there is an increase in expressed hostility 
(Posner 2004). 
 
There are five problems with arguments that emphasize the role of political competition. 
First, with respect to the formation of caste alliances with Dalits in Gujarat, there have not 
been many instances. The Dalits are classified as Scheduled Castes (SC) and the SCs 
constitute a small proportion of the total population, less than 7%. Their small numbers 
do not lend easily to the formation of alliances. The last alliance formed with the Dalits 
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(Harijans) was the KHAM alliance which brought the Congress Party led by Madhavsinh 
Solanki to power in 1980. When he tried to institutionalize reforms that were promised to 
his supporters, the state (and the country) witnessed the first wave of anti-reservation 
riots.  
 
The second and third problems pertain to the lack of study of the effects of caste alliances 
or the emerging identities (in Gujarat or any other part of India). As identities such as the 
Kshatriya label by the Gujarat Kshatriya Sangh or Hindutva by the BJP are constructed 
for a purpose (winning elections), should it be assumed that the duration for which the 
effects of the new identity lasts are the same as the electoral cycle? We just do not know. 
Third is the range of spaces to which these new forms of behavior apply. For instance, 
we do not know whether inter-dining of castes is observed only during political meetings 
of the alliance or do they also spillover to the family and village. The temporal and spatial 
effects of electoral incentives to build inter-caste relationships in the Indian context have 
not received as much attention as much as the faith that is placed in their power to change 
deep-rooted caste behaviors.   
 
The fourth problem with placing a lot of weight on elections is much more fundamental. 
The problem lies with the assumption about caste which underlies such arguments. The 
belief is that caste is a “political” problem that can be solved “politically” and after that it 
will meet its “natural” end. What this means is that caste is an issue that the state is 
responsible for “solving” and is doing so with measures such as reservations, special 
courts and the extra protection offered to the minorities. Nothing more is needed. In fact 
there are scholars who have prematurely rung the death knell of caste based on this 
assumption (Srinivas 2003). In Chapter 3, I will demonstrate that the diagnosis of caste 
as a political problem whose prognosis lies in legislations and policies have been 
deliberately constructed to limit the scope of the state in society.  
 
This is not to say elections have no role in changing discriminatory behaviors. What I am 
trying to argue is that the role of elections in altering deep-rooted behaviors needs to be 
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qualified. Writing on the relationship between the electorate and elections Guinier (2008) 
writes: 
 
Do more elections produce more democracy? I answer that question with a qualified negative: rule 
by elections, or what I have come to call ‘electocracy’, does not adequately serve the values of 
democracy. By electocracy I mean a political environment that defined itself by sacred moments of 
choice. The act of choosing in a competitive contest produce a clear winner. By casting their ballots, 
citizens bestow democratic accountability on the victor. At the same time, who wins the contest is 
even more important than who votes. And who votes is more important than the quality and quantity 
of citizen participation in, or the political consequence of, other important political acts of self-
government such as deliberation, persuasion or collective mobilization (Guinier 2008:2). 
 
And lastly, is the issue of applying mechanisms from higher levels of aggregations - 
assembly constituencies - to smaller levels such as villages i.e., the issue of ecological 
fallacy. Most of what we know about the outcomes of competition between political parties 
are at the level of assembly or parliamentary constituencies. This makes sense because 
it is at this level that the contest takes place. However we cannot apply the same logic to 
the village. Here is why. An assembly constituency contains a few hundred villages. If 
there are anti-caste riots in this constituency then one would expect that all villages would 
have relatively high levels of caste discrimination as compared to a constituency where 
there wasn’t a riot. This expectation just does not hold up because as I will show that 
levels of discrimination vary within constituencies.  
 
1.3.2.4.2 Colonial Legacies 
Moving beyond proximate causes such as elections, there is work by scholars who write 
about the enduring impact of colonialism on existing patterns of ethnic discrimination. 
Nicholas Dirks argues that the enumeration of castes by the British gave caste the 
appearance of permanence (Dirks 2001). India at that time was however was only 
partially ruled by the British. There were some areas that were administered by the British 
and others by princes and kings. Utilizing this variation in the forms of rule, Verghese 
(2016), argues that cleavages which forms the basis for conflict are rooted in varying 
forms of rule. He finds that conflict is oriented around caste in British areas while conflict 
takes on religious undertones in princely areas. The reason for this is that British 
administration used caste to organize their own affairs while the rule of the princes was 
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legitimized by God i.e., religion. The British selected literate and educated castes like 
Brahmins and Baniyas to run their administration. Martial castes like the Kshatriyas and 
Pathans were recruited to become a part of the British military services. The incorporation 
of different castes into the service of the British Empire reinforced prior patterns of 
privilege. This reinforcement was also accompanied by the creation of new forms of 
privilege. For example in his work on Banaras, Cohn shows that those who became 
incharge of maintaining land records and collecting taxes, were able to use the office to 
increase their own share of land (Cohn 1960).  
 
On the other hand the rule of the princes was legitimized by religious authorities. Thus in 
order to rule those belonging to the same religion were more likely to be allocated benefits 
as compared those who belonged to a different religion. The point however is simple. 
Benefits such as jobs and scholarships were distributed along caste lines in British areas 
and along religious lines in princely states. Thus varying forms of rule cemented the 
organization of politics in different ways.  
 
While Verghese’s account is compelling, there are two problems. First theoretically, the 
dichotomous division into British and non-British is problematic. This is because of 
substantial variation within British administered areas (Naseemullah and Staniland 2016). 
Disaggregated studies show evidence of substantial variation even within British 
administered areas. While some areas were seen as important for the purposes of 
revenue, other more remote areas did not get the same degree of investment. Thus even 
within British administered areas there is variation in the form of rule. And if there is 
variation in the form of rule then according to Verghese’s own logic, there would be 
varying levels of caste discrimination. Therefore what matters is not just who ruled i.e., 
British or prince, but also why they ruled. 
 
Secondly, Verghese’s data focuses on a very narrow form of caste conflict. He uses data 
on the Naxalite conflict in a few states in eastern India as a measure of caste conflict. 
This ignores several important episodes of caste conflict such as the anti-reservation riots 
which shook up the entire country in the early 90s.  
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Moving beyond Verghese, there are two very basic problems with relying on colonial 
legacies as a possible explanation for varying levels of caste discrimination or conflict. 
The first is that too much weight is given to the colonizers at the cost of denying agency 
to the colonized. What this account suggests is that the British were able to dictate norms 
of behavior in each and every dimension of life to the colonized Indians. That the 
colonized were complicit in their own oppression and that they conceded to the idea of 
the “civilizing mission” where the “civilization” propounded by the British was superior to 
theirs. This is far from the truth as evident in the emergence of nationalist thought as 
exemplified by the writings of people like Aurobindo Ghosh and Swami Vivekananda  
much before the emergence of the Indian Congress in late 19th century (Chatterjee 
1993). So while the British dominated India, they did not have hegemonic control (Guha 
1997).  
 
The second is a more difficult problem. The problem is with the classification of Hindu-
Muslim conflict as religious and caste as ethnic. Caste has religious foundations so then 
how does it get classified as “ethnic” when it should be “religious”? Treating caste 
discrimination and conflict independently of religion is a prevalent assumption. However 
the process by which caste came to be disassociated from religion but at the same time 
its continuing existence being legitimated by religion is a puzzle which needs to be 
empirically investigated. The disassociation cannot be assumed to be fact.  
 
1.3.2.4.3 Reservations 
The Constitution of India has allocated a certain proportion of seats in the government for 
members of the SC. This has been done to ensure representation of groups that have 
been historically oppressed. Whether reservations have “worked” is a difficult question 
and out of scope of this work2. However Chauchard’s research is one of the first to look 
at how reservations impact the perception of SCs. Chauchard finds that while stereotypes 
about SCs do not change - i.e., non-SCs continue to believe that SCs cannot rule, are 
                                               
2 Most of the existing work focuses on whether reservations leads to more allocation of benefits to groups that the 
reserved seat is supposed to represent. 
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incompetent and not hard-working  - what does change are the norms of legally 
acceptable behavior i.e., non-SCs know that caste discrimination is legally wrong. 
Chauchard attributes this change in perception about norms of acceptable behavior to 
reservations.  
 
While Chauchard’s work on assessing the psychological impact of reservation on 
discrimination is important and his methodology innovative, there are four problems. The 
first problem is the duration of these effects i.e., do these effects last as long as the 
reservation is in effect? The second is that these are reported attitudes and not actual 
behavior. Third, he talks to males and from my experience in the field I have found males 
and female to give varying responses.  
 
Lastly and more relevant to the case at hand, Chauchard does not deal with the problem 
of “reverse discrimination” which has manifested itself in the form of anti-reservation riots 
in the state.  
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1.4.0 The Argument In Brief 
There are two parts to my argument. In the first part, I discuss untouchability in a historical 
context. I show that untouchability has been and is a feature of the social structure of 
caste in India. There have been a fair share of struggles against untouchability across 
time. However, during the struggle for Independence, struggles against caste were given 
a different meaning. The Indian freedom leaders made untouchability a private issue 
which was to be addressed by Hindus themselves. The state - in this case the colonial 
state - was not allowed to interfere. In the process of confining and privatizing caste, the 
leaders were able to build a narrative of what it meant to be “Indian” and unite people 
based on an idea of India. While political freedom came our way - social freedom 
remained a distant dream. The nation was placed before caste. However lawmakers 
realized that untouchability would not simple disappear with Independence. And waiting 
for Hindus to introspect and then change their hearts and minds was an illusion. For 
untouchability to end, it has to become political i.e., the state had to be brought back in. 
This is exactly what was done when the practice of untouchability was made illegal in the 
Constitution of newly independent country. 
 
However there were two issues. The first was the untouchability has never been actually 
defined by lawmakers. And second, while the Constitution made untouchability illegal, it 
simultaneously protected the freedom to practice any religion. Now we know that 
untouchability is caste-based discrimination and that caste is legitimated by religious texts 
so in a way untouchability too is backed by religious texts. So we see that on one hand 
people have the freedom to practice a religion of their choice but on the other hand certain 
religious behaviors - untouchability - are illegal. It is easy to imagine that prior to 
Independence, children from lower and higher castes did not go to the same school. 
However post-Independence, the state required that all children go to school. This put 
children from both lower and higher castes together in the same school. At its birth, facing 
political and social unrest, the Indian state was not in a position to send police forces to 
all of its few hundred thousand villages to make sure the law was followed.  
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I argue that what followed was an interpretive struggle of the place of caste and 
consequently untouchability in daily life. The state had provided the opportunity for 
changing social relations but it was not backed by enough state support. Therefore, the 
struggle could either result in the transformation of untouchability or its preservation. The 
direction of the struggle depends on the village-level upper-caste elites and their 
relationship with the state and their own village communities. I contend that untouchability 
is jointly produced (Figure 1.1) by the two forces - how village-level upper-caste elites 
bargain with the state and how they in turn bargain within their own castes. I expect high 
levels of bargaining to be associated with low untouchability and low levels of bargaining 
to be associated with high untouchability. 
 
Figure 1.2: The joint production of untouchability 
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1.5.0 Research Design and Methods 
I use two types of analyses to test my claims. As mentioned there are two parts to my 
argument. In the first part, I provide some historical context around the issues of caste 
and untouchability. To test claims about this, I need a descriptive source which goes back 
in time. I use the Times of India. In the second part, I focus in on the village-level caste 
elites and their interactions with the state and with their own caste members in their 
villages. For this I need a village-level dataset. I rely on a study done by scholars and 
NGOs between 2005-08 in Gujarat, India, and propose a new measure of untouchability. 
And I present a new cross-sectional village-level dataset of covariates.  
1.5.1 Content Analysis 
I relied on the coverage by the Times of India (TOI from here on) which started in 1838 in 
Bombay. TOI is the largest national English daily with some states having their own 
regional office. I was able to gain access to the entire TOI database consisting of 
everything ever published beginning 1838 and ending in 2005 via the University of 
Michigan’s Hatcher Graduate Library. The TOI is a good source to test my claims about 
the changing perceptions of caste and untouchability (part 1 of my argument), because 
of two reasons. Theoretically, I needed a source which covered India (more specifically 
the Gujarat area) both before and after independence in 1947. The TOI provides 
coverage well before India became a part of the British Empire (1838-1857), then as a 
British colony (1858-1947), and finally an independent nation (1947-now). I use both 
automated and manual coding to examine different aspects of the texts. According to my 
claims, I expect the changing political contexts to capture the changing narratives on 
caste discrimination. I argue that these changing narratives reflect particular 
understanding of the problem and also the perceived solutions.  
1.5.2 Quantitative Analyses 
The quantitative analysis is done in two parts. In the first part, Chapter 4, I develop a 
measure of untouchability and in the second part, Chapter 5, I use a regression framework 
to account for variation in the measure. The data for both the measure and analyses 
comes from a study done by activists and scholars from Navsarjan which is an NGO 
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based in Gujarat, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights, and scholars from the 
University of Notre Dame, University of Michigan, and University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. 
They came together between 2005 and 2008 to build an instrument which would record 
the varying manifestations of untouchability3 in rural Gujarat. The survey (referred to as 
the Navsarjan study from here on) covered 1578 villages across 11 districts in Gujarat.  
 
I use this data to first show that the experience of untouchability is not uniform across all 
Dalit groups within Gujarat. The Valmikis face the maximum levels of discrimination as 
compared to other Dalit groups. With a focus on the Valmikis, I then develop a measure 
of untouchability, which I call the vulnerability score. The creation of this scores takes into 
consideration two aspects of untouchability – (1) dependence i.e., various manifestations 
of untouchability maybe linked to each other and (2) uniqueness – each manifestation 
has its own distinct function and one cannot be substituted for another. The incorporation 
of these two aspects by calculating the joint probabilities of all possible combinations of 
untouchability practices results in a number or score which tells us how vulnerable a 
particular form of untouchability is to influence. It does not simply tell us the probability of 
finding a particular form of untouchability in a village or not. In fact it goes deeper than 
that and takes into account the relational aspect of untouchability. It attempts to provide 
a context within which untouchability is experienced. High vulnerability scores indicate 
that the practice is deeply embedded (strongly connected with other forms of 
untouchability) and thus less vulnerable to influence change and low vulnerability scores 
indicate that the practice is easier to influence (weakly or loosely connected with other 
forms of untouchability). 
 
As each form of untouchability is considered to be unique, it has its own vulnerability 
score which tells us how strongly or weakly it is connected to other manifestations in the 
village. I focus on the variation in vulnerability score around a particular form of 
untouchability – discrimination around the distribution of electricity - in the regression 
analysis.  I choose to focus on discrimination around the distribution of electricity for two 
reasons – one theoretical and one practical. Theoretically, I argue that each form of 
                                               
3 Chapter 4, Table 4.4 
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discrimination is unique but linked to other forms. Electricity being a scarce and valuable 
resource which was controlled by the Gujarat government up until 2003, has been argued 
to be a contestable public service (Min 2015). The distribution of this resource is 
contestable even within the confines of the villages where there is some evidence to 
suggest the capture of government resources by the village elite (e.g., Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2006; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2008). Thus I expect discrimination around 
the distribution of electricity to be reflective of underlying village caste dynamics i.e., 
importance of caste and untouchability in everyday life.  
 
Practically, there is disaggregated time series data about electricity distribution which is 
available for researchers in from different sources (e.g., district census handbooks and 
satellite imagery). The data availability allows us to test speculations about the link 
between different aspects of the political and social contexts and the distribution of 
electricity. 
 
In addition to developing a new measure of untouchability, I also present a novel village-
level dataset to test my claims. As no village level quantitative indicators of bargaining 
exist, I theorize what these measures would look like by drawing on the literature about 
state-building and the distribution of public goods. I then use government sources to 
quantify bargaining. I quantify bargaining between the state and village-level caste elites 
by coding when a village was electrified. The idea here is that villages electrified closer 
to state formation exert more influence on how the state distributes a scare resource like 
electricity. Gujarat as its own state was formed in 1960. Prior to that it was a part of 
Bombay Presidency. I expect villages found to be electrified in 1961 to have a greater 
influence on the government than villages which were electrified for the first time in 1981. 
I used the district census handbooks of 1961, 1971, 1981 which I found in the Gujarat 
Institute of Development (GIDR) library in Ahmedabad. 
 
I then quantify bargaining between village-level caste elites based on a very interesting 
observation about how neighborhoods are named within villages. As mentioned earlier, 
the caste identity of any individual is very strong, especially inside the boundaries of the 
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village where everyone knows everyone. The strength of this identity is observable in the 
names of the neighborhoods which often take the name of the caste. For instance, it is 
not unusual to find a Brahminvas in a Gujarati village. This is the area where only 
Brahmins live or Bhangivas which is where Bhangis or Valmikis lives. However, there is 
variation. For instance, while in some villages all neighborhood names are jati names, in 
others some neighborhoods are jati names and some are non-jati or what I call “secular” 
names. This variation is interesting in that it shows a move away from being publicly 
associated with a particular jati. This movement however is not random. As there has not 
been much work done on this topic specifically, I use the work done about caste-based 
residential segregation (e.g., Thorat et al. 2015) to argue that changing the name of a 
neighborhood from that based on the jati to a non-jati names i.e., from a caste specific 
name to a secular names, is an outcome of internal deliberation or what I have referred 
to as bargaining within the caste. I expect villages which have a higher proportion of 
secular neighborhoods to be indicative of higher levels of bargaining. I used the electoral 
rolls publicly available on the Gujarat State Electoral Commission’s website to develop 
this measure. More details about the extraction process can be found in Chapter 5.  
 
These two measures – bargaining between the state and village-level caste elites and 
internal bargaining at the village-level – are what I argue in the next chapter (Chapter 2) 
to be involved in the joint production of untouchability. Hypotheses are tested in a 
regression framework in Chapter 5. 
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1.6.0 Dissertation Outline 
The rest of the chapters of the dissertation are laid out with a brief description of their 
contents. Chapter 2 is devoted to laying out a theoretical framework for understanding 
variation in untouchability. In the first part of the argument, I show that the efforts to 
privatize caste were part of the larger movement for Independence. This is followed by a 
discussion about the role of the Independent state of India in addressing untouchability. 
In the next part I argue the ambiguity in the state’s position on untouchability has provided 
village-level upper-caste elites ample opportunities for interpreting the role of caste. They 
can either engage in transformational efforts or preservationist. What they decide to do 
(or not) is a determined by their relationships with the state and with their own caste 
members. I then proceed to show that untouchability is jointly produced by these two 
levels of interactions. 
 
In Chapter 3, I use the TOI to test the more qualitative aspects of my argument. 
Specifically, I analyze the content of newspaper articles published between 1838 and 
2005 in and around Gujarat, to test my claims about the narrative around caste and 
untouchability i.e., was untouchability indeed a “social” issue pre-Independence and a 
“political” issue post-Independence? The difference lies in the role of the state where in 
the former the state is seen as more distant while in the latter the state is actively involved. 
Additionally, the “untouchables” are depicted as dependent and helpless in the former, 
while in the latter, they are more self-aware and demand the state address their 
grievances.   
 
Chapters 4 is devoted to creation of the untouchability measure - vulnerability score. I 
also introduce the data that would be used for creating the measure and show that the 
experience of untouchability varies across group. Choosing to focus on Valmikis, the 
group facing the most discrimination, in Chapter 5, I use a regression framework to 
analyze variation in the untouchability measure.  
 
And lastly, in Chapter 6 I provide a summary of the argument, the results, its contributions 
and identify a few shortcomings and ways to move forward. 
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1.7.0 Appendix A – 1911 Census of Baroda State  
 
Figure 1.3: Brahmin jatis as enumerated by the 1911 Census for Baroda State (princely 
kingdom in Gujarat 
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Chapter 2 
A Framework for Understanding Variation in Untouchability 
2.1.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present a framework for understanding variation in untouchability 
i.e., caste-based discrimination. In brief, I argue that variation in untouchability can be 
understood as jointly produced by two forces - bargaining between the state and village 
level upper-caste elites and within caste bargaining. Before I delve into the details of the 
argument, I briefly re-describe the phenomena under investigation – untouchability and 
secondly, I clarify the actors and where they are situated relative to each other.  
 
In Chapter 1, I described caste and untouchability. Untouchability is a feature of the 
social stratification system of caste. Simply put it comprises discriminating and 
humiliating behaviors directed from the higher castes to lower castes. However what 
sets it apart from other forms of observed discrimination is its ritualistic aspect. Each 
manifestation of untouchability is accompanied by a set of elaborate rituals that 
prescribe correct behavior and what should be done in case of violation both by the high 
and low caste (Gupta 2005). Untouchability as a phenomena pervades all interactions 
between low and high castes. As I will show in this Chapter, it is not something that can 
switched off or left behind, when moving from one place to another. While it consists of 
specific observable behaviors, I will argue that untouchability also constitutes a way of 
understanding the world and the individual’s place within it. However developing a 
framework to understand its variation in its manifestations across villages will be the 
primary focus of this chapter 
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The village is the smallest unit of the Indian administrative system and is the unit of 
analysis. The next level is the sub-district (or taluka), followed by the district and lastly 
the highest level is state1. There are four actors - state, upper-caste elites, community of 
upper-castes and the lower-castes. Figure 2.1 shows the relative position of the actors. 
F1 represents bargaining between the state and village level upper-caste elites. F2 
represents within caste bargaining. I will present an argument which will show that 
variation in untouchability, which is prejudice against lower-castes by upper-castes, can 
be accounted for by the interaction of F1 and F2.   
 
Figure 2.1: The joint production of untouchability 
 
 
I set up my argument in 5 parts. Each part is shown in Figure 2.2. In Section 2.2.0, I 
show that the struggle over classification of caste as a public or a private issue was 
grounded in the perceived role of the colonial state in the daily lives of people. Public 
being domains where the state has a clear mandate to intervene and private being 
spaces where the state has limited or negligible influence such as in the personal 
sphere (families and homes). As religious texts were being reinterpreted by leaders of 
the freedom movement to construct a broad Indian identity which would transcend 
religion and caste, caste and consequently untouchability, were confined to the private 
domain where the colonial state and later the post-colonial state were not allowed to 
intervene (Figure 2.2, part 1) (Chatterjee 1993, 1995). 
 
                                               
1 The state is embedded within a country.  
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This is followed by examining the conflict over the place of caste in society in the 
Constitution of independent India in Section 2.3.0. As untouchability is rooted in caste, 
one cannot understand the former without understanding the role of caste. While on one 
hand the Constitution outlaws untouchability making it a punishable offense, it 
simultaneously protects the freedom of people to practice their own religion. A 
consequence of this has been to make caste discrimination illegal without doing the 
same to caste (Figure 2.2, part 2). This ambiguity in the law - caste being legal (freedom 
of religion) but untouchability being illegal (discrimination based on caste is banned) - is 
what I argue to be fundamental in understanding variation in untouchability. In some 
cases this ambiguity has been exploited to preserve untouchability and but in others, it 
has been used for transformation.  
 
In Sections 2.4.0 and 2.5.0, I show that the locus of change (preserve or transform) lies 
with the village level upper-caste elites and how they bargain with both the state and 
within their own communities in their villages. Bargaining with the state takes the form of 
mobilization for government services (such as irrigation, agricultural subsidies) (Figure 
2.2, part 3) and bargaining within the caste takes the form of reinterpretation of caste 
rules (Figure 2.2, part 4).  
 
In the last Section (Figure 2.2, part 5), I draw out the implications for untouchability in 
villages. I argue that untouchability can be understood as jointly produced by how 
upper-caste village level elites bargain with the state and with their communities. These 
implications are formulated as testable hypotheses in Section 2.6.0.   
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Figure 2.2: Flowchart of the Argument 
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2.2.0 Colonial India – Privatizing Caste (part 1) 
Chatterjee (1993) in his book The Nation and Its Fragments asks a provocative 
question. Probing the concept of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983) as the basis 
for a nation, Chatterjee asks whose imagination is used to build a nation (specifically 
India) because if colonialism were completely successful, then it had to have colonized 
the minds of Indians2. If however, colonialism was not as totalizing as expected, then 
the effects would be limited. He argues that if the former were true i.e., successful 
colonization of the minds of Indians, then the anti-colonial struggle would not have taken 
the form it actually did as the colonial regime would have instilled complete obedience - 
both in thought and action. However, what was observed was both the ability of the 
colonized not to just imagine but also act in ways contrary to the expectations of the 
colonial regime thus showing the limited effects of colonialism, at least in the minds of 
the colonized. Chatterjee (1993) writes:  
“By my reading, anticolonial nationalism created its own domain of sovereignty within colonial 
society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the 
world of social institutions and practices into two domains - the material and the spiritual. The 
material is the domain of the “outside”, of the economy and of the statecraft, of science and 
technology, a domain where the West has proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In 
this domain, then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully 
studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an “inner” domain bearing the 
“essential” markers of cultural identity. The greater one’s success in imitating Western skills in the 
material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one’s spiritual 
culture. This formula is, I think, a fundamental feature of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and 
Africa” (Chatterjee 1993:6). 
 
This “spiritual” or “inner” domain that Chatterjee refers to is the preserve of the 
““essential” markers of cultural identity” such as religion, family, position of women and 
important for us, caste. It is a space where the state is not allowed to dictate the norms 
of behavior. The separation of experience into these two distinct domains - public and 
private - had a purpose. It was the creation of a space (private) where the past could be 
reinterpreted in a way to meet challenges in the present. For the anticolonial struggle, it 
was in this “spiritual” or private space that the meaning of being an Indian was 
                                               
2 My focus is India, however his argument can be applied to colonies both in Asia and Africa.  
 
This hypothesis of the colonization of mind may bear some semblance to the idea of “false consciousness” whereby 
the oppressed believe and thus are complicit in their own oppression. Their consciousness is not truly theirs, it 
belongs and has been instilled by the oppressor, hence the term “false consciousness”. But even this idea of 
hegemonic control has been challenged through evidence of resistance and rebellion by untouchables in India and 
slaves in the US (Scott 1990). 
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redeemed from imperialism’s epistemic violence. It was in the private sphere, that the 
leaders of the anticolonial struggle could challenge and invalidate claims about Indians 
being “superstitious”, “barbaric”, and “uncivilized”. It was in this space that they could 
imagine an Indian and thus a community called India which would transcend the 
contours of what the colonizers had propagated who an Indian was (e.g., “traditional”, 
“superstitious”, “uncivilized”) and what India was (land of darkness which needed the 
West to educate and civilize its inhabitants).  
 
It was in this private domain that India was imagined by one of the most popular and 
remembered leaders of the Independence movement, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 
(Gandhi from here on). Gandhi, writes in Hind Swaraj, which is his exposition of his own 
political philosophy: 
 
I believe that the civilization India has evolved is not to be beaten in the world. Nothing 
can equal the seeds sown by our ancestors. Rome went, Greece shared the same fate; 
the might of the Pharaohs was broken; Japan has become Westernized; of China nothing 
can be said; but India is still, somehow or other, sound at the foundation. The people of 
Europe learn their lessons from the writings of the men of Greece or Rome, which exist 
no longer in their former glory. In trying to learn from them, the Europeans imagine that 
they will avoid the mistakes of Greece and Rome. Such is their pitiable condition. In the 
midst of all this India remains immovable and that is her glory. It is a charge against India 
that her people are so uncivilized, ignorant and stolid, that it is not possible to induce 
them to adopt any changes. It is a charge really against our merit. What we have tested 
and found true on the anvil of experience, we dare not change. Many thrust their advice 
upon India, and she remains steady. This is her beauty: it is the sheet-anchor of our 
hope. 
 
Civilization is that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty. 
Performance of duty and observance of morality are convertible terms. To observe 
morality is to attain mastery over our mind and our passions. So doing, we know 
ourselves. ... 
 
If this definition be correct, then India, as so many writers have shown, has nothing to 
learn from anybody else, and this is as it should be. …  We have had no system of life-
corroding competition. Each followed his own occupation or trade and charged a 
regulation wage. It was not that we did not know how to invent machinery, but our 
forefathers knew that, if we set our hearts after such things, we would become slaves and 
lose our moral fibre. ... They further reasoned that large cities were a snare and a useless 
encumbrance and that people would not be happy in them, that there would be gangs of 
thieves and robbers, prostitution and vice flourishing in them and that poor men would be 
robbed by rich men. They were, therefore, satisfied with small villages. They saw that 
kings and their swords were inferior to the sword of ethics, and they, therefore, held the 
sovereigns of the earth to be inferior to the Rishis and the Fakirs. A nation with a 
constitution like this is fitter to teach others than to learn from others. … 
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And where this cursed modern civilization has not reached, India remains as it was 
before. ... 
 
Now you see what I consider to be real civilization. Those who want to change conditions 
such as I have described are enemies of the country and are sinners (emphasis mine). 
 
I have quoted Gandhi at length not because his words are the truth, but instead to show 
what his conception of India looked like. As the leader of the Congress party which also 
made him the leader of independence movement, he was to have a huge influence in 
the prioritization and sorting of issues into seemingly rigid dichotomies such as the 
public/state and private/non-state spaces. For Gandhi, the “true” India, untouched by 
modern/Western civilization was in the villages. In his interpretation, it was in the 
villages that there was peace and harmony. As people were organized by caste and 
knew their place in society, there was no competition. Without competition, the 
probability of conflict would be greatly reduced. It was this idea of India - that stressed 
on one’s moral duty (dharma) and the path of right action (karma), - which was to 
provide the basis for mobilizing a mass movement. However caste-based discrimination 
and conflict were inevitable as this idea of India was based on an illusory separation of 
the “material”/public/state and the “spiritual”/private/non-state.  
 
Caste is typically depicted as a religious hierarchical social order with Brahmins on the 
top and the untouchables at the bottom. In between are the Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and 
Shudras. Each of these five groups are divided into thousands of endogamous jatis and 
the social position of each within a local unit such as a village is subject to contestation 
(Srinivas 1980). The untouchables who are at the bottom, however, have historically 
had the least amount of resources and opportunities for negotiation and thus upward 
mobility. One of the defining features of this social order is the phenomena of 
untouchability. Untouchability are a prejudicial behaviors that are legitimized by ancient 
religious texts and whose goal is to maintain distance between higher and lower caste 
members (jatis classified as untouchables). One of the purported reasons being that 
their hereditary occupations are associated with the handling of objects considered to 
be both materially and spiritually polluting (Randeria 1992). These objects range from 
the removal of animal carcasses, skinning animal carcasses for leather, cleaning 
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cremation grounds, cleaning streets, cleaning toilets, and messengers of bad news 
such as death. In addition to their association with “dirty jobs”, they have also been 
considered impure because of their dietary habits that includes the consumption of 
meat. Because of their association with items considered to be both spiritually and 
materially degrading, there exist several practices which maintain a distance (e.g., no 
inter-caste marriage, residential segregation, prohibition of entry to homes and temples) 
and serve to remind them of their place in society (e.g., separate drinking cups in 
schools and restaurants, forced to sit on the ground during panchayat meetings, forced 
to wait by the village well till the arrival of an upper-caste person).  
 
This is not to say that there have been no challenges to both caste and untouchability. 
The challenges mostly stemmed from observation of the immense suffering, humiliation, 
and oppression that is an outcome of adherence to caste beliefs rules3. While delving 
into the history of resistance to caste is not the subject of the thesis, what is relevant is 
the indispensability of the state (both colonial and post-colonial) to bringing about a 
change in the status quo. A successful intervention by the state would be the banning of 
certain behaviors backed by a credible threat of punishment. For instance, Chatterjee 
writes, “the period of “social reform” was actually made up of two distinct phases. In the 
earlier phase, Indian reformers4 looked to the colonial authorities to bring about by state 
action the reform of traditional institutions and customs. In the latter phase, although the 
need for change was not disputed, there was strong resistance to allowing the colonial 
state to intervene in matters affecting “national culture”” (Chatterjee 1993: 6). Caste was 
one the traditional institutions that was being bought under the purview of the colonial 
state. There are a few documented examples of such intervention. Viswanath (2014) 
examines how lower castes with the help of missionaries used the legal apparatus of 
the colonial state to challenge upper caste dominance and improve their own 
                                               
3 Religions such as Sikhism and Buddhism were a reaction to the Brahmanical orthodoxy. Juergensmeyer (1982) 
traces the Adi-Dharm movement in Punjab. There were also the founding of sects to move away from a blind 
adherence to prescribed behaviors which were in most case steeped in prejudice. Some of the sects that are widely 
known are the Arya Samaj started by Dayanand Saraswati in 1875 and the Brahmo Samaj started by Raja 
Rammohan Roy in 1828 in West Bengal. And the Satyashodhak Samaj founded by Jyotiba Phule in 1873 in Pune, 
Maharashtra.  
 
4 The example of Raja Rammohan Roy is well known. He used the state apparatus to bring about a ban of sati in 
1829 which was a practice where widows were required to kill themselves by sitting on their husbands’ funeral pyre.   
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conditions. Rudolph (1965) describes the efforts of the Shanans to use the state to 
defend the right of their women to cover their upper bodies which until then had been a 
prerogative of only upper caste women.  
 
While the colonial state was used to transform caste behaviors, what is clear from the 
accounts is that for such to happen, upper-caste elite support was to a certain extent 
necessary and the issue had to be mobilized enough to pose a threat to the law and 
order of the colonial state. Once deemed a public issue, the state had the mandate to 
intervene. The literature on social movements have provided us with substantial 
evidence about the importance of framing issues and grievances in ways to get not just 
attention but also the implementation of solutions (Benford and Snow 2000; McVeigh et 
al. 2004).  
 
However, with the growing mobilization efforts of the Independence struggle, caste was 
being gradually displaced from the public sphere to the private sphere. What this meant 
was that the state could no longer intervene in caste related matters. Caste was 
increasingly being framed as a “spiritual” problem over which the colonial government 
had no authority. In 1936, this displacement of caste as a public (political) to a private 
(social) problem is observed and recorded by Ambedkar: 
 
The path of social reform, like the path to heaven (at any rate, in India), is strewn with 
many difficulties. Social reform in India has few friends and many critics. The critics fall 
into two distinct classes. One class consists of political reformers, and the other of the 
socialists.  
... 
It was at one time recognized that without social efficiency, no permanent progress in the 
other fields of activity was possible; that owing to mischief wrought by evil customs, 
Hindu society was not in a state of efficiency; and that ceaseless efforts must be made to 
eradicate these evils. It was due to the recognition of this fact that the birth of the National 
Congress was accompanied by the foundation of the Social Conference. While the 
Congress was concerned with defining the weak points in the political organization of the 
country, the Social Conference was engaged in removing the weak points in the social 
organization of Hindu society.  
… 
But soon the two wings developed into two parties, a ‘political reform party’ and a ‘social 
reform party’, between whom there raged a fierce controversy. The ‘political reform party’ 
supported the National Congress, and the ‘social reform party’ supported the Social 
Conference. The two bodies thus became two hostile camps. The point at issue was 
whether social reform should precede political reform. 
… 
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It was, however, evident that the fortunes of the Social Conference were ebbing fast. The 
gentlemen who presided over the sessions of the Social Conference lamented that the 
majority of Hindus were for political advancement and indifferent to social reform; 
(Ambedkar 1936: 210-11) 
 
Ultimately, for Ambedkar the solution was to “give up” Hinduism whose religious texts 
promote untouchability. This position was in contrast to Gandhi who responded to 
Ambedkar saying: 
 
In my opinion the profound mistake that Dr Ambedkar has made in his address is to pick 
out the texts of doubtful authenticity and value, and the state of degraded Hindus who are 
no fit specimens of the faith they so woefully misrepresent. (328) 
 
Instead, what Gandhi believed was that while untouchability was a serious defect in 
Hinduism, it could be treated through reflection of “true” religion is accompanied by 
introspection of individual Hindus on their own behavior. Regarding untouchability, he 
writes in Hindi Swaraj, 
 
At this time of the day it is unnecessary to dilate upon the necessity of the removal of this 
blot and curse upon Hinduism. Congressman have certainly done much in this matter. 
But I am sorry to have to say that many Congressmen have looked upon this item as a 
mere political necessity and not something indispensable, so far as Hindus are 
concerned, for the very existence of Hinduism. If Hindu Congressmen take up the cause 
for its own sake, they will influence the so-called sanatanis (traditionalists) far more 
extensively that they have hitherto done. They should approach them not in a militant 
spirit but, as befits their non-violence, in a spirit of friendliness. And so far as Harijans are 
concerned, every Hindu should make common cause with them and befriend them in 
their awful isolation - such isolation as perhaps the world has never seen in the 
monstrous immensity one witnesses in India. I know from experience how difficult the 
task is. But it is part of the task of building the edifice of swaraj. And the road to swaraj is 
steep and narrow. There are many slippery ascents and many deep chasms. They have 
all to be negotiated with unfaltering step before we can reach the summit and breathe the 
fresh air of freedom 
 
While the ideological debate on caste5 would continue, leaders who were in charge for 
the day to day mobilizing of people for the Independence movement had to confront the 
reality of caste. These leaders recognized that without the support of the village level 
caste leaders, which meant turning a blind eye to social evils like untouchability, it would 
be difficult to build a mass movement. The presence of local caste leaders would add 
                                               
5 Whether social change should precede political change (likes of Ambedkar) or political change should 
precede social change (likes of Patel and Tilak). The question about the sequence in which different 
rights (social or political) are achieved (Guttmann). 
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legitimacy to the movement seeing which their caste brethren would join. Anil Bhatt’s 
work on the Patidar Yuvak Mandal (Patidar Youth Organisation) in Gujarat is an 
instructive example of the indispensability of local caste leaders. Bhatt observes, 
 
In their task of organising public support for the national movement at the local level, the 
leaders confronted several problems. First of all they had to prepare the traditional 
leaders to relate their roles to the political movement, by supporting their caste reforms6 
while at the same driving home to them the utility of political means in achieving their 
goals. Secondly, they had to seek the approval of higher level leaders whose style and 
idiom were dominated by universalistic and secular symbols. They had also to gain 
recognition from the urbanised, high-caste sections of society. Since political activity in 
this period was confined to a small section of the English educated urban elite, the efforts 
of these rural leaders towards a mass movement were often looked down upon or even 
ridiculed, by the former. It was therefore important, in the beginning, to win their 
recognition, and by a slow process to incorporate some of them into the new leadership 
and to make them see the utility of traditional society and loyalties for a broad-based 
political movement (Bhatt 1970: 285). 
 
What the leaders of the Independence movement, both at the local and national level, 
realized (more so at the local than the national) is that building a nation, imaginary and 
real, like India could not happen without the cooperation of village-level caste elites. And 
thus an attack on the bases of their legitimacy,- religion, - and consequently its 
products, - untouchability, - could not be a part of the public nationalist agenda. Doing 
so would alienate their deeply religious and hence casteist supporters. The result was 
the confinement of problems of untouchability to the private sphere where individuals 
were responsible for their own conduct. 
  
                                               
6 Education within caste; widow re-marriage within caste. Extent of reform was limited to caste members. 
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2.3.0 Making Caste Legal and Untouchability Illegal in an Independent Nation (part 
2) 
In the previous Section, I showed that the struggle over classification of caste and 
consequently untouchability as a public/private issue was grounded in the particular 
interpretation of religious texts  brought about by the matter of political Independence 
taking precedence over social reforms. As certain religious principles were being 
appropriated by leaders of the freedom movement to construct a broad Indian identity 
which would transcend caste differences, caste and thus untouchability were relegated 
to the private domain where the colonial state was not allowed to intervene. Articulating 
Indianness and instilling a sense of pride was imperative for mobilizing people into the 
freedom movement. Framing what it meant to be a part of a larger Indian community as 
conditional on values of dharma (moral duty) and karma (right action), like Gandhi did, 
preserved caste and consequently (but unintentionally) untouchability. However 
imagining a nation where caste was a private affair, as argued by Ambedkar, threatened 
the very principles which were being used by leaders such as Gandhi to define what it 
meant to be Indian.  
 
While we know that Gandhi prevailed over Ambedkar, the latter, in his role as 
independent India’s first law minister, enshrined into the Constitution legal provisions for 
addressing caste discrimination. By doing this, he made caste a public problem where 
the state can intervene. However during the debates of the Constituent Assembly, 
making caste and consequently religion a matter of state intervention i.e., a public 
problem, was not easy. He is recorded as saying: 
 
The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life 
from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religious and if personal law is to be 
saved I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill …. There is 
nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of 
religion in such a manner that we shall not extend it beyond beliefs and such rituals as 
may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious. It is not necessary 
that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws relating to succession, 
should be governed by religion ...I personally do not understand why religion should be 
given this vast expansive jurisdiction so as to cover the whole of life and to prevent the 
legislature from encroaching upon that field (Ambedkar cited in Chatterjee 1995: 19) 
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Imposing a democratic political order which held sacred the principle of equality before 
law would drastically curtail the power of the village-level caste elites. The lawmakers 
led by Ambedkar came up with provisions to address the history of oppression of 
weaker communities such as lower castes, tribes, and women. They did this through 
quotas which reserves seats in colleges, universities, civil services, police, panchayat, 
municipalities, legislative assemblies and the parliament. They also passed laws which 
banned untouchability and which protected minorities in cases of coercion and violence. 
Article 17 of the constitution bans untouchability but it does not define untouchability. 
But from Article 15 which prohibits discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth, we know that the spaces that Article 17 applies to. These are: (a) access 
to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment or (b) the use of 
wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly 
out of state funds or dedicated to the use of general public.  
 
However at the same time the Constituent Assembly also gives the citizens of India the 
freedom to practice one’s own faith and religion. It is at this juncture that the Indian state 
becomes embroiled in an intractable controversy over the place of caste in society. One 
on hand untouchability, which is discrimination based on caste is banned but on the 
hand people have the freedom to practice their own religion and thus engage in caste 
practices. Simply put, caste is legal but certain caste based behaviors are not. The 
State cannot interfere in religious practice because it is the private domain. It exercises 
its power in the public realm which are the spaces listed in Article 15. So for example, 
the state cannot do anything about endogamy i.e., no inter-caste marriages, because it 
is a private affair. But the state can exert its influence when Dalits are denied 
employment or Dalits are beaten up or are denied seats on public transport.  
 
The fragmentation of life into the public and private, where in the former laws of the 
state apply but in the latter the very same laws are inapplicable, causes much ambiguity 
i.e., much space for interpretation and bargaining as to what counts as untouchability. It 
is this ambiguity, that I argue, lies at the core of the observed variation in untouchability. 
As I will argue, this ambiguity in the law: - caste legal (freedom of religion) but caste 
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based behaviors illegal (discrimination based on caste is banned),  leads to ambiguities  
in the definition of untouchability - which in some cases is exploited to preserve 
untouchability and but in others used to transform untouchability. The locus of change, - 
preserve or transform, - lies with the local village elite and how they interpret the law 
and bargain with the state. It is to them that I turn in the next section. 
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2.4.0 Independent India – Bargaining Between the State and Village-Level Upper-
Caste Elites (part 3) 
So far I have shown two things. The first part of my argument (Figure 2.2, part 1) shows 
how the struggle for Independence resulted in the separation of the “material” 
(public/state) and “spiritual” (private/non-state) (Chatterjee 1993, 1995). Caste and 
untouchability were assigned to the private domain thus restricting the right of the state 
to intervene. In the second part of my argument (Figure 2.2, part 2), I show how this 
fragmented worldview found its expression in the contradictory mandates of the 
Constitution regarding untouchability. The law on one hand makes caste legal as it 
protects the freedom of religion but on the other hand makes certain aspects of caste in 
certain spaces, namely, untouchability illegal. While this separation of untouchability of 
caste may work in theory, the next two sections will demonstrate the ambiguity of this 
separation. I will show that in some cases this ambiguity has been exploited to preserve 
untouchability and but in others, it has been used for transformation.  
 
In this Section I discuss the relationship of village-level caste elites with the state 
(Figure 2.2, part 3). So far, I have focused on the ambiguity around caste and 
untouchability at the level of the law. The law undermines certain aspects of caste, 
namely untouchability in public spaces but protects it in private domains. However 
assuming compliance in public spaces is a naive assumption. Additionally the data 
(Chapter 3 and 4) shows the variation in compliance in public spaces. The problem with 
a sole focus on the state assumes that the implementation of laws are a top-down 
process and as such is unable to account for variation in untouchability. This is because 
a state-centric explanation has a more fundamental problem. This view denies agency 
to the people for whom the laws are intended. It assumes blind compliance and 
obedience to laws of the government by the people.  
 
There is disaggregated research from the state-building literature which warns us from 
adopting such a top-down perspective. Jim’s Scott’s research (1990, 1998, 2009) bears 
testimony that those in positions of power and authority often do not have hegemonic 
control over the lives of their subjects. What may look like compliance may not indeed 
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be so and this is demonstrated through the scripts (public and hidden) adopted by the 
oppressed such as slaves in the United States and untouchables in India (Scott 2009) 
and strategies of continually moving to evade state control (Scott 2009). More recently 
disaggregated research on state-building have shown a variation in the forms of rule 
which is the result of how local leaders negotiate with the state.  
 
Drawing on her deep ethnographic work in post-conflict Afghanistan, where President 
Hamid Karzai was given mandate of rebuilding the country, Mukhopadhyay finds that 
even though observers in the United States and Western Europe may frown upon the 
reliance on local leaders for state-building, these apparently “undemocratic” leaders are 
indispensable. She demonstrates variation in the relationship between the center and 
periphery - i.e., while some leaders are “strongman governors” who promote the 
mandate of the central government, others retain the role of “warlords” and cannot be 
ruled (Mukhopadhyay 2014). Returning to Asia, scholars have documented evidence of 
varying relationships between the state and local elites (Naseemullah and Staniland 
2016). Cases have been documented where the state shares authority with the local 
elite or as Naseemullah refers to it as “hybrid regimes” (Naseemullah 2014) or where 
the state is complicit in the durability of the conflict (Baruah 2005), or the state 
outsources law and order to militias (Staniland 2012), or as the state simply does not 
care (Slater and Kim 2015). 
 
The continued authority of the local leaders or “traditional chiefs” has also been argued 
to actually increase responsiveness of the government (Baldwin 2016). In her work in 
Zambia, Baldwin argues and finds evidence that citizens tend to trust their traditional 
unelected chiefs more than the elected politicians. This is because of the incentives 
each faces. A traditional leader has a longer time horizon as compared to the politician 
whose time horizon is as long as an election cycle. This variation causes citizens to 
trust traditional leaders more for mobilizing the state for development projects. Thus the 
traditional leaders are seen as a bridge between the people and the democratic 
electoral system (Baldwin 2016). 
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Evidence of the link between mobilization and government services has also been 
documented by scholars of social movements and public goods provision. Andrews 
(2001) finds that US counties which had strong movement infrastructures were more 
likely to receive funding as compared to those who did not. Weitz-Shapiro (2006) finds 
that protest has a positive effect on redistribution in Argentina although the effect 
changes with time. 
 
The common denominator in the studies mentioned above is the varying mobilization 
capacity of the local elites to bargain with the state for resources and/or sharing power. 
In the case of some African states, it has been found that higher level of mobilization 
pre-independence resulted in higher levels of government services post-independence. 
Bates (2008: 37) refers to this as the “fruits of independence”. These are the rewards 
that local elites and their supporters expected for their participation in the independence 
movement. And these rewards came in the form of “jobs, loans or cash” (Bates 2008: 
38).  
 
Returning to the case of our village-level caste elites, I expect patterns of public goods 
provision to be reflective of the bargaining and mobilization efforts that occurs between 
the state and village-level caste elites.  If the group is deemed to be a credible threat to 
the political order by the state, then there is a high chance of accommodation and 
political inclusion. If this is not done, then there is a high chance of civil conflict 
(Wucherpfennig et al. 2016).  
 
Village level elites who are successfully included by the political system find it “easier” to 
reconcile with laws which undermine their authority in public spaces. This is because 
they have become part of a political system which gives them the opportunity to extend 
their influence beyond the village. Thus, they become transformative agents for both 
caste and untouchability. On the other hand, village level caste elites who find 
themselves excluded by the political system, hold on to their power and do not comply 
with the laws of the state. In this process both caste and untouchability are preserved in 
the public domains.  
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2.5.0 Independent India – Reinterpretation of Caste Rules at the Village-Level (part 
4) 
In the previous section I discussed the relationship between the state and village-level 
caste elites. I argued that the law is perceived to threaten the power of the caste elites 
by making particular caste behaviors (untouchability) illegal. In order to counter this 
threat, caste elites need to mobilize to retain or enhance their positions. I argued that 
one way of doing this was through incorporation into the democratic political system. 
Several scholars have documented participation in the democratic political system as a 
way of political inclusion (Rudolph 1965; Kothari and Maru 1965; Jaffrelot 2003; Witsoe 
2013; Baldwin 2016). Now given that the law seeks to undermine upper-caste authority, 
and that the elites mobilize to become a part of the political, there is one more crucial 
actor whose behaviors determines the treatment of lower-castes. These are the 
constituents or supporters of the upper-caste elites whose loyalty is required for 
successful political inclusion (Lipsky 1968). It is to them that I now turn. In this section, I 
discuss the relationship of village-level caste elites with their caste members within the 
village (Figure 2.2, part 4).  
 
While on one hand local elites mobilize and bargain with the state for the distribution of 
resources, they also simultaneously need to be in touch with their own supporters. We 
know that meeting goals is contingent not just on receiving attention (and benefits) from 
the target (in this case the state) but also ensuring that the leadership remains loyal the 
demands of the supporters (Lipsky 1968). How do the upper-caste elites interpret the 
law such that they retain the support of their own constituents? Given the ambiguity in 
the law - untouchability is not defined but is made salient contingent on the space i.e., 
public or private - it is precisely at this point that there arises the opportunity for a 
reinterpretation of caste rules and thus a change of what constitutes the private/spiritual 
domain such that it aligns with the public/ “material reality”. And more importantly, it is 
this reinterpretation that provides for the transformation of untouchability.  
 
I will use an example to demonstrate what I mean by reinterpretation of caste rules. 
Mario Rutten (2002) studies the attitudes of the Patidar community in Gujarat. Prior to 
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Independence, there is no mention of the Patidar caste in the caste census of 1911 and 
1921. They were formally identified as a group in 1931. Before that they were classified 
as “Kunbis”, an agriculturalist group. Today the Patidars are a politically and socially 
dominant group in Gujarat. What Rutten shows is a change in their attitudes towards the 
poor (mainly lower castes) over time. While they used to be associated with agriculture 
and land-based work, they no longer wish to be associated with manual work. They 
regard manual work as “dirty” and something to be done by lower-castes. Earlier, 
manual work was acceptable and even encouraged. But given the increasing prosperity 
of the group which was a direct result of their mobilization efforts7, attitudes towards 
manual work have changed. Accompanying changes in perception of manual work are 
also changes in obligations towards the poor mainly lower castes in their village. While 
earlier there was an expectation of donating food and clothes, these are now seen as a 
burden (Rutten 2002).     
 
Similar behavioral changes have also been documented by Scott (1976). He documents 
that state-sponsored industrialization often led to traditional obligations between the rich 
and poor being perceived as burdensome. As this perception grew, age-old norms of 
hosting feasts and distributing food during festivals withered away. The terms of 
reciprocity which ensured that the poor, mostly peasants, could subsist in a precarious 
agrarian economy, gradually eroded. While Scott ties this rebellion by the peasants, my 
point is to use this example to document changing attitudes and behaviors of the upper-
castes and/or rich in Indian villages as a function of their upward mobility which is made 
possible by the state.  
 
Both Scott (1976) and Rutten (2002) attribute these changes to state-led 
industrialization efforts. While that is a part of my argument (elite mobilization for state 
resources - Figure 2.2, part 3), we need to probe how these changes are actualized 
within the village. I argue that the adoption of new ways of acting are accompanied with 
new ways of thinking which simultaneously delegitimize the old. Karl Deutsch (1961) 
writes: “As Edward Shils has rightly pointed out, the original images of “mobilization” 
                                               
7 While there is no systematic study of the rise of the Patidar group, the story of their upward mobility is not new.   
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and of Mannheim’s “fundamental democratization” imply two distinct stages of the 
process: (1) the stage of uprooting or breaking away from old settings, habits and 
commitments; and (2) the induction of the mobilized persons into some relatively stable 
new patterns of group membership, organization and commitment” (Deutsch 1961: 
494). This idea of mobilization – where people are uprooted from an old order and 
absorbed into a new order – is central to understanding variation in untouchability.  
 
To illustrate this process, I will use a particular caste rule which was the topic of intense 
negotiation and bargaining in 19th and early 20th century India as evident in the media 
reports of caste conferences being organized to discuss this topic. This was the ban on 
travel by sea. This ban also applied mainly to the trading/business community as it was 
them who needed to travel. If a member traveled, a meeting of the caste was called 
where the punishment for violation would be decided. More often than not, the violator 
was excommunicated. Over time however, this ban was lifted as the benefits of 
traveling were being realized. While it carried some risk, but if successful, it would bring 
prosperity for several generations. Caste rules were reinterpreted such that this ban 
was lifted and travel by sea became the norm instead of exception.  
 
Of reinterpreting the past to justify actions in the present, Weiner (1984) writes:  
There is also the well-known phenomenon of reinterpreting the past to bring it more in conformity 
with contemporary beliefs and practices. Although all societies do this to some extent, Indians are 
particularly skilled in the art. They reinterpret the past without deceit, considering it to be no more 
dishonest than the practice of Japanese or Chinese artists who painted in the style of the 
predecessors and then forged their signatures, in order to demonstrate their skill in emulating the 
great masters (Weiner 1984: 112) 
 
Practically the reinterpretation or giving new meaning to actions has to accompanied by 
mobilization. The people need to be mobilized into doing actual physical work to 
convince themselves that reinterpretation is in their own interest. Overy (1982) shows 
this by studying the “constructive” work done by Gandhi. For instance, while Gandhi 
preached that untouchability was wrong, he also practiced it and made people around 
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him act as if they believed it. While this aspect of Gandhi is highly under researched8, it 
formed an integral part of all his anti-colonial efforts (Hardiman 2014).  
 
Writing about Kamaraj Nadar, a former chief minister of Tamil Nadu and a leader in the 
Congress Party, who came from a caste that were historically toddy tappers and thus 
considered a low (polluting) caste, Rudolph (1965) writes: 
 
The story of the Shanans illustrates in some measure the general processes of social 
change and political modernization which have affected traditional Indian society. Castes, 
“the stereotype and disconnected units” which Marx, over a century ago, described as 
having survived the break-up of the village economy and government, but which were to 
be dissolved by the effects of industrialization, have not yet been so. Instead, they seem, 
in good Hindu fashion, to have reincarnated in a modern form as the caste association” 
This has become a vehicle for internal cultural reform and external social change 
(Rudolph 1965: 981). 
 
How did this “reincarnation” happen? Rudolph lists few actions taken by the Shanan 
community such as claiming the right to clothe their upper bodies, which was the 
exclusive domain of higher caste women, and that eventually resulted in the Travancore 
Riot of 1858. The British Governor intervened and found no objection to Shanan women 
covering their upper bodies. Claiming the right and simultaneously getting the society 
writ large to accept the claim was one measure. The Shanans also started to claim that 
they were descendants of high caste Kshatriyas. Schools were opened for the 
education of the Shanan boys. They changed their marriage rituals such that they 
resembled that of the high castes. And one of the actions that formalized the 
transformation of the Shanan to the Nadar was the Census of 1921 according to which 
the term “Shanan” was no longer to be used for official purposes.  
 
Returning to the case of our village-level caste elites and their relationship with their 
communities, I expect greater levels of reinterpretation to be associated with lower 
                                               
8 Most researchers tend to focus on his interaction with the British authorities, However the outcome of his interaction 
with British authorities depended on his interactions with the local people and local authorities. That is was he able to 
convince them of his methods and then were they able to endure the consequences of his methods. If not, we know 
that Gandhi called off action such as when he called off the Non-cooperation movement in 1922 when the 
demonstrators burnt a police station killing all people inside. This was known as the Chauri Chaura incident and was 
provoked when the police opened fire on the peaceful demonstrators. 
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levels of untouchability. The push for reinterpretation however comes from greater 
levels of inclusion in the political system.  
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2.6.0 The Joint Production of Untouchability (part 5) 
In the last part of this Chapter, I list the implications of each part of my argument as as 
testable hypotheses.  
 
From part 1, where I argued that caste and thus untouchability were privatized by 
leaders of the Indian freedom struggle, I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Prior Indian Independence, untouchability would be depicted as a 
“social” issue. 
 
From part 2, where I showed that the struggle over the role of caste and the state in 
addressing untouchability made it into the Indian Constitution. What the law does is 
protect religion and thus caste but make untouchability illegal. There is however one 
ambiguity and one limitation. The ambiguity comes from the fact that untouchability is 
not defined. And the limitation comes from the state being able punish violators only in 
certain public spaces. Thus I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Post Indian Independence, untouchability would be depicted as a 
“political” issue. 
 
Part 3 and part 4 of my arguments have an interactive relationship. I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A higher (lower) level of state-caste bargaining decreases 
(increases) the probability of untouchability. This probability however depends 
on the degree of within-caste bargaining. Greater (Lesser) levels of within-caste 
bargaining decrease (increase) the probability of untouchability. 
 
 
The outcomes from Hypothesis 3 are displayed in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: Implications for untouchability 
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2.7.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter I presented a framework for understanding variation in untouchability. 
Figure 2.4 shows the different parts of the argument along with the implications of each 
part for caste discrimination. I started the argument with locating the problem of caste 
and untouchability in the history of the struggle for Independence. I used postcolonial 
scholarship (Chatterjee 1993, 1995) to show that making caste and consequently a 
private issue was important for building the idea of nation. Privatizing caste severely 
restricted the ability of the state to intervene in the issue of untouchability. This however 
was to change with Independence when lawmakers gave the state teeth to address 
untouchability as its presence was antithetical to the idea of a nation where everyone, at 
least, in the eyes of the law, would be considered a citizen with equal rights.  
 
However, the manner in which this was done was ambiguous and thus leaving room for 
much interpretation. The most glaring ambiguity is that the lawmakers did not define 
untouchability. Instead they mentioned certain public spaces where behaviors can be 
argued to be discriminatory and thus punishable under the law. Both the efforts to 
private caste in colonial India and make certain parts of caste - untouchability in public 
spaces - come under the jurisdiction of the state in independent India were formalized in 
two hypotheses which will be tested in Chapter 3. 
 
What this ambiguity has done is given space for reinterpretation i.e., what constitutes 
caste and what is untouchability. I made an argument that as the state did in some way 
undermine the power of village level elites, they had to do something. They could either 
engage in transformation or preservation. Using insights from the literatures on state-
building, distribution of public goods and social movements, I presented hypotheses 
where high levels of bargaining with state and high levels of bargaining within castes, 
would be associated with lower levels of untouchability. Lower levels of both would be 
associated with higher levels of untouchability. I present a way to measure 
untouchability in Chapter 4 followed by a statistical analyses in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 2.4: Argument revisited with testable propositions  
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Chapter 3 
An Exploratory Investigation Into How Caste Discrimination is Framed in The 
Times of India  
3.1.0 Introduction 
During the course of my research on caste discrimination in Gujarat, people often asked 
me “So, do you find discrimination in Gujarat?”. My response was a long awkward pause 
followed by a slowly drawn out yes. I found it very difficult to understand where this 
question comes from. I have not been able to understand why would one not find caste 
discrimination given that our social fabric is dyed in caste. Caste is everywhere. But then 
if it is so obvious to me, why is it not for those asking me this question. While the main 
purpose of this Chapter is to test two claims laid out in Chapter 3, I also come to a tentative 
answer to my question. In brief, media coverage of caste discrimination in Gujarat is rare, 
very rare. If we are to assume that people learn about what is happening in other states 
(and the world) via newspapers, then it makes perfect sense for them to ask, “So, do you 
find discrimination in Gujarat?”. Because if reports on caste discrimination are rare, then 
discrimination must not exist, right? In this Chapter, I show that while reports on 
discrimination are rare, in reality, discrimination varies from some villages where lower 
castes report experiencing less discrimination to villages where their experience is much 
worse1.  
 
                                               
1 Focus of Chapter 5. 
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The primary empirical contribution of this Chapter is creating a dataset2 to test claims 
about of how a media outlet - The Times of India - reports about caste-based 
discrimination. To create this dataset, I used a combination of automated and manual 
coding. I use this dataset to test the following two claims:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Prior to Indian Independence, untouchability would be depicted as 
a private issue. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Post Indian Independence, untouchability would be depicted as a 
public issue. 
 
Figure 3.1 is a visual representation of hypotheses 1 and 2.  
 
The Chapter is organized as follows. I start by laying down the research design. In this 
section, I describe the data and then the methods used to create the dataset. This is 
following by exploratory analyses of the dataset. I explore different aspects of the data 
ranging from the variation in names associated with the “untouchables” across different 
political contexts, to exploring how the issue of “untouchability” is covered.  
 
In brief, I find that  coverage by the Times of India (TOI) as observed in the frequency of 
articles on caste and the salience of caste discrimination as observed in the frequency 
with which the terms associated with caste discrimination appear in the headlines of 
articles, is relatively rare. Regarding hypothesis 1, I find that prior Independence, the 
narrative around caste discrimination is focused more about the “reform”, “welfare” and 
“upliftment” of “Depressed Classes” or “Harijans” through education where the state plays 
a paternal role. And lastly I find little support for hypothesis 2. What is seen across the 
texts post-Independence, is that the “Dalits” are portrayed as “assertive” and are 
associated with “conflict” and “rights”.   
                                               
2 In my review of existing literature this is the first dataset of its kind. Christian Davenport helped me find one exception. 
Shah (1994) studies the coverage of the 1990 anti-reservation protests across the country by the TOI. Verghese (2016) 
in his work used the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) to study caste conflict. However, the data he uses 
is limited to the Naxalite movement. This is problematic for two reasons. The first is that armed conflict against the state 
is not the same as discrimination. And secondly, caste affects every person living in the country and not just those who 
are a part of the Naxal movement. The TOI have been used to code religious conflict such as the dataset on post-
independence Hindu-Muslims riots by Wilkinson and Varshney (2006).  
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Figure 3.1: Visual representation of hypotheses 1 and 2 
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3.2.0 Research Design: Data, Methods and Results 
I relied on the coverage by the Times of India (TOI from here on) which started in 1838 in 
Bombay3. TOI is a national English daily with some states having their own regional 
offices4. I was able to gain access to the entire TOI database consisting of everything 
ever published5 beginning 1838 and ending in 2005 via the University of Michigan’s 
Hatcher Graduate Library6.  
 
I used the TOI to test my claims for two reasons. Theoretically, I needed a source which 
covered India (more specifically the Gujarat area) both before and after independence in 
1947. The TOI provides coverage well before India became a part of the British Empire 
(1838-1857), then as a British colony (1858-1947), and finally an independent nation 
(1947-now). According to my claims, I expect the changing political contexts to capture 
the changing narratives on caste discrimination. The changing narratives  reflect 
particular understandings of the untouchability i.e., what is the problem (diagnosis) and 
what is to be done (prognosis). There is research that what newspapers publish and also 
the narrative is influenced by the political context. For instance, in their work Baum and 
Zhukov (2015) argue that under democratic conditions the press is more likely to publish 
articles that may be critical of the status quo. They are more likely to publish events that 
are large-scale, dramatic (some violence) and urban based. They do find support for this 
using media coverage of the Arab Spring across 113 countries. Their finding has received 
support from research done earlier by Davenport and Ball (2002). In the case of 
Guatemala, the authors find that a few correlated factors such as democracy and the 
number of human rights organizations increase the probability of human rights violations 
                                               
3 Current day Mumbai.  
 
4 Given that TOI is an English newspaper, its readership mostly consists of urban English speaking people. Now how 
closely does this section’s perception of caste reflect the dominant narrative of caste is an empirical question which is 
out of scope for this thesis.  
 
5 Everything that gets filed does not necessarily get printed. I only have access to what appears in print. 
(http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/caste-matters-in-the-indian-media/article3114199.ece)  
 
6 I thank Catherine Morse, Scott Dennis and Shevon Desai at the UM Hatcher Graduate Library for working with Times 
of India to help me acquire the entire database. This work would have taken years had not it been for their help and 
negotiation with the TOI. 
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by the state being covered (Davenport and Ball 2002). On the other hand, under non-
democratic (in my case colonial conditions), however, the probability that a media outlet 
will publish something that goes against the state is very low.  
 
While so far the research has looked at how political contexts (democratic or non-
democratic) influence the coverage of atrocities (protests and political violence in the case 
of Baum and Zhukov (2015) and human rights violations by the state in the case of 
Davenport and Ball (2002)), what I am trying to learn from the data is slightly different. In 
addition accounting for political constraints, I am investigating how it is covered i.e., the 
narrative. The language used to write about discrimination is, in my case, central to 
understanding the perception of consumers of news on caste. The narrative, as 
mentioned earlier, reflects current understandings of the issue. Thus the long time period 
of the TOI corpus make it well suited to test my claims about caste being a private issue 
(state is distant, responsibility for change lies with the society) or a public issue (state is 
closer and responsible for combating discrimination).  
 
And the second reason for choosing the TOI is practical. TOI agreed to share their entire 
news corpus with the University of Michigan in a text format. This eliminated the need for 
Optical Character Recognition (OCR)7. The availability of the data in a text format saved 
a lot of time and allowed me to focus on exploring the data.  
3.2.1 Data 
The TOI archive8 contains everything ever published by the paper when it started in 1838 
up until 2005. In total this archive is 24GB and contains 6,828,509 documents which is a 
mixture of articles, opinions, letters to the editor, advertisements, matrimonial 
                                               
7 Converting images and PDFs to text relies on OCR. Different OCR softwares have varying levels of accuracy in 
extracting text. This process in itself is time consuming and labor intensive. 
 
8 The zipped/compressed TOI file is about 8.5GB. 
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advertisements, weather reports, stock quotes, etc. The focus of this analysis will be only 
on articles9. 
3.2.2 Methods 
I relied on both automated and manual coding of articles published in the TOI. Automated 
coding is used for three purposes. First, I used Python to automate extraction of 
information that has a structure. For instance, I wrote a script which relies heavily on 
BeautifulSoup10 (Python package to parse HTML) to extract the header details of all 
articles (i.e., metadata). These details include, if found, the date, headline, sub-headline, 
type of report (article or op-ed), dateline (date and place of publication) and the 
contributor. As all the documents have the same header structure, this information is 
relatively easy to extract with a high level of accuracy.  
 
Second, I relied on automated coding to give me the subset of documents that were used 
to test the claims. I used regular expressions in a Python script to search through all the 
6.8 million documents to see if there was any mention of “Gujarat”. If there was a non-
zero count of “Gujarat”, that particular document was copied to a separate folder. There 
were a total of 111,773 documents which had a non-zero count of “Gujarat” out of the 6.8 
million documents. Out of these 111,773 documents, 51,669 (46.23%) were articles11. 
 
And lastly, I use Python to search for terms associated with caste-based discrimination 
which were later classified into private/public. I then use R to quantify the association 
between these terms and caste-based discrimination. In R, I primarily relied on the text 
mining package, tm12. 
                                               
9 While I cannot make the raw data public, I will make all my Python scripts which were used to extract information 
available on GitHub. So if a user has an article in the text format then they can reproduce my results using the available 
scripts. 
 
10 https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/bs4/doc/  
 
11 Classified ads (mainly matrimonial) consisted of the next highest type of reports - 35.56%, followed by display ads 
(4.9%), stock quotes (3.4%), front page (3.17%), and weather (2.74%) editorial article (1.09%), letter to the editor 
(1.01%). The other article types comprised less than 1% each. 
 
12 https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/tm.pdf  
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While automated coding is suitable for relatively straightforward tasks such as extracting 
header details and finding key terms, the more difficult portion, however, was extracting 
the context around the “relevant” information from the text (Franzosi et al. 2012). In my 
case, this was to figure out a way of classifying text as either private or public. The 
classification was done manually using the rules listed in Figure 3.7.   
3.2.3 Results  
3.2.3.1 What’s in a Name? 
The following poem13 by Neerav Patel, a pioneer of Dalit literature in Gujarat, shows the 
emotions associated with different labels: 
 
When you call me ‘dher’ 
I am hurt 
And wish to kick you in the belly 
When you call me untouchable 
I am offended 
And wish to slap you on the face 
When you call me Harijan 
I am humiliated 
And wish to spit on your back 
When you call me a member of the Scheduled Caste 
I am insulted 
And wish to money at your ... 
When you call me Neerav Patel 
I suspect you call me convert 
(a crow that dyed his feathers white to be called a swan) 
and wish to turn away my face 
when you don’t call me anything 
I am annoyed that you neglected me altogether 
And wish to call you back to call me ... 
Yes, it’s all a mess since the beginning 
    like the tale of a seven-tailed mouse. 
 
What this poem shows is that while we talk of untouchability and the untouchables, their 
experience of the phenomena is reflected in the names used to address them. For 
instance, in the poem, calling a low caste member an “untouchable” is perceived to be 
offensive. So the first step to building the dataset was listing all the possible words and 
                                               
13 I thank Achyut Yagnik for showing me this. 
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phrases most commonly associated with “untouchables” as there have been several. The 
search is restricted to documents containing a non-zero mention of “Gujarat”14. Table 3.1 
lists the terms commonly associated with “untouchables”. 
 
Table 3.1: Popular variants of “untouchables” used across time 
 
Term Brief description 
Untouchables The lowest ranked caste in the 5 caste varna system. 
Depressed Classes This was the phrase used by the British to classify the “untouchables” 
starting in the 30s. 
Scheduled Castes Term introduced by the British to refer to the Depressed Classes in 1935 
and formally adopted by the Indian Constitution in 1950. 
 Harijans This term literally means “children of God” and was popularized by Gandhi 
starting in 1932 when he started his Harijan publications. 
Dalits This term had been around prior to Independence but became 
increasingly popular with Ambedkar and then the emergence of the Dalit 
Panthers15 in the 70s in Maharashtra. Allegedly, this is the most preferred 
term. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the variation in the usage of the terms listed in Table 3.1 by time. I have 
also marked significant events as references to provide some historical context. The 
numbers being plotted are the natural logs of the total number of articles that mention 
each of the terms listed in Table 3.1. A lowess plot is generated for a smoothing effect 
which is helpful in observing general trends in the data. The Figure contains five 
interesting observations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14 Now Gujarat as an independent state came into existence in 1960. Prior to that it was a part of Bombay 
Presidency. However, there is no change in the name of the area currently known as Gujarat.  
 
15 A radical Dalit group whose name was inspired by the Black Panther Party in the US.  
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Figure 3.2: Variations in terms used across time along with significant events in the history 
of India 
 
 
 
First, the lowess curve for “caste” dominates all other curves. This is not surprising. The 
coverage of “caste” in itself does not tell us much about “caste discrimination” and that is 
why it is necessary to disaggregate “caste” by the actors involved who are - 
“Untouchables”, “Depressed Classes”, “Scheduled Castes”, “Harijans”, or “Dalits”. What 
is interesting is the plateauing trend between 1910 and 1950. This was the period of the 
independence struggle. And perhaps the focus was more on “nation”, rather than “caste” 
(Chatterjee 1993).  
 
Second, we observe that the term “Harijans” and “Scheduled Castes” begin to appear in 
the paper beginning 1932 and 1935 respectively. This is because in 1932, Gandhi started 
his Harijan journals where untouchability was a core issue he discussed with his readers. 
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And in 1935, the British government started reserving seats for the hitherto group known 
as “Depressed Classes” and began to use the term “Scheduled Castes”. The Indian 
Constitution adopted this term post-independence, and thus the legal term used for the 
untouchables is “Scheduled Castes”. 
 
Third, related to the second observation is the inverse relationship between “Depressed 
Classes” and “Scheduled Castes”. It is to be expected that as the use of the former term 
decreases, the use of the latter will increase. 
 
Fourth, is the dramatic divergence in the use of “Dalits”, “Harijans” and “Scheduled 
Castes” after the 1985 anti-reservation riots in Gujarat. While the use of the term “Dalits” 
increases, the latter two see a sharp fall. The term “Dalits” is often viewed as more 
assertive as compared to the other two which are viewed as patronizing and 
condescending.  
 
And lastly, a few minor observations. In 1885, the Indian National Congress (INC), a 
nationalist party, was formed in Bombay. Soon after this, the print media starts to mention 
“Depressed Classes”. Perhaps this signifies that the INC started to mobilize this section 
of the population which was being picked up by the TOI. In 1905, Bengal was partitioned 
between a Muslim dominant area (current day Bangladesh) and a Hindu majority area 
(current day West Bengal). Perhaps the coverage of the partition took priority and 
coverage on caste and “Depressed Classes” decreased as seen in the plateauing of the 
“caste” curve and sharp drop in “Depressed Classes”. And finally, the observation that 
the use of the word “untouchables” is the most infrequent16.  
 
Based on observations from Figure 3.2, it is clear that in order to analyze the discourse 
around caste discrimination, we need to be pay careful attention to the terms being used. 
Different terms were used by different actors at different periods of time. The British 
introduced “Depressed Classes” and “Scheduled Castes”. Gandhi started the use of 
                                               
16 These are mostly speculations in my last point however given the lack of event data based on newspapers for India 
and empirical testing of such data, I think these speculations can be developed into hypotheses subject to more rigorous 
testing.  
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“Harijans”. And lastly, the untouchables themselves introduced “Dalits” to the vocabulary. 
The term used, as I have tried to make a case, reflect the particular understandings of 
both caste and caste discrimination. 
3.2.3.2 Changing Names, Changing Narratives 
I used regular expressions in a Python script to search through all the 6.8 million reports 
for each of the terms listed in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 shows the percentage of all articles 
beginning 1838 and ending in 2005 that mention “Gujarat” which also mention each of 
the 5 terms from Table 3.1. Caste is found to be mentioned in the text of about 3.58% of 
the articles. The other terms are found in less than 1% of the articles. The term 
“untouchables” is the least common (0.18%) and “Dalits” is the most common (0.91%).  
 
Assuming that the headline conveys the primary issue being covered in an article, I 
calculated the proportion of articles whose headlines contained the terms in Table 3.1. I 
find that “Depressed Classes” is mentioned in the headline in 17.69% of all articles and 
“Dalits” is mentioned in the headline in 4.8% of all articles. This is interesting if we are to 
think about the consumers of the news when the term “Depressed Classes” was prevalent 
vs. when “Dalits” became more prevalent. In the former, it was mainly the British people 
and urban, upper class, English educated Indian elite and in the latter case it is urban, 
English speaking people. So what were the British and elite Indians learning about the 
“Depressed Classes”? An article dated August 26, 1910 reports the following: 
 
“The so-called depressed classes the Deputation pointed out who form the outcast 
population of India have lived and are living in condition of ignorance and depression which 
would hardly be believed by anyone who had not intimately studied their conditions. Until 
quite recently the deputation said the feeling of religious impurity which divided them from 
the main mass of the Hindu population was so intense that it was almost impossible to 
arouse any interest in their condition or to give them an opportunity to utilize the powers 
intellectual which they possess. Not only have they been Helot class but Helot class 
religiously impure cut off from the contact and interest of the remainder of the people and 
they are not a small body of people though they exist in larger numbers in Bombay and 
Madras than in other parts of India. The magnitude of any question regarding them may be 
seen from the following numbers Total population of India 294,361,053; depressed classes 
53,206,632; percentage 18. Total population of Bombay Presidency 25,468,209; 
depressed classes 3,479,084; percentage 12. Up till the present the only opportunity of 
rising out of this Helot condition has been furnished by three agencies. In the first place 
Christian Missions have taken noble part in refusing to acknowledge any distinctions of 
caste or anything in the nature of pariah class and have done much to educate such of 
them as have come under their influence. In the second Mahomedanism has also received 
67 
and welcomed into full membership any member of any class without distinction of caste 
and thirdly the British Government has established the principles of equal treatment of all 
without distinction which has given an opportunity under which small but constantly 
increasing number of the depressed classes have attained to positions of credit and even 
of distinction.” 
 
What the readers were learning were that the condition of the “Depressed Classes” was 
poor and the only ways out of their misery was either through the Missionaries, or 
conversion to Islam or through opportunities given by the British Government. These 
forces were all outside of the fold of Hinduism. Only external forces could save or uplift 
them out of their “Helot condition”. Perhaps this image of the Missionaries and the 
Government was required for continued support of colonizing India.  
 
While such discourse was common around the term “Depressed Classes”, this narrative 
changes when it comes to “Dalits”. The following is an excerpt from an article about the 
Dalit Panthers published on August 8, 1980: 
 
“The Dalit Panthers who had taken out morcha17 yesterday to the Council Hall to demand 
the renaming of Marathwada University after Dr. Ambedkar turned violent according to the 
police today. The police said they threw stones at passing motorists on the road and 
damaged the glass showroom of Sadguru Photo Framers. When sub-inspector Amolik who 
was escorting them tried to prevent them from throwing stones he was assaulted by the 
mob. Another sub-inspector Jivan Johari who came to his rescue was also assaulted. The 
injured sub-inspectors were later treated at St Georges Hospital for minor injuries.” 
 
 
There are some striking differences between the two articles. While both are about the 
same group - the “untouchables” - they do so very differently. In the former (before 
Independence), the “untouchables” who are referred to as “Depressed Classes” are 
portrayed to be in need of help from the outside world. While in the latter (post-
Independence), the “Dalits” have their own voice and their own demands. They do not 
need saving and are shown as having the both the capacity and will-power to mobilize 
and demand what they perceive to be their rights. This transformation from “subjects” to 
“citizens” has been documented through in-depth studies (Rao 2009; Viswanath 2014). 
 
                                               
17 A march. 
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I also find that 24% (82/339) articles with “Harijans” in it, 8.6% (41/474) articles with 
“Dalits” and 6.9% (9/130) articles with “Depressed Classes” are reported from within 
Gujarat i.e., dateline contains a place in Gujarat. Others are filed outside Gujarat. 
 
Overall, I find that coverage by the TOI, as observed in the frequency of articles on caste 
and the salience of caste discrimination as observed in the frequency with which the terms 
associated with caste discrimination appear in the headlines of articles, is rare. I also find 
that within Gujarat, which is our focus area, articles refer to “untouchables” more as 
“Harijans” than as “Dalits”. This could be due to the fact that the term “Harijan” originated 
in Gujarat with Gandhi. It should also be remembered that “Harijan” is associated with an 
image of acceptance of the Hindu social order while “Dalit” is associated with an image 
of assertion and challenge to the caste order.  
 
Table 3.2: Proportion of articles with each of the terms associated with “untouchables” 
  
Term # of articles 
(n) 
% of articles 
((n/N)*100) 
% of articles with term 
in headline/subheadline  
Reported from 
within the state of 
Gujarat  
Caste 1850 3.58 2.3  
Untouchables 92 0.17 5.4  
Scheduled Castes 301 0.58 0.6  
Depressed 
Classes 
130 0.25 17.6 9 
Harijans 339 0.66 5.3 82 
Dalits 474 0.92 4.8 41 
N=51,669 
 
3.2.3.3 Geography of Reporting in Gujarat 
In their paper, Davenport and Ball (2002) find that human rights violations which occur in 
rural area are underreported as compared to those that happen in urban areas. This is 
because the primary readership of newspapers, especially English dailies, reside in urban 
areas. Similar trends are observed with respect to reports on caste in Gujarat. Figure 3.3 
shows the geographical distribution of all the articles based in Gujarat18. There are a total 
                                               
18 This was done in R using the ggmap package. 
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of 132 articles which are reported from Gujarat and contain some reference to one of the 
terms listed in Figure 3.1. From the Figure we can see all reports are based in cities/urban 
areas. The maximum number of reports come from Ahmedabad, followed by 
Gandhinagar and then Vadodara and Surat. These are the four main cities of mainland 
Gujarat. We observe that not only are urban areas represented more than rural areas, 
certain urban areas (mainland Gujarat) are more represented than peninsular Gujarat 
(Saurashtra).  
 
Figure 3.3: Geographical distribution of articles published in Gujarat 
 
3.2.3.4 Exploring Frequencies  
In order to calculate the word frequencies, which is done in R, stopwords19 such as “the”, 
“a”, “an”, are removed from the texts that are reported from within Gujarat. Undoubtedly, 
these words have the highest frequencies but they do not convey much information. I 
choose to focus on words of substantive interest. Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show 10 
                                               
(D. Kahle and H. Wickham. ggmap: Spatial Visualization with ggplot2. The R Journal, 5(1), 144-161. URL 
http://journal.r-project.org/archive/2013-1/kahle-wickham.pdf)  
 
19 R has a list of stopwords (https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/tm/versions/0.7-3/topics/stopwords)  
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frequent words occurring in texts containing “Depressed Classes”, “Harijans” and “Dalits” 
respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: 10 frequent words occurring in texts containing “Depressed Classes” 
 
 
Figure 3.5: 10 frequent words occurring in texts containing “Harijans” 
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Figure 3.6: 10 frequent words occurring in texts containing “Dalits”  
 
3.2.3.5 Word Associations 
Figures 3.8 and Figure 3.9 show the association between the three terms - “Depressed 
Classes”, “Harijans” and “Dalits” - and a list of words i.e., the correlation between two 
words existing in the same document20. This association measure which I have labeled 
as an association score ranges between [0,1]. 0 means that the two terms are never found 
in the same document and 1 means that they are always found together. But before that 
we need to clarify how words have been classified as private and public. 
 
By looking at the frequency distribution of words for each term listed in Table 3.1, I came 
up with lists of words which could be classified either as private or public. Strictly 
speaking, the classification of words into private or public would be based on whether the 
state is involved in the actions/words which are being coded as private/public. If yes, then 
they would be classified as public and if not then private. While this is one straightforward 
variable which would determine the classification, my argument from Chapter 3 is little 
more nuanced. Figure 3.7 displays the rules used to classify words. There are three rules 
                                               
20 Measured in R Package tm. 
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- (1) representation of the state, (2) representation of the society and (3) representation 
of untouchables. It is not whether the “state” is reported to be involved, what is more 
important is in what capacity is the state involved. According to rule #1, what matters is 
whether the state is reported to be distant or close. Moving onto rule #2, does the report 
represent members or organizations from the society as taking an initiative towards 
changing the status quo or are they comfortable with the status quo. And lastly according 
to rule #3, are the “untouchables” portrayed as helpless and downtrodden whose 
betterment depends on the magnanimity of caste Hindus or are they depicted as 
“assertive” where they know what is good for them and they do not need any favors from 
caste Hindus. Table 3.3 lists the words and their classification. 
 
Figure 3.7: Classification rules 
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Table 3.3: Classification of words – Private or Public 
Private Public 
School, Uplift, Welfare, Hindus, Hinduism, Caste, 
Reservation, Educate 
Discrimination, Adhikar (rights), Violence, Non-
Violence, Activist, Atrocities, Untouchability, 
Conflict, Asserted, Protest, Leaders, Reservation, 
Representation, Literature  
 
In Figure 3.8, the association score was calculated for all the documents which mention 
“Gujarat” and contain any of the three terms - “Depressed Classes” (n=130), “Harijans” 
(n=339) and “Dalits” (n=474). And Figure 3.9, the association score was calculated for 
only the documents which were published in “Gujarat” and contain any of the three terms 
-  “Depressed Classes” = 9, “Harijans” = 82 and “Dalits” = 41. 
 
The scores for each of these three terms are displayed in panel 1, panel 2 and panel 3 
respectively. The 3 panels contain identical words on the y-axis, however their order 
varies depending on the value of the score. The scores are arranged in ascending order 
in each panel. The colors for the scores for “Depressed Classes”, “Harijans”, and “Dalits” 
are blue, dark green and red respectively.  
 
“Untouchability” is another word for “discrimination”, however what emerges from Figures 
3.8 and 3.9, is that it was not an issue for the “Depressed Classes” (correlation is 0.04 for 
“untouchability” and 0 for “discrimination” in Figure 3.8 and 0 for both in Figure 3.9) or the 
“Harijans” (0 and 0.11 respectively in Figure 3.8 and 0 and 0.05 in Figure 3.9). It however 
is an issue for the “Dalits” (0.1 and 0.17 in Figure 3.8 and 0.35 and 0.16 in Figure 3.9). 
This does lend some suggestive support for Chatterjee’s (1993, 1995) idea which I 
engaged with in the first part of my argument presented in Chapter 2 about the 
privatization of caste and thus untouchability. It is possible that as caste was considered 
to be a private affair, the colonial state could not address untouchability. It is only after 
Independence, when ending untouchability became a part of the state’s mandate, does it 
become a public issue.  
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Looking at the association of these words with the leaders who made untouchability either 
a private or public in Figure 3.8, we would expect “Depressed Classes” to be associated 
more with Dr. Ambedkar than Gandhi as the former tried to mobilize them and get 
separate representation. This is found to be the case. The correlation with Ambedkar is 
0.23 and with Gandhi is 0.02. Then we would also expect “Harijans” to be strongly 
associated with Gandhi, the originator of the term, than Ambedkar. This too has some 
support. “Harijans” and Gandhi is 0.17 and “Harijans” and Ambedkar is 0.07. And lastly, 
we would expect “Dalits” to be strongly associated with “Ambedkar” than Gandhi. This 
again has some support. “Dalits” and Ambedkar is 0.24 and “Dalits” and Gandhi is 0.01. 
Similar trends are observed for reports published in Gujarat (Figure 3.9).  
 
Moving beyond the individuals who popularized the terms, and looking at words which 
have the highest correlations with the terms, we find that “Depressed Classes” is most 
closely associated with “representation” in both Figures 3.8 and 3.9 (0.28 and 0.83 
respectively). “Harijans” is most closely associated with “school” and “uplift” in Figures 3.8 
and 3.9 (0.23 and 0.24 respectively). And “Dalits” is most closely associated with 
“Ambedkar” and “conflict” in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 (0.24 and 0.55 respectively). These 
association scores provide some support for both my claims. From Figure 3.3, we can 
see that “school” and “uplift” have been classified as “social” while “conflict” is “political”. 
What is interesting is the association of “Depressed Classes” with “representation” which 
has been classified as “political”. Here we see that changes accompanying nomenclature 
- from “Depressed Classes”-“representation”-public to “Harijans”-“uplift”-private and 
finally to “Dalits”-“conflict”-public. This change is exemplified by the struggle between 
Gandhi and Ambedkar which culminated in the Poona Pact of 1932. While the 
“Depressed Classes” were mobilizing for separate representation prior to Gandhi, Gandhi 
saw this is counterproductive to building the nation as it would divide the people and thus 
he protested (by fasting) separate representation for the “Depressed Classes”. He 
advocated social reform of Hindu society and of “Harijans” and not the mobilization of 
“Depressed Classes”. Post-independence, Ambedkar re-ignited the movement for 
“Dalits” to find their own voice and demand rights as his experience had demonstrated 
that social reform of Hindu society was a far-fetched dream.  
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It is interesting to note the gradual increase in the association scores for two terms which 
I have classified as public - “literature” and “adhikar” as we move from panel 1 to panel 3 
in both the figures. The word “adhikar” is a Hindi word which means rights. In Figure 3.8, 
panel 1, the score is 0 for both, in panel 2, it is 0.02 for both and in panel 3 it is 0.18 and 
0.19 respectively. In Figure 3.9, panel 1, the score is 0 for both, in panel 2, it is 0 and 0.05 
respectively and in the last panel it is 0.43 and 0.21 respectively. Both these words are 
closely associated with “Dalits” as compared to “Harijans” and “Depressed Classes”. 
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Figure 3.8: Words associated with the 3 terms for all reports with “Gujarat” in them 
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Figure 3.9: Words associated with the 3 terms for all reports published in Gujarat 
 
 
 
78 
3.3.0 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this Chapter I have done two things. First, I demonstrated that in order 
to use print media to study caste-based discrimination, it is imperative to build 
comprehensive lists of all possible terms associated with the victims. The variation in the 
associated terms reflect changing political contexts and changing understandings of caste 
and caste discrimination across time. I then used automated coding to explore different 
facets of the text data - relevance of the issue, rural/urban divide, and common words 
used in the news articles.  
 
And second, I tested hypotheses about the nature of the coverage of untouchability. I did 
this by developing some rules of how to classify words into private and public. And then I 
used text mining software in R to get association scores, for each of the terms associated 
with the “untouchables” and each of the words classified as either private or public.  
 
The next two chapters are devoted to constructing a valid measure of untouchability 
(Chapter 4) - vulnerability score - followed the analyzing variation in the measure using a 
regression framework (Chapter 5).  
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Chapter 4 
Quantifying Untouchability  
4.1.0 Introduction 
While caste and untouchability have been around for thousands of years, it is surprising 
that there have not been more intensive efforts to gather information and provide 
measures1. In this Chapter I address this concern by providing a model of untouchability 
and proposing a quantitative measure. I begin with a conceptualization of untouchability. 
This is followed by descriptions of the data collection and the data which will be used to 
study variation in untouchability. Third, I explore three possible ways of operationalizing 
the concept but focus on the my chosen model. The chapter ends with a brief summary 
of the proposed model and the measure of untouchability. 
  
A note on terminology. The “untouchables” were classified as the “Depressed Classes” 
by the British and then as “Scheduled Castes” by the Indian government. Gandhi called 
them “Harijan” which literally means children of God. This term was however felt to be 
patronizing. Instead, the term “Dalit” is preferred. It is a Marathi word which means 
“broken”. I will however show that even the terms “Dalits” or “Scheduled Castes” are 
problematic as they tend to homogenize diverse experiences of different Dalit groups. In 
this Chapter I use the terms “untouchability” and “caste discrimination” interchangeably.  
                                               
1 There are several in-depth studies such as M.N. Srinivas’s The Remembered Village (1978), Shalini Randeria’s 
unpublished dissertation (1992), Lancy Lobo’s The Thakors of North Gujarat (1995), Mario Rutten’s (1995) on caste 
and untouchability in Gujarat. I am not saying that quantification of untouchability is better. I think given the 
prevalence of the phenomena, and its variability across space and time, relying on any single method is not enough. 
Case studies provide the details and valuable insights such as possible links between practices across different 
spaces which can then be incorporated into creating a measure which tries to capture the phenomenon as is. I see 
quantification as a means of accounting for linkages between practices and then comparing caste discrimination 
across villages in a relatively homogenous geographical area i.e., Gujarat. Macwan et al (2010) provide the first ever 
measure of untouchability. Desai (1976) was the first to document various forms of untouchability.  
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4.2.0 Conceptualization 
4.2.1 Describing Untouchability 
Untouchability is caste based discrimination. Shah et al. (2006) write that untouchability: 
“is a distinct Indian social institution that legitimizes and enforces practices of 
discrimination against people born into particular castes, and legitimizes practices that 
are humiliating, exclusionary and exploitative. Although comparable forms of 
discrimination are found all over the world, untouchability is made unique by the fact that 
its parent institution - the caste system - is found only in the Indian subcontinent” (Shah et 
al. 2006: 19). 
 
It is crucial to remember that both caste and untouchability are deeply rooted in Hindu 
religious texts2 that continue to provide Hindus a way of looking and interpreting the 
world around them. These texts legitimate untouchability. For example, it is considered 
to be morally wrong for an upper caste Brahmin to dine with lower caste persons. It 
constitutes a violation of what is understood to be their dharma. So while non-
government organizations may advocate inter-dining between castes to change 
perceptions and behaviors towards lower castes, some interpreters of religious texts will 
rail against it as it would be seen as being morally wrong.  
 
Untouchability being rooted in religion thus becomes an important factor responsible for 
the perceived stability of the Hindu social order. The stability of any order is measured 
by how it manages and minimizes conflict (Gaventa 1982; Jackman 1994). While 
untouchability serves to distinguish on the basis of caste, this distinction has been made 
stable and conflict kept to a minimum, because of the emphasis on one’s dharma or 
duties. Being born a Hindu means that the individual is born into a caste and must 
follow his or her dharma. The community takes precedence over the individual. If there 
were a violation of the dharma, instability would ensue. Compliance to one’s dharma is 
enforced by two principles – one, is by the use of danda (means literally stick) or 
coercion/force and second, is the idea of karma which justifies an individual’s place in 
the social order. What a belief in karma does is say that being born in a certain caste is 
not because of chance. Instead, one is born in the caste that they are in the current life 
                                               
2 Their interpretation by priests that is. These texts are written in Sanskrit and the probability that a Hindu can 
understand Sanskrit is very low. Thus their interpretation is left to priests and gurus.  
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because of their actions in the previous birth. If the actions were according to one’s 
dharma, then one is born into a higher caste (Brahmin, Kshatriya, or Vaishya) and if not 
then, then one is born into a lower caste (e.g., Shudra or untouchable). Therefore, 
according to this logic, mobility lies across lifetimes instead of within a lifetime. Danda 
and karma are both attributed with a causal role in the maintenance of the social order 
i.e., caste system and thus untouchability. They are responsible for minimizing conflict 
between different castes by placing very strict limits on aspirations and detailing the 
consequences of attempting to aspire more than one’s birth position allowed (Thapar 
1978). 
4.2.2 The Spatial Dimension of Untouchability 
The forms of untouchability which actually constitute discrimination remain ambiguous. 
This is because, as I wrote about in the previous chapter, the Constitution does not 
define untouchability and nor does it list the various forms of behaviors which count as 
discriminatory and thus punishable under the law. While the Constitution does not 
define untouchability, it does list the spaces where behaviors can be claimed to be 
discriminatory. These are: (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of 
public entertainment or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of 
public resort maintained wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use of 
general public (Constitution of India).  
 
While the state has the mandate to intervene in public spaces, untouchability is 
manifested in domains which lie outside the jurisdiction of the state such as in homes 
and neighborhoods. What the separation of spaces into state/public and non-
state/private means for the experience of discrimination remains to be investigated. This 
is best illustrated with an example.  
 
At the time of Independence, it was decreed by the new Indian government that every 
child will attend school and will receive a free education. This was a big deal because it 
was believed up until then that lower castes do not need education and only children of 
certain higher castes should to go to school. Now for the first time, there was an 
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institution - the state - whose mandate was very clear - every child regardless of caste, 
class, gender will go to the public school. This challenged the caste system because it 
forced children from all castes to sit together in school (Dreze 2017). Let us also 
assume for now that because of fear of breaking the law and thus losing their jobs, the 
teachers did not segregate children i.e., they did not seat Dalit and non-Dalit children 
separately. But then what happens outside the school premises? How does 
desegregation in school affect the life of a Dalit child outside of the school? One can 
easily imagine that outside of the school, the identity of the Dalit child does not simply 
vanish. The truth is that the Dalit child continues to live in a segregated neighborhood. 
The child continues to be told that she should not venture into the non-Dalit 
neighborhood. The child continues to witness the servility and subservience of her 
parents in front of members of higher castes. The Dalit child is being given two 
conflicting signals - the state tells her that she is equal while her village reminds her that 
she is not. Thus the point is simple: just because Dalits can attend school and sit 
alongside non-Dalits, discrimination does not end.  
 
What the example above shows is that understanding discrimination cannot be done by 
focusing on a single manifestation - such as the school or neighborhood or local 
government. For instance, in the example above, focusing on education, it would be 
easy to conclude that there is no discrimination. This however is an observation based 
on a sliver of reality whereas discrimination continues to affect lives of Dalit children 
outside school. Mehta (2003) best summarizes the experience of discrimination: 
 
The difference between masters and servants in traditional aristocratic societies and 
democratic societies is this: in traditional societies, this relationship had caste-like 
characteristics. You are subordinate not simply because you are under a contract to carry 
out particular tasks, your identity as a servant permeates the whole of your social being 
and the scope of social possibility. If you are a servant, you cannot sit with the master or 
in his presence, you cannot inhabit the same social spaces, you may not speak unless 
spoken to; even in urban settings, there is an ensemble of practices that makes the 
distance between human beings match the distance between species. Even outside the 
confines of your workplace, that fact that you are servant remains an indelible social fact 
(Mehta 2003: 85). 
 
The experience of the “servant” that Mehta refers to is similar to that of the Dalit 
experience. So if we want to measure untouchability, we need to observe its 
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manifestation in several spaces - schools, neighborhoods, buses, banks, shops, 
restaurants (National Research Council 2004). Because clearly, the diminishment of 
untouchability in one space does not necessarily mean it will decrease in other spaces. 
Places of learning ranging from primary school to universities can become 
desegregated, but where people live or work can continue to be segregated. This is not 
unique to the experience of caste in India. It has been documented extensively in the 
case of racism in the United States (Marx 1967) and apartheid in South Africa (Adam 
1976). The totality of the experience of discrimination cannot be fathomed by looking at 
a single dimension in isolation of others. In fact disappearance in one domain may 
mean an increase in other domains. As Shah et al. wrote in what is the first national 
study of untouchability in 2006:  
 
In some areas, practices of untouchability are being erased, while in other spheres, new forms of 
untouchability are being invented. Therefore efforts to document various forms of untouchability 
always lag behind the new adaptations and innovations in its practice (Shah et al. 2010: 63).  
 
4.2.3 Modeling Untouchability 
In this Section I will propose a model of untouchability whose operating rules are similar 
to that of the game of Jenga3. Jenga is a game that is played with rectangular wooden 
blocks. Three blocks are put together to make one level. Then another set of three 
blocks are put perpendicularly on top of the first storey. Like this, the remaining blocks 
are arranged such that each level is perpendicular to the one below it. Each player 
removes a block from anywhere but the topmost level and puts it on top using only one 
hand. Eventually the stack of blocks becomes unstable. The player that causes it to 
collapse loses the game. 
 
Now imagine each form of caste discrimination to be a block. The arrangement of the 
forms however is not random i.e., there are particular blocks which form the base, 
others that form the middle and the remaining go on top. So while Jenga blocks are 
interchangeable and independent and it does not matter where a block is placed in the 
                                               
3 I thank Christian Davenport for putting the seed of this idea in my mind. 
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stack, it is not so with forms of discrimination. Now if forms of discrimination are not 
interchangeable, then how do we arrange them in a Jenga stack? Here is where I use 
the prevalence of different forms to guide how I would put the blocks. The blocks that 
form the base are the invariant forms of discrimination i.e., they are reported to affect 
Dalits in more than 75% of the villages. And the top most blocks are the most variant 
i.e., reported in less than 25% of the villages.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows both the Jenga stack and the stack of discriminatory forms side by 
side. The stability of the Jenga stack decreases from the bottom upwards. What this 
means is that removing a block from the bottom will cause the entire stack to fall but 
doing the same from the top is less likely to result in the whole stack come crashing 
down. Just as the stability of the blocks varies from bottom to up, the forms of 
discrimination are arranged such that their prevalence varies from the most prevalent to 
the least prevalent. I have listed 3 distinct forms for each of the 4 rates starting from the 
bottom: greater than 75%, between 50% and 75%, between 25% and 50% and less 
than 25%4. Starting from the bottom of this stack, Valmikis5 face discrimination in the 
following forms in more than 75% of the villages - not allowed to marry outside their 
caste (75%), not allowed to enter the house of a non-Dalit (83%) and not allowed to rent 
a home in a non-Dalit neighborhood (80%). Going up one level, Valmikis are not 
allowed to enter temples in about 73% of the villages, they are not allowed to shake 
hands with non-Dalits in 53% of the villages and need to wait for a non-Dalit to come 
and pour water in their buckets in about 50% of the villages. Moving up another level 
(prevalence between 25%-50%), in about 26% of the villages Valmiki women are 
publicly teased and verbally harassed, in 31% of the villages Valmikis are not allowed to 
touch vegetables at the shop while shopping and in 36% of the villages, Valmiki 
panchayat members have to sit on the floor. And in the last level, we find that 
discrimination in hospitals, schools and buses is the least prevalent i.e., less than 25%.  
 
                                               
4 The prevalence rates of all the practices are given in Table 4.4. 
 
5 A Dalit sub-caste that experiences the maximum discrimination. The decision to focus on this group will be 
explained in detail in the next section. 
85 
Just like in Jenga, if we pull out the bottom most block, we know that probability that the 
stack will is high. This is similar to the construction of a building i.e., a weak foundation 
will bring the entire structure crashing down. Now if we look at the bottom most level of 
the caste stack, it comprises of a restriction on marriage partners i.e., a Valmiki can 
marry only a Valmiki. Several prominent reformers such as Ambedkar made a case that 
marriage was the cornerstone of the caste-system. With the ban on inter-caste marriage 
removed, caste would collapse - just like the Jenga blocks. Gandhi too shared a similar 
sentiment and said he would not attend a wedding unless it were an inter-caste 
marriage. These were very strong statements made by extremely influential men and as 
such they did pose a challenge to the Hindu social order. 
 
Figure 4.1: Using Jenga to model untouchability 
 
 
 
Using Jenga is just one way of thinking about untouchability and how its varying 
manifestations may be linked. I have used this model because there are plenty of 
historical examples that lend credibility to the forms of discrimination that form the 
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various levels of caste discrimination. I am not arguing that thinking of types of caste 
discrimination like a Jenga model captures the true reality of caste. I think the Jenga 
model is a reasonable heuristic which needs to be tested empirically to learn about its 
usefulness (Moore 2001).  
 
The next section provides details about the data instrument and the data that will be 
used to build a measure of untouchability. 
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4.3.0 DATA 
4.3.1 Data Instrument 
Keeping in mind the multiple forms and sites of untouchability across multiple spaces, 
activists and scholars from Navsarjan which is an NGO based in Gujarat6, Robert F. 
Kennedy Center for Human Rights, and scholars from the University of Notre Dame, 
University of Michigan, and University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, came together between 
2005 and 2008 to build an instrument which would record this. The survey (referred to 
as the Navsarjan study from here on) covered 1578 villages across 11 districts in 
Gujarat. A list of 98 manifestations of untouchability (see Table 4.4) was drawn up. This 
list is a census and hence comprehensive in that it covers all possible forms of 
untouchability that could possibly exist in the districts where Navsarjan operates. 
Questions were asked about the prevalence of each practice along with the most likely 
perpetrator and the most likely victim. Specifically with regard to each of the 98 
practices the survey asked: 
  
i. Untouchability practiced – NA, Yes, No 
ii. Most practicing caste – Brahmin, Baniya, Kshatriya, Patel/Patidar, Kshatriya 
(OBC), Patel (OBC), Bharwad/Rabari, Vaghri, Barber/Potter, Christian/Muslim 
iii. Not practiced by caste – Brahmin, Baniya, Kshatriya, Patel/Patidar, Kshatriya 
(OBC), Patel (OBC), Bharwad/Rabari, Vaghri, Barber/Potter, Christian/Muslim 
iv. Most practiced with sub-caste – Vankar, Rohit, Senma, Valmiki, Nadiya, Turi, 
Garo-Brahmin, Nat, Tirgar, Christian    
  
Looking at (i), it needs to be clarified “who” exactly answers the questions and how the 
responses are recorded. Figure 4.2 illustrates the data collection process. There are 
                                               
6 As of December 2016, the Ministry of Home Affairs cancelled Navsarjan’s FCRA (Foreign Contribution Regulation 
Act) license. What this means is that NGO cannot accept any funding from donors outside India. Given that more 
than 90% of their funding came from abroad, Navsarjan had to lay off all its employees and shut down. Navsarjan 
was one of the thousands of NGO’s whose FCRA license was cancelled. The Government did as it believed that 
resources coming from abroad were being used to engage in anti-national and anti-development activities in India ) 
http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/fcra-licence-cancelled-ngo-navsarjan-lays-off-all-staffers-
4440969//) 
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about 18,000 villages in Gujarat. Navsarjan works in about 3500 of the 18,000 villages7. 
1578 were randomly selected out of these 3500 villages. Each one of these 1578 
villages were administered the survey. The enumerators selected and trained to 
conduct this survey worked with Navsarjan and as such had a good rapport with the 
Dalit population of every village. Having a good rapport is important to elicit truthful 
responses about sensitive questions such as caste discrimination (Fujii 2012). 
 
Figure 4.2: Data collection process 
 
 
 
  
                                               
7 There are two ways that Navsarjan got involved in a village. It either got involved because of a reported atrocity on 
a Dalit and then the NGO was sought after for legal aid. And second, is expansion. If it is already working in a village, 
it may decide to start work in neighboring villages. 
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Once the 1578 villages were selected, they were randomly stratified such that in some 
villages the survey was conducted at the household level and in others it was conducted 
at the community level. Furthermore within the household level, surveys were stratified 
by gender and age. And at the community level, stratification took place along sub-
caste, gender and age8. There were some villages where no stratification was done. 
Once information about the respondents was recorded, they were asked about the 
prevalence of the different forms of untouchability. One response was recorded. The 
recorded response – NA, Yes or No - reflected the response of the majority. From the 
responses we know whether a certain form of untouchability exists in the village, the 
most likely perpetrator, the least likely perpetrator, and the most likely victim.  
4.3.2 Disaggregating the Untouchability Experience Across Dalit groups 
When asked about specific forms of untouchability, information about which non-Dalit 
caste practices it the most and with which Dalit caste was also collected. All 
perpetrators and victims, especially when studying caste, cannot be lumped into one 
large category of The Perpetrator and The Victim. Distinguishing between perpetrators 
and victims is very important. This point is often missed when we discuss “higher 
castes”, “upper castes”, and “lower castes”. There are many reasons for this. The first 
one being there are just too many sub-castes and to make conversation possible we 
need broad labels. Even though labels make discussion possible, a more serious issue 
is the lack of studies examining different sub-castes and their relationships amongst 
themselves and with other “higher-castes”. There is one study that has been extremely 
helpful in justifying my decision to examine discrimination experienced by one Dalit sub-
                                               
8 A personal experience will throw light on why this was necessary. I was visiting a village in summer 2013. An 
activist from Navsarjan took me to one of the villages where she had been working. I asked to be left in the village for 
the day and I would return the next day. I stayed with a Dalit family: husband, wife and 2 sons. The sons were away 
in school. Late afternoon, we were sitting outside, drinking tea and chatting. I remembered that while entering the 
village, I saw a temple in the central square. As the family I was staying with seemed relatively prosperous and also 
the husband had a government job, I asked whether they were allowed to enter the temple. The husband said yes. In 
fact, he went on to say that there was no untouchability in the village. I left it there as I did not quite know how to 
probe this. In the evening, the wife offered to take me around the village. As soon as we stepped out of the house, 
she said that her husband had lied. They (Dalits) are not allowed to enter the temple and untouchability exists in the 
village. Now whose story does one believe? The husband according to whom there is no untouchability or the wife 
according to whom untouchability is real and exists. Depending on who one chooses to talk to, the “truth” looks 
different. Stratification was done in order to capture this complication. Perhaps, men are more likely to give socially 
desirable responses as compared to women and/or women feel more secure with other women to give honest 
responses. Stratification was done to ensure possible variation in responses which could arise due to gender (male or 
female), age, (young or old) or sub-caste (low or high ranked). 
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caste – Valmiki. In her unpublished dissertation, Shalini Randeria9 (1992) closely 
examines the relationship between different Dalit sub-castes in a few villages in Gujarat. 
She observes that the experience of caste varies by sub-caste. Vankars experience 
less oppression and humiliation as compared to the lowest sub-caste of Valmikis. 
  
What the varying discrimination experienced by Dalit sub-castes also shows is that the 
higher castes distinguish between Dalits – i.e., a Vankar will not be treated like a 
Valmiki, even though both are Dalits. In the context of the village, the specific group 
identity is more salient than a broad Dalit identity which subsumes all differences. From 
the survey, there are 7 different sub-castes. While Garo Brahmins (priestly Dalit caste) 
report the least amount of discrimination, Valmiki (sweepers, scavengers, cleaners) 
experience the maximum. Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics for the number of 
distinct forms of reported discrimination experienced by each group10. We observe that 
the average number of practices reportedly experienced by Vankars are about 4 and by 
Valmikis is about 36, which is 9 times that of Vankars. 
  
To construct these measures, I code each of the forms of untouchability as 1 or 0 if it is 
reported or not in the village. I then look at the reported Dalit group that is most likely to 
experience that particular form of discrimination11. I count the number of distinct or 
unique practices reportedly experienced by each Dalit sub-caste. The maximum number 
of distinct practices that can be experienced are 98. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 Achyut Yagnik gave me a copy of Shalini Randeria’s dissertation as it is not publicly available. 
 
10 I exclude Nat because the mean and standard deviation are negligible. 
 
11 Again this measure gets only at prevalence and not pervasiveness that is the count does not distinguish between 
whether 50% of the respondents say “Valmikis are not allowed into the temple” vs. 100% say the same. 
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Table 4.1: Number of distinct practices by different Dalit sub-castes 
Name of Dalit jati Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation 
Garo Brahmin 0 45 0.13 1.88 
Nadiya 0 87 1.66 8.27 
Vankar 0 77 3.89 10.63 
Senma 0 95 3.95 12.32 
Rohit 0 79 10.52 17.14 
Valmiki 0 87 35.89 22.79 
  
The statistics in Table 4.1 treat all forms of untouchability as equivalent or 
interchangeable i.e., discrimination in school is treated the same as discrimination at the 
village, which is treated the same as discrimination in the panchayat (government) 
office. In other words, the statistics are insensitive to the site (space)12 of discrimination. 
Let us take a look again at these statistics but this time with attention to the space of 
discrimination. Table 4.2 shows the spatial variation in the experience of discrimination 
of each Dalit group at 5 distinct sites but which get subsumed in the aggregated 
statistics in Table 4.1. What Table 4.2 shows is the % of villages where the particular 
group experiences discrimination at the specified site. For instance, in 20.4% of the 
villages, Valmikis are being reported to face discrimination at the village well. In about 
66% of the villages they are not allowed to enter the temple. Garo-Brahmins experience 
the least discrimination as compared to the Valmikis across the 5 sites. They do not 
experience any discrimination at the village well. In about 31% of the villages, they 
report not being allowed to enter the temple.  
 
Table 4.2: Percentage of villages where Dalit sub-castes report experiencing 
discrimination in particular spaces 
 
 Practice (and site of 
discrimination) 
Garo-Brahmin Nadiya Senma Vankar Rohit Valmiki 
Village wells (wells)  0  .57  2.9  2.5  5.8  20.4 
Touching vegetables in the 
shop (shops) 
 0  .95  2.8  1.5  6.2  24.9 
Gramsabha participation 
(panchayat) 
 .06  2.02  2.7  3.2  9.4  33.1 
Mid-day meal (schools)  .19  1.7  3.6  4.4  10  36.3 
Temple entry (temples)  .31  3.4  8.6  7.9  24  66.3 
  
                                               
12 I use site and space interchangeably. 
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Given the variation in the experience of discrimination as shown through Tables 4.1 and 
4.2, I have shown that any data on untouchability needs to seriously consider two 
aspects of the phenomena. The first is that the experience of untouchability varies as 
per the Dalit group in question. Valmikis report experiencing more discrimination as 
compared to Vankars (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). And second, the form of untouchability 
observed varies by space (Table 4.2) (i.e., Valmikis reportedly experience less 
discrimination at the village well than in the temple). 
 
Focusing on the experience of Valmikis across all the spatial sites I will now go over 
three possible ways of measuring untouchability and will conclude with choosing what I 
think to be the most valid measure. 
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4.4.0 Operationalization 
The observations from here on will focus on discrimination reportedly experienced by 
the Valmikis. The Navsarjan study collected information on 98 forms (Table 4.4) of 
untouchability across 1578 villages. The dataset is a large matrix with 1578 rows and 98 
columns. How does one analyze variation in a large ([1578][98]) matrix? There are a 
three ways of doing this. 
 
4.4.1 Count/proportions 
4.4.2 Scales 
4.4.3 Network Based Measure 
4.4.1 Count/proportions 
We know the forms of discrimination that are reported to exist in a village and that there 
is a maximum of 98 (Table 4.4). One could add them up and either use this total count 
or a proportion based on it as a measure for untouchability. For instance we could find 
that there is a village where 50 of the 98 forms have been reported. The proportion of 
forms of untouchability that exist are 0.51 (50/98=0.51). This could be done for all the 
villages in the sample (1578) and depending on the distribution, a choice could be made 
as to which statistical model would best represent the distribution.  
 
I first created a straightforward and very simple measure of untouchability. This 
measure however falls shorts because of two simplifications. First, is that of 
interchangeability. When we count and create a sum or proportion of untouchability 
practices, the practices become indistinguishable. What does this mean? By way of 
example, it means that not being allowed to wear fancy clothes or goggles is the same 
as not being allowed to enter the temple which is the same as not being allowed to 
marry outside one’s caste. This does not constitute an accurate representation of the 
experience of untouchability  
 
One variable that can be used to empirically distinguish between different forms of 
untouchability is how violators are punished. Wearing goggles would invite verbal 
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abuse, entering the temple would lead to beating, and inter-caste marriage would result 
in excommunication or death. These are three different violations with three different 
consequences. Wearing goggles invites less punishment than entering a temple, which 
invites less punishment than marriage outside one’s caste. Thus the punishment is 
evidence that some constitute smaller violations and others larger. While all are meant 
to reinforce the status quo, which is  the domination over the lower castes, the unfolding 
of the punishment dimension shows us that they serve different goals. Calling out 
people on how they dress in public causes embarrassment and humiliation, beating 
people for entering the temple causes physical hurt, and excommunication results in 
isolation. These experiences are not just confined to the individual violator, instead their 
public nature sends a message to the entire community of the consequences of 
breaking social norms. These varying punishments target the body, mind, and soul of 
the individual, and the community of which the individual is a member. They instill fear 
which makes people alien in their own skins and they spend most of their time 
constantly trying to conform with expected behaviors: don’t wear what you want, don’t 
pray to who you want, and don’t fall in love with anyone outside your caste. Thus, 
lumping or conflating these violations into a count or proportion disregards a very 
fundamental aspect of how untouchability operates on a daily basis: different behaviors 
have different goals.  
 
The second is that of independence where each form of discrimination is seen in 
isolation of other practices. For instance, if Dalit students are seated separately in a 
classroom, then it would be expected that they would be seated separately during 
lunchtime or vice-versa. One would expect a high correlation between sitting separately 
in the classroom and sitting separately during lunch. The relationship between practices 
does not make it into the count which weights every form equally. One could say that 
because of the high correlation between such practices, it would suffice in counting just 
one of them instead of all of them. We could do this but then it would mean treating the 
forms as interchangeable i.e., sitting separately while learning and sitting separately 
while eating are the same. But once again, they are simply not the same. They have 
different effects. Sitting separately while learning exposes one to partial treatment by 
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the teacher who is expected to pay more attention to non-Dalits than Dalits. This would 
result in unequal learning opportunities. On the other hand sitting separately while 
eating prevents any possibility of inter-caste friendships.  
 
I am not against simplifications (in this case interchangeability and independence) per 
se. Simplifications are useful as they help in breaking down complex phenomena like 
untouchability into more manageable units. However given that there have been 
advances made in creating measures which take into consideration linkages between 
different forms of human rights abuses/violations to human dignity may be related 
(Macwan et al. 2010; Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014), we are in a position to build 
more precise measures, which will be discussed in the next two sections. 
4.4.2 Scales 
The problem with counts/proportions are the simplifications which treat different forms of 
untouchability as interchangeable and independent. One way of not doing so is by 
building a scale which is what was done in the Navsarjan study. The idea behind scaling 
is to collapse the responses and find an order. The procedures used to collapse and 
create an identifiable order varies based on the conception of the phenomena that 
needs to be quantified. The Navsarjan researchers used a cumulative scaling technique 
called the Mokken scaling technique. What this method does is it collapses and 
arranges responses in order of “hardness”. There are two assumptions. The first is that 
the different forms of discrimination are manifestations of a single latent concept called 
“untouchability”. And second is that these can be hierarchically ordered. 
 
If the practices are arranged from the least prevalent to the most prevalent, then given 
that a less prevalent practice is found, means that the probability of finding a more 
prevalent practice is high. While I agree that we need to account for linkages between 
different practices, there is a problem in assuming that they are manifestations of a 
single latent variable. Work done by scholars on the dynamics of power make a 
compelling case for treating associated concepts such as oppression and discrimination 
as multidimensional (Gaventa 1982; Davenport 1995). Discrimination is not just about 
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denying or restricting access to resources. As demonstrated by Gaventa in his study of 
apparent powerlessness in a coal valley of Appalachia, while the miners and their 
families were completely dependent on the mine owners for everything - housing, food, 
water, electricity, rations - there were other elements at play which secured their 
obedience. He writes about the “mobilization of bias” i.e., preventing issues considered 
to be important to the miners from being discussed and addressed and an ideological 
control over signs and symbols around the valley. These were not random and were 
designed in order to make the workers believe in their place in society13 (Gaventa 
1982).  
4.4.3 Network Based Measures 
The Jenga model of untouchability presented in Section 4.2.3 is an attempt to address 
the two simplifications underlying proportions and scales, interchangeability and 
independence. To implement the Jenga model, I apply and modify a measurement 
approach by Fariss and Schnakenberg (2014).  
 
In brief, what the Jenga model of untouchability assumes is that untouchability practices 
are linked to each other. However some are more tightly linked or coupled or embedded 
as compared to others. For instance, in current day India, it may be easier to get Dalit 
children into the public primary school but difficult to ensure Dalit and non-Dalit children 
sit together. What this notion of a practice being “easier” or “harder” gets at is the level 
of vulnerability. Some practices cluster more tightly together and some less so. Those 
that are tightly linked to each other, are harder to influence and this less vulnerable. 
Other forms of discrimination are easier to influence and thus more vulnerable.  
4.4.3.1 Measuring Vulnerability 
In order to measure vulnerability I draw on a paper by Fariss and Schnakenberg (2014). 
In their paper, the authors call for researchers of human rights violations to pay more 
attention to possible linkages between different types of violations as compared to 
                                               
13 Scott (1990) challenges this idea of workers believing that they are where they are because they deserve it. 
Instead he argues the appearance of compliance and deference is feigned. The powerless cannot assert themselves 
in front of the powerful. Both the powerful and powerless have public and hidden scripts which are used to navigate 
daily interactions.  
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treating them either separately or as manifestations of the same underlying variable. Let 
us take for example two forms of violations that states are known to engage in - torture 
and disappearance - to understand the consequences of treating violations independent 
of each other. If one were interested solely in variation of torture and found the number 
of reported torture events to decrease over time, then it would be concluded that torture 
and hence repression was decreasing. While this is not incorrect, what is problematic is 
the assumption that torture is an independent form of repression i.e., not connected with 
other repressive behaviors. What if it were to be found that even though torture was 
indeed decreasing, reported political disappearances increased during the same time? 
This is evidence that forms of repression are linked to each other and a decrease in one 
could lead to an increase in another (Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014).  
 
The second issue the authors point out is treating different forms of repression as 
manifestation of a single latent variable called “repression”. If there is a single latent 
variable, then it means that there are no differences between torture and 
disappearances i.e., they are interchangeable, and both are intended to induce the 
same effect. This again is not true as torture is intended to extract information while 
disappearances are meant to eliminate political challengers. Thus they are not 
interchangeable or “substitutes” (Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014). 
 
The authors present a measure of mutual dependence between human rights violations. 
They use a network variable which they call proximity that is defined as: 
 !",$,% = '() = 1	|	- = 1) − '() = 1|	- = 0)																										(1)  
 
What (1) does is calculate the change in probability of observing the violation of right ) 
given that - goes from not being violated to being violated. In order to build a 
vulnerability measure, (1) needs to be slightly modified. What the vulnerability measure 
should capture is how strongly (or weakly) are human rights violations or in my case 
untouchability practices  linked to each other. In other words how does the presence of 
one discriminatory behavior affect the presence of another discriminatory behavior? Or 
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what is the conditional probability of observing one form of untouchability such as 
separate pots for water for Dalits in school, given the existence of another form such as 
constrained access to the public village well? Formally, vulnerability is the joint 
probability of two forms of discriminatory behaviors existing simultaneously and is 
defined as, 
 
        !",$ = '() = 1	|	- = 1)																													(2)    
 ! will be a number between [0,1]. If this number is small (closer to 0), it would indicate 
that ) is weakly coupled with - and easier to remove and thus more vulnerable. And if 
the value is high (closer to 1), then it would indicate that ) is strongly coupled with - and 
difficult to remove and thus less vulnerable.  
 
Applying (2), we get a 98X98 vulnerability matrix. This matrix shows us the joint 
probabilities of every possible pair of untouchability practices. The diagonal elements 
are set to 0 as a practice cannot be coupled to itself. The form of the matrix is as 
follows: 
 !4,4				!4,5			. . .			!4,78 !5,4				!5,5			. . .			!5,78 . . .						 . . .						 . . .						 . .. !78,4				!78,5		. . .			!78,78 
 
While it is not possible to show the entire 98X98 matrix, Figure 4.3 shows the 
distribution of the ! scores around two untouchability practices - discrimination with 
street lights (L) where Dalits report having poor access to electricity and prohibition on 
inter-caste marriage (M) where Dalits and non-Dalits are not allowed to marry. From the 
matrix,	!9,: = 0.19. This is on the lower side, which means that L and M are not strongly 
coupled. Thus it would be expected that perturbing either one of them would not have 
an effect on the other. The left panel of Figure 4.3 is the distribution of ! scores around 
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L. These scores are the vulnerability scores of L with every other form of discrimination 
(Table 4.4). The minimum value is 0, the maximum value is 0.22 and the mean value is 
0.12 (dashed blue line). The right panel of Figure 4.3 is the distribution of ! scores 
around M. These scores are the vulnerability scores of M with every other possible form 
of discrimination (Table 4.4). The minimum value is 0, the maximum value is 0.62 and 
the mean value is 0.3 (dashed blue line). The mean of M is greater than that of L 
(0.3>0.12). This could be interpreted as M being more tightly coupled and thus less 
vulnerable to influence as compared to L.  
 
Another noticeable difference between the two are the maximum ! scores. For L, the 
maximum value is 0.22 while for M, it is 0.62. This again reinforces the observation that 
M seems to be more strongly coupled with other forms of discrimination as compared to 
L. This observation is not surprising as marriage is more central to preserving caste 
identity than the distribution of electricity. The centrality of the ban on inter-caste 
marriage is evident when these bans are violated. Stories of excommunication and 
death are common when inter-caste marriages do take place. On the other hand, when 
Dalits get access to street lights non-Dalits may react by stealing the light bulbs, 
vandalizing electricity poles or delaying any maintenance issue. 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of the vulnerability scores (!) around two untouchability 
practices 
 
 
 
So far we focused on the distribution of ! scores for two practices - distribution of 
electricity and inter-caste marriage. What we observed was a variation in two metrics - 
the mean and maximum vulnerability (!) scores with each practice. Now we move onto 
looking at all the practices. Figure 4.4 shows the mean !	scores for all the 98 forms of 
discrimination and plots them in an ascending order. Each dot - 98 in total - represents 
the mean ! value associated with each form of untouchability. The highest rank, 98, is 
for the highest mean ! value which is 0.34. The lowest rank, 1, is for the lowest ! value 
which is 0.006. The points are further color coded where red dots indicate forms of 
untouchability practiced in spaces where the state does not have (or have very limited) 
jurisdiction such as homes and the blue dots represent practices where the state has a 
clear jurisdiction such as public schools14. Figure 4.4 shows a high concentration of the 
red points (non-state spaces) with high mean ! scores and high ranks (top right corner). 
                                               
14 My classification of spaces can be found in Table 4.4. 
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The blue points (state spaces) are mostly concentrated at lower ranks i.e., they have 
low mean ! scores. The mean of the red dots is 0.21 (red solid line) is greater than the 
mean of the blue dots is 0.12 (blue solid line).  
 
There are two important observations from Figure 4.4. The first is that caste behaviors 
in non-state spaces have a higher average vulnerability score (!)	than caste behaviors 
in state spaces (0.21>0.12). What this means is that forms of untouchability which lie in 
the “private” domain are more strongly linked to other forms of caste discrimination as 
compared to the behaviors in the “public” domain. These behaviors are more difficult to 
perturb because of their embeddedness with other behaviors i.e., they are more deeply 
entrenched or rooted. If we recall the Jenga model of untouchability, then these 
practices (red dots), could be seen as forming the base of the stack. And we know that 
it is more difficult to remove a Jenga block from the bottom without the entire stack 
collapsing.  
 
Second, is the single blue dot in the upper right hand quadrant. This blue dot is 
discrimination experienced by Dalits at the cremation grounds. While cremation grounds 
are considered to be public property and thus accessible to all regardless of caste, 
cremation is a religious process. Lower caste members cannot be cremated on the 
same grounds as higher caste members. Given the deeply religious nature of 
cremation, the state just does not have enough jurisdiction to enforce equality in the last 
rites of the dead regardless of caste.  
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Figure 4.4: Mean vulnerability !	scores for all the 98 forms of discrimination 
 
 
  
Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of the mean ! scores by space (state and non-state) 
type. Like Figure 4.3, Figure 4.5 marks the mean of the two distributions. We observe 
that at lower mean scores of ! which indicate higher vulnerability, behaviors in the state 
space (public) dominate while at higher mean scores of ! which indicate lower 
vulnerability, behaviors in the non-state space (private) dominate.  
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of the mean vulnerability scores (!) disaggregated by space  
 
  
 
4.4.3.2 Creating a Composite Connectedness Score 
The last sub-section deals with creating a composite vulnerability score (!<,",=). This will 
be done by synthesizing the distribution of vulnerability scores (!) around individual 
forms of untouchability ()) for each village (>). I use the formula employed by Fariss and 
Schnakenberg (2014) where the composite vulnerability score is: 
 !<,",= = ∑ @A,BCD,AA∑ CD,AA 																																																											(3)                                                               
  
Here, ), refers to the form of untouchability whose variability we are interested in. > is 
the village. - refers to the other practices ) is linked to. F$ is 1 if the practice (-) is 
reported in the village and 0 otherwise. !",$ is the vulnerability score between ) and -. 
These scores stay constant across villages and are calculated using the 98X98 matrix. 
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Let us take an example to see how exactly (3) works. Using discrimination with the 
distribution of street lights as ) in two villages (1 and 2), we see how it is connected to 4 
other forms of caste discrimination in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: Example implementing the composite vulnerability score !<," 
 > ) - !",$ F$,= F$,=!",$ 
1 Street lights Bus services 0.19 1 0.19 
1 Street lights Separate water pot in 
schools 
0.08 0 0 
1 Street lights Manual scavenging 0.1 1 0.1 
1 Street lights Temple entry 0.19 1 0.19 
   ∑ !",$$ = 0.56  ∑ F$,4!",$$ = 0.48 
2 Street lights Bus services 0.19 0 0 
2 Street lights Separate water pot in 
schools 
0.08 0 0 
2 Street lights Manual scavenging 0.1 0 0 
2 Street lights Temple entry 0.19 1 0.19 
   ∑ !",$$ = 0.56  ∑ F$,5!",$$ =0.19 
  
 
From Table 4.3, we can calculate the composite vulnerability score for village 1 as: 
 !<,",4 = ∑ F$,=!",$$∑ !),-- = 0.480.56 = 0.85																																									(4)						 
And for village 2 as, 
 !<,",5 = ∑ F$,=!",$$∑ !),-- = 0.190.56 = 0.33																																								(5)							 
 
Around discrimination experienced with respect to the distribution of electricity ()), 
village 1 has a composite score (!<,",4) of 0.85 while for village 2 it is 0.33 (!<,",5). While 
the value of the denominator in (4)and (5) are identical (0.56), the numerators are 
different. This is because village 2 has fewer (¼) reported other forms of discrimination 
as compared to village 1 (¾). This is accounted for in the composite vulnerability score.  
For the purpose of interpretation, it could be said that in village 1, discrimination with 
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respect to electricity distribution, is less vulnerable to influence as it more deeply 
entrenched with other forms of discrimination as compared to village 2.   
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4.5.0 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this Chapter I have done three things. First, I presented a way of 
modeling untouchability which takes into consideration that forms of discrimination are 
dependent and not interchangeable. Furthermore, this measure captures variation in the 
discrimination as manifested in public (state) and private (non-state) spaces (Figures 
4.4 and 4.5). 
 
Second, I introduced novel data on untouchability. Using this data I showed that serious 
attention needs to be paid to the varying experiences of different Dalit groups across 
different spaces. The experience of untouchability cannot be aggregated for all the 
group because of the huge variation (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). I decide to focus on Valmikis 
as they experience the maximum discrimination. 
 
And lastly, I implemented my model of untouchability by modifying a measurement 
model presented by Fariss and Schnakenberg (2014). I refer to this measure as a 
vulnerability score. High scores around particular practices indicate that the practice is 
deeply embedded and thus harder to influence (less vulnerable). While lower scores 
indicate that the practice is not deeply embedded and thus vulnerable to influence. 
These scores will be used as dependent variables for regression analyses in the next 
chapter.  
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4.6.0 Appendix B - 98 forms of untouchability 
Table 4.4: The 98 forms of untouchability with their associated short names, brief 
descriptions and prevalence rates for Valmikis 
 
Practic
e_num
ber 
Practice_sh
ortname 
Practice_description Practice_p
revalence
_rate (%) 
Space_typ
e 
1 U1_water_
Val 
Dalits must use their hands to drink water at the public pub 16 non-state 
2 U2_water_
Val 
Non-Dalit women will not allow Dalit women to access the well 
directly. Instead the latter must wait for the former 
26 non-state 
3 U3_water_
Val 
Separate water pots exist for Dalit and non-Dalits in the 
panchayat office 
38 state 
4 U4_water_
Val 
Separate water pots exist for Dalit and non-Dalits students in 
school 
24 state 
5 U5_water_
Val 
Dalit women who attempt to use the only water source located 
in the non-Dalit area may encounter violence 
50 non-state 
6 U1_foodbev
_Val 
Dalits must use separate cups in the tea stalls 74 non-state 
7 U2_foodbev
_Val 
For  community meals, Dalits must bring plates from home 
and eat last 
14 non-state 
8 U3_foodbev
_Val 
Dalits will not be employed as a cook for the mid-day meal in 
the primary school 
66 state 
9 U4_foodbev
_Val 
Food for Dalit laborers is cooked separately 75 non-state 
10 U5_foodbev
_Val 
Non-Dalit beggars will not accept food from Dalits 57 non-state 
11 U6_foodbev
_Val 
Dalits must use separate cups in the liquor pub 39 non-state 
12 U7_foodbev
_Val 
Dalit children are seated separately during the government 
provided mid-day meal 
37 state 
13 U8_foodbev
_Val 
Dalits will not enter a non-Dalit shop 19 non-state 
14 U9_foodbev
_Val 
Dalits must use separate glasses in the soda pub 82 non-state 
15 U10_foodbe In non-Dalit houses, a cup is left outside for Dalit use 41 non-state 
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v_Val 
16 U11_foodbe
v_Val 
During panchayat meetings, Dalits will either not be served 
tea or will be served in a different cup 
79 state 
17 U12_foodbe
v_Val 
Dalits who work as scavengers are given food in exchange for 
work instead of money 
80 non-state 
18 U1_rel_Val Non-Dalits will not visit the temple in Dalit areas 55 non-state 
19 U2_rel_Val During religious discourse, Dalits must sit separately 76 non-state 
20 U3_rel_Val Non-Dalits will not visit the chief goddess temple in Dalit areas 78 non-state 
21 U4_rel_Val Religious offerings i.e., Prasad is thrown into the hands of 
Dalits 
77 non-state 
22 U5_rel_Val Non-Dalit religious leaders will never conduct ceremonies for 
Dalits 
80 non-state 
23 U6_rel_Val A religious guru carrying out a satsang may enter a Dalit 
home but will not accept food or drink 
73 non-state 
24 U7_rel_Val Dalit religious leaders will never be asked to conduct 
ceremonies of non-Dalits 
76 non-state 
25 U8_rel_Val Dalits are not allowed to enter the temple 73 non-state 
26 U9_rel_Val During the inauguration of a temple, Dalits must sit separately 
and also bring their own plates 
79 non-state 
27 U10_rel_Va
l 
Religious articles that are used to conduct ceremonies such 
as utensils, wood, cloth are segregated 
78 non-state 
28 U1_casjob_
Val 
Dalits must collect the cloth covering the dead body prior to 
cremation 
80 non-state 
29 U2_casjob_
Val 
Dalits are responsible for placing grass on the roof of every 
house during solar eclipse 
35 non-state 
30 U3_casjob_
Val 
Dalits must harvest and supply toothbrushes 12 non-state 
31 U4_casjob_
Val 
Dalits must play the drum (dhol) at events organized by upper 
castes 
48 non-state 
32 U5_casjob_
Val 
Dalits must remove the carcasses of dead animals 66 non-state 
33 U6_casjob_
Val 
Dalits are expected to make indhoni. Indhoni is an article 
which is placed on the head and used as a support to carry 
the water pot 
31 non-state 
34 U7_casjob_
Val 
Dalits are required to deliver bad news 63 non-state 
109 
35 U8_casjob_
Val 
Dalits are expected to make public announcements 78 non-state 
36 U9_casjob_
Val 
Dalits must collect and dispose human feces collected from 
households 
46 non-state 
37 U10_casjob
_Val 
Dalits are expected to make garlands and hang them around 
the village during religious occasions 
67 non-state 
38 U1_touch_
Val 
If a Dalit touches a non-Dalit by accident, the latter is 
considered to be defiled 
34 non-state 
39 U2_touch_
Val 
A non-Dalit will not share a bidi with a Dalit 30 non-state 
40 U3_touch_
Val 
Dalit teachers cannot touch non-Dalit students 5 state 
41 U4_touch_
Val 
Dalit women cannot react to eve-teasing 26 non-state 
42 U5_touch_
Val 
Dalits will not enter a non-Dalit house 83 non-state 
43 U6_touch_
Val 
Dalits and non-Dalits will not shake hands 53 non-state 
44 U7_touch_
Val 
Dalits will not sit on a cot or a chair in a non-Dalit house 80 non-state 
45 U8_touch_
Val 
A non-Dalit will not share a smoke with a Dalit 81 non-state 
46 U9_touch_
Val 
A non-Dalit will not take snuff from a Dalit 72 non-state 
47 U10_touch_
Val 
Water used by a Dalit to for the purpose of washing or bathing 
must not touch non-Dalit 
36 non-state 
48 U11_touch_
Val 
A non-Dalit shop owner must purify money from a Dalit before 
accepting it 
4 non-state 
49 U12_touch_
Val 
Non-Dalits sprinkle water on themselves before entering their 
homes to purify any accidental touch with a Dalit 
42 non-state 
50 U13_touch_
Val 
Dalits cannot touch the food of non-Dalits 81 non-state 
51 U14_touch_
Val 
Dalits cannot touch vegetables in the shop 31 non-state 
52 U15_touch_
Val 
Dalits will not touch water pots or utensils used by non-Dalits 83 non-state 
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53 U1_pubfac_
Val 
Cremation grounds are segregated 79 state 
54 U2_pubfac_
Val 
Dalits enter the bus last and need to give their seat to non-
Dalits 
7 state 
55 U3_pubfac_
Val 
If the talati is a Dalit, he has to sit on the floor 2 state 
56 U4_pubfac_
Val 
If the sarpanch is a Dalit, he has to sit on the floor 4 state 
57 U5_pubfac_
Val 
Dalit midwives will not provide non-Dalits their services 32 state 
58 U6_pubfac_
Val 
Dalit postman cannot enter a non-Dalit street 11 state 
59 U7_pubfac_
Val 
Dalit teachers have separate cups for drinking water in school 10 state 
60 U8_pubfac_
Val 
Dalits do not have access to the public grazing land 36 state 
61 U9_pubfac_
Val 
Dalits will be seated separately and will be allowed to speak 
last during the gramsabha meetings 
34 state 
62 U10_pubfac
_Val 
Dalits cannot use the dharamshala (rest houses for pilgrims) 20 state 
63 U11_pubfac
_Val 
Non-Dalit midwives will not provide Dalits their services 46 state 
64 U12_pubfac
_Val 
Dalits need to stand in a separate line to buy milk from the 
dairy 
25 state 
65 U13_pubfac
_Val 
Dalits cannot serve on the management committee of the co-
operative society 
16 state 
66 U14_pubfac
_Val 
Dalits cannot enter the panchayat office 40 state 
67 U15_pubfac
_Val 
Non-Dalit postman cannot enter a Dalit street 14 state 
68 U16_pubfac
_Val 
Doctors in the primary health center will not touch Dalits 3 state 
69 U17_pubfac
_Val 
Public bathing areas are segregated 8 state 
70 U18_pubfac
_Val 
Dalits must wait for non-Dalits to finish their purchasing before 
their turn arrives to shop at the ration shop 
16 state 
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71 U19_pubfac
_Val 
Dalits cannot sit in the public square 41 state 
72 U20_pubfac
_Val 
Dalit and non-Dalits children do not sit together in school 17 state 
73 U21_pubfac
_Val 
Dalits need to step aside while walking on the road if a non-
Dalit is approaching 
22 state 
74 U22_pubfac
_Val 
Washing ghats are segregated 15 state 
75 U1_socsan
c_Val 
Dalits are forced to sit on the floor during panchayat meetings 36 state 
76 U2_socsan
c_Val 
Dalits must refer to non-Dalit males as Bapu and females as 
Baa 
53 non-state 
77 U3_socsan
c_Val 
Dalits cannot drive or ride through non-Dalits areas in the 
village 
11 non-state 
78 U4_socsan
c_Val 
Dalits cannot hire houses in non-Dalit neighborhoods 80 non-state 
79 U5_socsan
c_Val 
Dalits are not allowed to tuck in their shirts, wear ornaments 
or sunglasses. They cannot emulate the dressing style of non-
Dalits 
18 non-state 
80 U6_socsan
c_Val 
Inter-caste marriage between Dalits and non-Dalits is not 
allowed 
75 non-state 
81 U7_socsan
c_Val 
Dalit men are required to shave their heads at the death of a 
non-Dalit as a demonstration of grief 
1 non-state 
82 U8_socsan
c_Val 
Dalits cannot hire a band to play at their weddings 15 non-state 
83 U9_socsan
c_Val 
Dalits are not allowed to participate in the navratri garba 70 non-state 
84 U10_socsa
nc_Val 
Dalit funeral processions cannot enter the city from the main 
street 
45 non-state 
85 U11_socsa
nc_Val 
Dalits are not allowed to walk through the village with their 
friends and family prior to the wedding (phuleku). They can do 
so only within their own neighborhood 
55 non-state 
86 U12_socsa
nc_Val 
Dalit grooms are not allowed to sit on a horse during wedding 
processions 
42 non-state 
87 U13_socsa
nc_Val 
A new Dalit bride must touch the feet of all non-Dalit women 49 non-state 
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88 U14_socsa
nc_Val 
Dalit must vacate the bus seats for non-Dalits 10 non-state 
89 U1_pvtsec_
Val 
Barber’s services are refused to Dalits 58 non-state 
90 U2_pvtsec_
Val 
A non-Dalit will not shop at a Dalit store 13 non-state 
91 U3_pvtsec_
Val 
There are a fewer taps in Dalit areas or there is no water in 
the taps 
24 non-state 
92 U4_pvtsec_
Val 
Non-Dalits will not employ Dalits to perform household 
services such as cooking and 
cleaning 
15 non-state 
93 U5_pvtsec_
Val 
Dalits cannot hire utensils during weddings 74 non-state 
94 U6_pvtsec_
Val 
Potter’s services are refused to Dalits 42 non-state 
95 U7_pvtsec_
Val 
Private transport services such as autos, vans and buses are 
refused to Dalits 
9 non-state 
96 U8_pvtsec_
Val 
Private doctors will not touch Dalits during examination 5 non-state 
97 U9_pvtsec_
Val 
Very few lights on Dalit streets or if present then in a poor 
condition 
29 state 
98 U10_pvtsec
_Val 
Tailor’s services are refused to Dalits 26 non-state 
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Chapter 5 
Analyzing the Variation in Caste Discrimination Using a Regression Framework 
5.1.0 Introduction   
In this chapter I test claims which were presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I 
presented a concept of discrimination which accounts for dependencies among different 
manifestations of discrimination. This yields a measure which tells us whether a 
particular form of discrimination is deeply embedded in the village or not. That is, does it 
co-occur with other manifestations. If it does, then it is less vulnerable to influence and if 
not then it is more vulnerable to influence. It is this vulnerability of a particular form of 
discrimination that is modeled in this Chapter. I also argued in Chapter 2, that the 
vulnerability of a particular form of discrimination is a joint production of two forces - 
bargaining between the state and village-level upper caste elites (F1 in Figure 5.1)  and 
within caste negotiation (F2 in Figure 5.1). Figure 5.1 illustrates the argument in brief.  
 
I test the following re-worded claim (hypothesis 3) from Chapter 2 : 
A higher (lower) level of state-caste bargaining increases (decreases) the 
probability of  discrimination of being more (less) vulnerable. This probability 
however depends on the degree of within-caste bargaining. Greater (Lesser) 
levels of within-caste bargaining increase (decrease) the probability of a 
practice being more (less) vulnerable.  
 
The two concepts that are central to testing claim are discrimination and bargaining 
(both state-caste and within the caste). Their measurement will be elaborated in detail 
later in the Chapter.  
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Figure 5.1: Revisiting the Argument 
 
 
The particular form of discrimination that I choose to focus on is discrimination with 
respect to electricity distribution. I find some support for my hypothesis. I find that 
greater within caste bargaining as measured by a larger proportion of “secular” named 
neighborhoods increases the probability of a village being classified as less 
discriminatory. This however is conditional on the state-caste bargaining. When the 
state invested resources earlier than later i.e., electrification closer to the formation of 
the state as compared to later, the probability of a village being classified as less 
discriminatory is higher.  
 
The Chapter proceeds as follows. In order to test my hypotheses, I first, introduce an 
original village level dataset on caste-based discrimination and its covariates. This is 
followed by regression analyses of the cross-sectional data which provides some 
support for my claim. I then proceed to conduct a robustness check on these findings. 
This Chapter ends with a discussion of the statistical analyses.  
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5.2.0 Data and Research Design 
In order to test my hypotheses a village level time series dataset would be ideal. But we 
know that quantitative measures on untouchability just do not exist (Dreze 2017). While 
a time series dataset is not possible, I have access to cross-sectional data on the 
dependent variable - untouchability - which comes from the Navsarjan study introduced 
in Chapter 3. The independent variables were assembled keeping in mind the time 
frame of the Navsarjan study (2005-08).  
5.2.1 Untouchability 
In Chapter 3, I introduced the Jenga model of untouchability. I used and modified the 
measurement paper by Fariss and Schnakenberg (2013) to implement this model and 
produce the composite vulnerability score for each village. What this score tells us is the 
average tightness or looseness of a behavior with other behaviors. If the score is high, it 
means the behavior is deeply embedded and difficult to “shake” or manipulate. On the 
other hand if the score is low, the behavior is loosely connected to other forms of 
discrimination and maybe easier to manipulate.  
 
There are two aspects of this score that I think are germane to the conceptualization of 
untouchability. The first is that it takes seriously that discriminatory behaviors are 
dependent on each other. They do not exist in isolation of each other and this is an 
inherent characteristic of how discrimination and oppression operate (National 
Research Council 2004). The second, related to the first, is that as behaviors are 
dependent on each other, they are not interchangeable. Experiencing discrimination at 
the public well is not the same as segregated seating during meals at school. The 
differences between them in lie in the identity of those who experience the humiliation 
(women in the former and children in the latter) and the punishment in cases of violation 
(the former may lead to public beatings or paying fines or not allowing women to use the 
well at all while in the latter there may be reprimanding).   
 
For the analyses that follow, I focus on one form of discrimination - distribution of 
electricity (!"#$%&'#()*#+). I construct the vulnerability score which is the average of all the 
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joint probabilities i.e., probability of reporting discrimination with respect to electricity co-
existing with the other 97 forms (Chapter 4, Appendix, Table 4.4). I focus on reported 
discrimination with respect to the distribution of electricity because of the availability of 
data sources that allow me to create measures of the primary independent variables 
around the distribution of electricity. And because variation in each form could be 
attributed to its own set of covariates. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the spatial distribution of the vulnerability score of discrimination 
experienced with respect to the distribution of electricity - referred to as !"#$%&'#()*#+ . 
There are three columns in Figure 5.2. The difference between the columns lies in the 
type of discriminatory behaviors which constitute the measure being displayed. In 
Chapter 3, I had made a case for thinking theoretically about classifying untouchability 
behaviors into distinct spaces - public/state and private/non-state. This was done 
because of the explicit reference to certain spaces (schools, buses, roads, hospitals) in 
the Constitution where caste based behaviors are illegal. Other spaces such as 
temples, family, neighborhoods and homes lie outside the jurisdiction of the state. I 
account for this variation in where the state has authority to intervene and where it does 
not by classifying behaviors accordingly (Chapter 4, Appendix, Table 4.4).  
 
The first panel is the !"#$%&'#()*#+,-""as a function of all the behaviors (both public and 
private). Here I calculate the extent to which discrimination with respect to electricity is 
connected with all the 97 manifestations of untouchability. The second panel is !"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)as a function of behaviors classified as public. This looks at the extent 
to which discrimination with respect to electricity is connected with all the public 
manifestations of untouchability. The last panel!"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2shows the score as a 
function of behaviors classified as private which is the extent to which discrimination 
with respect to electricity is connected with all the private manifestations of 
untouchability. 
 
From Figure 5.2, panel 1, what is clear is that there is variation in !"#$%&'#()*#+ . Each 
point is a village. The green indicates low !"#$%&'#()*#+scores (less tight or more 
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vulnerable) and red indicates high !"#$%&'#()*#+(more tight or less vulnerable). Panel 1 
shows variation in !"#$%&'#()*#+,-"". However visually there seems to be more “orangish-
red” i.e., discrimination with electricity seems to be a deeply embedded practice. But if 
we look at the other two panels a slightly different picture emerges. Panel 2 shows !"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)  and panel 3 shows !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2. We observe variation when we 
model discrimination as a “public” behavior. The average value is lower (more green) in 
panel 2 than that of panel 3 where discrimination with respect to electricity is counted as 
a “private” behavior (more red).  
 
Figure 5.3 shows statistics for each of the measures in Figure 5.2 - !"#$%&'#()*#+,-"" ,!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)and !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2 . The mean value is plotted as 
the red dot. The mean value for !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2 is higher than the mean value for !"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#) .  
 
While electricity is a public issue insofar as it is generated, transmitted and distributed 
by the government, when it comes to the actual implementation at the village, we 
cannot be absolutely sure that its distribution is free from caste prejudice. If caste does 
indeed play a role, then electricity is both a public issue (state level) and a private issue 
(village level). Whether measuring !"#$%&'#()*#+as a function of all the untouchability 
practices that exists in a village, or just the public forms or just private forms is not 
obvious. For instance, if it were argued that !"#$%&'#()*#+ is a public issue as the state is 
the sole authority, then we should not have seen any variance in panel 2 of figure 2. All 
villages should have or should not have discriminated against Dalits when it came to 
electricity distribution. That is, either they all obey state laws or do not. So villages 
would be either all green or all red. But we do not see this in any of the panels. What we 
see is variation whether we think of !"#$%&'#()*#+as a public or a private form.  
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Figure 5.2: Spatial variation in !"#$%&'#()*#+,-"",!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)and !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Boxplot with key statistics of !"#$%&'#()*#+,-"",!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)and !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2   
 
 
5.2.2 Primary Independent Variables 
In this Section I will describe the primary independent variables and the control 
variables that will be used in the regression analyses. Table 5.1 provides a summary of 
the concepts, operationalization and data source for each variable measured at the 
village level.  
5.2.2.1 Bargaining Between State and Caste 
One way of observing the outcomes of bargaining between the caste and state is by 
looking at the variation in public goods. It is assumed that early distribution i.e., soon 
after independence when resources were scarce and reliable delivery of resources is 
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indicative of greater negotiations between the state and local caste elites or 
representatives. The literature on public goods distribution tends to focus on state-
centric explanations to account for the perceived variation in services such as electricity, 
roads, education and healthcare. While political motivations are important, I have 
argued that they are not enough. For example, Bates (2008) shows that in newly 
independent nations, elites mobilized for the “fruits of independence”. 
 
I quantify the bargaining between caste and state by observing varying dates of 
electrification. Using insights from the literature on public goods, we know that the 
distribution of scarce goods such as electricity can be influenced. Additionally, work on 
the formation of post-colonial states show that elites who participated in the 
independence movements demanded services from the state (Bates 2008). Thus I use 
dates of electrification of villages in Gujarat. The state was formed in 1960. Villages that 
were electrified in 1961 as compared to those first electrified in 1981 are expected to be 
more influential. 
 
I used the 1961, 1971 and 1981 District Census Handbooks to which I found access at 
the Centre for Social Knowledge and Action (SETU) and Gujarat Institute of 
Development Research (GIDR) in Ahmedabad. I stopped at 1981 because according to 
the 1991 and 2001 censuses, more than 90% of the villages in these four districts have 
been electrified. The village directory for each census year shows whether a village was 
electrified in the given census year or not. I manually coded 1 if the village was found to 
be electrified in a given year and 0 otherwise. Figure 5.4 show the villages electrified in 
1961, 1971 and 1981 respectively across four districts - Ahmedabad, Anand, Kheda 
and Surendranagar. 
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Figure 5.4: Electrification across 1961, 1971 and 1981 
 
5.2.2.2 Bargaining Within Caste 
Village level quantitative indicators of the internal workings of any caste do not exist. We 
do not even have basic population measures of castes across India. While the caste 
population data was allegedly collected in 2011, it has not been made public. Now given 
the lack of caste measures, I used the literature to guide me in extracting caste 
measures from the resources that we do have.  
 
In order to measure within caste bargaining, I use a very interesting feature of the 
operation of caste in daily lives. People belonging to the same caste or jati in the case 
of the village live together. Additionally the names of their areas are the same as their 
jati name. Thus changing the name of an area is not a random process which just 
happens. It is my contention that the process of switching neighborhood names from its 
jati name to a non-caste or “secular” name is an outcome of bargaining within the caste. 
Greater the proportion of neighborhoods with “secular” names implies more bargaining 
within castes. And smaller proportion of neighborhoods with “secular” names implies 
less bargaining within castes. 
 
I extracted the proportion of neighborhoods with “secular” or non-caste sounding names 
by scraping the page source with the 20161 electoral rolls of the Gujarat State Election 
                                               
1 Even though the electoral rolls are from 2016, and the untouchability data comes from 2005-08, I don’t think the 
names of neighborhoods change very frequently. Thus it would be safe to assume that neighborhood names in 2016 
are identical to the neighborhood names in 2005-08 
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Commission (GSEC) website. From the html text in the page sources, I was able to 
write a Python script which extracted the polling station which is also the village name 
and the polling areas which are the neighborhoods in the village. Caste based 
residential segregation is a fact of village life. The electoral rolls are the clearest 
evidence of this residential segregation. Figure 5.5 shows a snapshot of the GSEC web 
page from which the page source was scraped for each assembly constituency.  
 
Figure 5.5: Snapshot of GSEC website showing a polling station and polling areas 
 
 
From Figure 5.5, we see that there is a polling station or village with the name 
“Virochnnagar”. This perhaps is village with a large population and that is why there are 
5 polling stations. Different areas of the village are assigned to different polling stations. 
We can see that “Makvana Vas” which is a Makvana (low caste) neighborhood is 
assigned to vote at polling stations #3. Similarly, the Thakor (upper caste) neighborhood 
is assigned to polling stations #3. Different areas are thus named by the caste that 
inhabits that area.  
 
However, while caste based segregation seems to be a fact of village life in India, I find 
variation in the degree to which polling areas actually have a caste sounding name. 
Figure 5.6 shows this variation. There are some villages, where almost all 
neighborhoods have caste names (red dots) but then there are other villages (green 
villages) where this is not the case. What is observed in these villages are 
neighborhoods which do not have caste names.  
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Figure 5.6: Variation in neighborhoods with caste names 
 
 
Table 5.1: Primary independent variables measured at the level of the village 
Concept Operationalization Data source 
Bargaining 
between the state 
and caste  
Electrification 1961, 1971 and 1981 District Census Handbooks 
Bargaining within 
the caste 
Proportion of 
neighborhoods with 
“secular” or non-caste 
names 
2016 electoral rolls publicly available on the website of the 
Gujarat State Election Commission 
 
5.2.2.3 Control Variables 
In addition to my primary independent variables, I also include the variables listed in 
Table 5.2, which have been argued to have an effect on variation in (reported) 
discrimination.  
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Table 5.2: Control variables 
Concept Measure Data source 
Colonial legacy Coded as 1 if area administered by the 
British and 0 otherwise 
Ajay Verghese public dataset  
Activism The number of non-violent forms of 
activism reported to have occured in the 
village 
Navsarjan study 
Literacy Proportion literate 2001 Indian Census Village 
Directory 
Dalit population Proportion SC 2001 Indian Census Village 
Directory 
Economic base of the village Proportion agricultural laborers 2001 Indian Census Village 
Directory 
Ruling party Coded 1 if BJP came to power in 2002 Gujarat State Election 
Commission 
Prior history of violence Coded if there is reported violence 
against Dalits 
Navsarjan study 
Modernization Distance to the nearest city 2001 Indian Census Village 
Directory 
Poverty Proportion of Below Poverty Line (BPL) 
families 
2002 Gujarat Socio-Economic 
Survey2 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
deviation 
Secular neighborhoods 887 0 1 .56 .33 
Colonial legacy 887 0 1 .72 .44 
Activism 887 0 5.7 .44 .7 
Literacy 887 .08 .79 .53 .11 
Dalit population 887 0 .58 .09 .08 
Economic base of the 
village 
887 0 .39 .11 .06 
Ruling party 887 0 1 .71 .45 
Prior history of violence 887 0 1 .56 .33 
Modernization 887 0 4.3 2.63 .71 
Poverty 887 .004 .84 .12 .08 
5.2.3 Estimation 
There are three dependent variables - !"#$%&'#()*#+,-"",!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)and !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2 - which range between 0 and 1. I create an ordinal measure from 
these variables such that there exist three distinct levels - 1, 2 and 3 - for each one 
                                               
2 I found a government website - http://ses2002.guj.nic.in/BPLNewList.php - which list the families who hold BPL 
cards in all villages in India. There are PDFs which have the same information but extraction from PDFs is not easy. 
Shammi Didla, a friend and a software engineer, wrote a script which scraped all the data and put it into a CSV 
format.  
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where level 1 contains the lowest values on each of the three scales, level 3 contains 
the highest values and level 2 contains the middle values. If a village is classified as 
level 1 it means it is highly vulnerable or that discrimination with respect to lights is 
weakly embedded. On the other hand if a village is classified as level 3, it means that it 
is less vulnerable or that discrimination with respect to lights is strongly embedded. 
Table 5.4 shows the three dependent variables - !"#$%&'#()*#+,-"" ,!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)and !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2 - and the values on each which correspond to the 3 levels along with 
the number of observations in each level (% n). 
 
Given the varying distributions of each variable (Figure 5.2), values which are classified 
as low for !"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)are not the same as the values which get classified as 1 for !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2 . These two variables have different distributions and I wanted to 
create an ordinal scale such that there are roughly the same proportion of observations 
at each level.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Creating an ordinal dependent variable  
 1 (high 
vulnerability/weakly 
embedded) (% n) 
2 (% n) 3 (low vulnerability/tightly 
embedded) (% n) 3!"#$%&'#()*#+,-""  [0, 0.52) (35) [0.52,0.68) (32) [ 0.68,1] (35) 3!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#) [0, 0.1) (33) [0.1,0.37) (33) [0.37,1] (33) 3!"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2 [0, 0.56) (31) [0.56,0.72) (34) [0.72,1] (33) 
 
As I have created ordinal measures, I use the ologit routine in Stata 14 to estimate the 
probability that a village gets classified in either of the three levels.  
 
To reiterate the central hypothesis along with the variables that will be used for testing 
is: 
 
A higher (lower) proportion of secular neighborhoods increases (decreases) 
the probability of  discrimination (with respect to electricity) being more (less) 
vulnerable. This probability however depends on when the village was electrified. 
Early (later) electrification as compared to later (early) electrification increases 
(decreases) the probability of vulnerability.  
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5.3.0 Results 
Table 5.5 presents the odds ratio for each of the 3 dependent variables - !"#$%&'#()*#+,-"" ,!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)and !"#$%&'#()*#+,.*#1-&2  - and Figure 5.7 shows the 
coefficients from Table 5.5 in a format that is easier to understand. In Model 1, 
discrimination with respect to light is measured as a function of all other prevalent 
discriminatory forms for each village. In Model 2, discrimination is operationalized as a 
public form (orange) and in Model 3, it is operationalized a private form (red). The 
coefficients for Models 1, 2 and 3 and their corresponding 90% confidence intervals are 
plotted in green, orange and red respectively in Figure 5.7. The list of covariates is 
identical across all 3 models.  
 
I find the interaction term - Electrified 1961 * Proportion neighborhoods with non-caste 
names - to be significant only in Model 3, when discrimination is operationalized as a 
public form, at the 0.1 level. What this term tells us the effect of the proportion of 
neighborhoods with secular or non-caste names on the probabilities of a village being 
less or more vulnerable to influence. This effect however is conditional on whether the 
village was first electrified in 1961 or later. The reference group is electrification in 1981. 
The interaction term is found to be significant at .1 level in model 3 where discrimination 
with the distribution of electricity is conceptualized as a “public” form. This interaction is 
further tested using the Wald test. What the Wald test does is test for whether two 
variables are equal to each other. In this case, to truly say that there is an interaction, 
we would need to test for whether the effect of secular caste neighborhoods is the same 
in 1961 and 1981. The p-value is 0.0789. Thus the null hypothesis can be rejected at 
the .1 level. This means that the effect of secular caste neighborhoods is different for 
1961 and 1981. 
 
As interpreting coefficients/log odds is not intuitive for interaction terms, the predicted 
probabilities are plotted. Specifically the predicted probabilities for 3!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)= 
1 and 3!"#$%&'#()*#+,./0"#)  = 3 are plotted. When we are plotting the probabilities for 
interaction terms we need to fix values for the other independent variables at 
meaningful values. This is necessary in order to get the marginal change in probability 
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of an outcome with a one unit change in the proportion of secular neighborhoods at 
different years of electrification. For Figure 5.8, the predicted probabilities are plotted for 
a village with the following values on the other independent variables - BJP party won in 
2002, was administered by the British prior to independence, has a history of violence 
against Dalits, has been witness to 1 form of activism, is about 7km from the nearest 
town, has 12% residents living in poverty, 9% are SCs, 52% are literate and 11% are 
agricultural laborers. 
 
The left panel in Figure 5.8 shows us predicted probabilities for outcome 1 for 456789:;7<=>7?,@AB67=measure. Outcome 1 contains values of 456789:;7<=>7?,@AB67=that 
indicate high vulnerability or weakly tied to other public forms of discriminatory 
behaviors. A one unit increase in the proportion of secular neighborhoods increases the 
probability of outcome 1, when the village has been electrified early i.e., in 1961.  
 
Among the control variables, I find a history of violence to have a positive effect across 
the 3 models. A history of violence against Dalits increases the odds of outcome 3 - low 
vulnerability/strongly connected. Activism has a negative effect across the 3 models. 
Experiencing activism against untouchability increases the odds of outcomes 1 - high 
vulnerability/weakly connected.   
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Table 5.5: Odds ratios of the ordinal logistic regressions using 3 different measures of 
discrimination  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 456789:;7<=>7?,C66 456789:;7<=>7?,@>7DC:E 456789:;7<=>7?,@AB67= 
Main effects    
Electrified post-1981 1.045 1.084 0.872 
 (0.10) (0.17) (-0.27) 
Electrified 1961 1.055 1.186 1.143 
 (0.06) (0.20) (0.41) 
Electrified 1971 1.587 1.772 1.334 
 (1.24) (1.48) (1.40) 
Proportion neighborhoods with non-
caste names 
1.688 2.017 1.410 
 (0.68) (0.92) (0.52) 
Interaction effects    
Electrified post-1981 * Proportion 
neighborhoods with non-caste names 
0.720 0.633 0.862 
 (-0.51) (-0.66) (-0.22) 
Electrified 1961 * Proportion 
neighborhoods with non-caste names 
0.317 0.319 0.316+ 
 (-0.89) (-0.92) (-1.76) 
Electrified 1971 * Proportion 
neighborhoods with non-caste names 
0.538 0.507 0.776 
 (-1.07) (-1.10) (-0.64) 
Control variables    
History of violence against Dalits 1.815*** 1.742*** 1.879*** 
 (10.87) (5.03) (3.80) 
Activism against untouchability 0.742* 0.775+ 0.752+ 
 (-2.10) (-1.70) (-1.80) 
BJP won in 2002 1.031 0.983 0.827 
 (0.14) (-0.10) (-0.82) 
British colonial legacy 0.956 1.055 0.888 
 (-0.67) (0.35) (-0.80) 
Distance to town (ln(kms)) 1.118 1.142 0.990 
 (1.26) (1.61) (-0.10) 
Proportion poor 0.490 0.310+ 1.101 
 (-0.58) (-1.73) (0.07) 
Proportion SC 1.497 2.385 1.135 
 (0.33) (0.75) (0.07) 
Proportion literate 0.676 0.700 1.218 
 (-0.23) (-0.19) (0.11) 
Proportion agricultural laborers 3.597 3.580 1.782 
 (0.78) (0.71) (0.52) 
128 
Observations 887 887 887 
Log L -947.6 -949.0 -947.5 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses; clustered errors 
+ p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Coefficients from the ordinal logistic regressions using 3 different measures 
of discrimination  
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Figure 5.8:  Marginal change in probabilities 
 
 
 
  
130 
5.4.0 Robustness Checks  
I check the robustness of the model and the results. To briefly recap, the vulnerability 
scores are actually continuous. What I did was break up a continuous scale into discrete 
values where low scores correspond to small discrete values and large values to large 
discrete values (Table 5.4). I then proceeded to treat the discrete values as if they were 
truly ordered and therefore modeled it as an ordinal variables and used the ologit 
routine in Stata 14. 
 
There is an assumption that is made when we treat a variable as an ordinal variable. 
The assumption is that of parallel regression. What this means is that there is just one 
model and just one coefficient which describes the relationship between different set of 
outcomes. If there is a variable X, then odds of being the lowest category as compared 
to the highest category is the same as the odds of being in the next second to lowest 
category as compared to the highest category. There is a possibility that assumption is 
incorrect. The Brant test helps test this proportional odds assumption. According to the 
test results, Model 3 (Table 5.5) violates the parallel regression assumption. The p-
value is 0.07. What this means is that there is no one single coefficient that describes 
the relationship between different outcomes. Instead there are different coefficients for 
varying set of outcomes. The coefficient describing the relationship between outcome 1 
and outcome 3 is not the same as the coefficient between outcome 1 and outcome 2.  
 
Given that the violation of the parallel regression assumption, I re-analyze Model 3 from 
Table 5.5 treating the outcomes as discrete but not ordered using the mlogit 
(multinomial regression) routine in Stata 14. The interaction term - electrified in 1961 * 
proportion of secular neighborhoods - which we found to be significant in the ordinal 
regression (Table 5.5, Model 3) continues to be significant. In fact, the term is now 
significant at the 95% level. The interpretation of the predicted probabilities, however is 
slightly different. They are plotted in Figure 5.9.  
 
Before we interpret the predicted probabilities in Figure 5.9, it is important to clarify what 
exactly are we interpreting. First, we are looking at the predicted probabilities for 
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outcome 1 on the public discrimination variable. Outcome 1 contains low values of the 
vulnerability score. Second, the interaction term plotted is the effect of the proportion of 
secular neighborhoods when electrification happened in 1961. Third, for the green lines 
(ologit), it is the probability of outcome 1. So we see that as the proportion of secular 
neighborhoods increases, the probability of outcome 1 (low vulnerability) increases. 
This is as expected. And lastly, for the red lines (mlogit), it is the probability of outcome 
1 relative to outcome 3. We observe that as the proportion of secular neighborhoods 
increases, the probability of outcome 1 (low vulnerability) as compared to outcome 3 
(high vulnerability) increases. 
 
As the results are comparable across ordinal and multinomial regressions, I choose to 
keep the former because of the relative ease of interpretation. 
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Figure 5.9: Comparing the Pr(outcome (1)) between ologit and mlogit 
 
. 
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5.5.0 Conclusion 
This chapter tested the claim that untouchability can be understood as jointly produced 
by two forces - bargaining between the state and village-level elites and within caste 
bargaining. To do this I introduced a new village level dataset of covariates. I measured 
the interaction between state and village level elites by looking at rates of electrification 
and I measured within caste negotiation by counting the proportion of neighborhoods 
with “secular names”. I used the measure of untouchability as proposed in Chapter 3 - 
vulnerability of a particular form of discrimination - with a focus on discrimination with 
respect to electricity distribution. I then used an ordinal regression framework where I 
find some support for my claim. I find that higher levels of “secular” neighborhoods and 
earlier electrification increase the probability that a village will be classified as more 
vulnerable. What a higher vulnerability of a particular form of discrimination suggests is 
that it is not as deeply embedded or entangled and thus easier to influence.  
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5.6.0 Appendix C – Village-Level Dataset (extra variables) 
5.6.1 Creating a Village-Level Dataset  
Here I describe how I created the variables which were not used in the regressions but 
could be helpful in exploring trends in the data. The scripts used to extract the data from 
various sources will be made available on GitHub. 
5.6.1.1 Trend in the Electricity Supply 
I used the daily satellite imagery that Brian Min3 was able to get from NOAA-NASA. 
Images between 1994 and 2003 were used as the electricity sector was privatized after 
2003. Once we have time-series data for every village, we need to come up with a 
summary measure. I am interested in a measure of the trend over time. A positive trend 
would indicate a more steady and reliable delivery of electricity while a negative trend 
would imply the reverse i.e., unsteady and unreliable. The measure that I use is the 
autocorrelation of the extracted values for every village. A positive autocorrelation would 
be interpreted as evidence of steady and reliable electricity supply while a negative 
autocorrelation would be interpreted as the opposite. Figure 5.10 shows the spatial 
distribution of the autocorrelation measure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 http://india.nightlights.io/#/nation/2006/12  
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Figure 5.10: Reliability of electricity supply (red is high reliability and green is low 
reliability) 
 
5.6.1.2 Trend in the Area under Double/Triple Crop 
Similar to the idea behind the measure of the reliability of electricity supply, I develop a 
measure for the area sown under double/triple crops. Growing two or three crops 
through the year requires a steady supply of inputs such as water and electricity for 
irrigation and other inputs such as labor, seeds, fertilizers and machinery. In the case of 
Gujarat, the crops that come under this category are generally cash crops such as 
cotton and tobacco. A sustained increase in the area which is sown with such crops 
requires the reliable provision of services such as water and electricity from the state.  
 
I was able to acquire annual satellite imagery from ISRO’s Bhuvan portal beginning in 
2005 and ending in 2012. These images classify different types of vegetation into 12 
categories such as wasteland, forest land, urban build up, fallow, winter crop, summer 
crop and double/triple crop. I calculated the average proportion of land classified as 
“double/triple crop” across all the years. An autocorrelation measure is not meaningful 
here because there is not much variation in the proportion of land classified as 
double/triple crop. Figure 5.11 shows this variation. 
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Figure 5.11: Trend in the cultivation of the proportion of double/triple crop (red is a high 
average and green is a low average) 
 
 
 
 
5.6.1.3 Numerical Strength of the Largest jati 
I used the 2016 electoral rolls that are publicly available on the Gujarat State Election 
Commission’s website. This data is however very difficult to work with. It is in a PDF 
format and it is in the Gujarat script. Raphael Susewind4 however has downloaded all 
the PDFs and extracted the text using OCR. He has put his data into a SQL database 
which can be queried by users. The data is about 30GB and he shared it with me.  
 
I wrote Python scripts that extract the data from the SQL database, put it in a CSV 
format and transliterated the Gujarati surnames to English. To this I added the polling 
station name which also happens to be the name of the village. In order to merge this to 
the larger data set, each village had to have the unique census code. As doing this 
manually for 18,000 villages would take a lot of time, I wrote a Python script which 
automated this process by matching village names in the two lists - electoral rolls and 
                                               
4 https://www.raphael-susewind.de/  
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village census directory5. When names matched, the village in the electoral roll was 
assigned a unique census code from the village census directory. 
 
Once we have the names of all the electors by village, it is easy to assign ranks based 
on the proportion of each jati which is calculated by counting the number of individuals 
with the identical last name. Figure 5.12 shows this variation.  
 
Figure 5.12: Proportion of the surname with a majority in a village 
 
5.6.1.4 Distance to the nearest Swaminarayan Institution 
There is not much scholarly work on the Swaminarayan movement in Gujarat. In 1986, 
when Makrand Mehta published an article in the Arthat, a publication based in the 
Centre of Social Studies, and edited by Ghanshyam Shah and Achyut Yagnik, followers 
of the sect harassed Mehta, Shah and Yagnik and sued them in the high court for the 
publication of an article which hurt religious sentiments6. While I have not been able to 
                                               
5 Some villages can have identical matches. In order to get around this the matching was based on a 
combination of district name, sub-district name and finally the village name. 
 
6 https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/education/story/19880531-research-paper-on-swaminarayan-sect-
triggers-off-controversy-797283-1988-05-31  
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find a copy of the article, I have spoken with Achyut Yagnik who brought to my notice 
the role that sects play in the transformation and preservation of caste based behavior.  
 
The location of all the BAPS institutions are publicly available7. I scraped all the 
addresses and used Google Maps to geocode the exact locations i.e., longitude and 
latitude. With this information the distance between a village and all BAPS locations 
were calculated and the minimum distance was finally used. Figure 5.13 shows this 
variation. 
 
Figure 5.13: Distance to the nearest BAPS temple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 http://www.baps.org/Global-Network/India.aspx  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
6.1.0 Introduction 
In this dissertation I have tried to account for why some villages exhibit higher levels of 
discrimination while others manifest lower higher levels? I endeavored to provide a 
framework for understanding variation in discrimination by using insights from the 
literatures on state-building, distribution of public goods and social movements. I tested 
the implications of the proposed theoretical framework on data from the western state of 
India, Gujarat.  
 
In brief, I first provide some historical context around the issues of caste and 
untouchability. I show how prior to Independence, caste was privatized i.e., it remained 
outside the jurisdiction of the colonial state. Post-Independence, certain aspects of 
caste, namely untouchability, came under the purview of the state. Despite what seems 
like to be a clear mandate for the state to address untouchability, the issue is far from 
being addressed. I attributed this to the inherent ambiguity in the law which one, does 
not define untouchability and two, protects the freedom to practice the religion of one’s 
choice (and consequently follow caste rules) but simultaneously makes illegal 
untouchability (which are caste rules grounded in religion). It is at this point that I argued 
that the state becomes embroiled in an intractable conflict over the place of caste in 
society. This ambiguity allows for a variation of interpretations of the law by the citizens 
of the country. While some interpretations are in the direction of transformation, others 
tilt towards preservation.  
 
 140 
I then proceeded to argue that whether untouchability is preserved or transformed 
depends in the interpretation of the village-level upper-caste elites. Specifically, I 
contend that untouchability is jointly produced by two levels of interactions of the village-
level upper-caste elites. One with the state and the second with their own caste 
communities in the village.  
 
There are two types of analyses that I conducted to test my hypotheses. I did an 
exploratory content analysis of all the articles published in Gujarat on the topic of 
untouchability in the Times of India (1838-2009) to examine the narrative around caste 
and untouchability across time. And second, I used the Navsarjan study to create a 
valid measure of untouchability. I also put together a novel village-level dataset of 
covariates which would be used for the quantitative analysis.  
 
In the next part of the Conclusion, I summarize the five chapters. This is followed by 
contributions made by the dissertation. And I end by identifying some shortcomings of 
this dissertation project and identify areas of future work.   
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6.2.0 Summarizing the Dissertation 
In the Introduction, I laid out the puzzle driving this dissertation project - What happens 
when an order premised on the belief that some people are inherently more privileged 
than others confronts another that believes that all people are equal? Specifically, how 
does a hierarchical social order like the Indian caste system interface with a democratic 
political order? I use the case of Gujarat to study this question. 
 
In the same chapter, I argue that existing perspectives do not provide adequate 
answers. I focus on the social movements literature and research on varying aspects of 
the political system. 4 features from the social movements literature are identified as 
having the potential to explain variation in caste discrimination - resources, multiplicity of 
strategies, elite solidarity and media presence. I show that the last two are absent or if 
present, they tend to be biased against lower castes. For instance, using examples from 
the Independence struggle, whose main “laboratory” was Gujarat, I show the 
polarization among elites (Congress elites) when it came to issues of caste and 
untouchability. While some like Gandhi did wish to address the issue, they did so within 
the framework of the social order. His solutions thus called for deep introspection and 
associating more closely with the “untouchables” following which there would be a 
change in the “hearts and minds” of the Hindus. Then there were other leaders like 
Sardar Patel and Nehru for whom caste and untouchability were social issues. The 
issue of the hour was political freedom and to that they dedicated all their energies. The 
last leader was Indulal Yagnik who advocated vociferously on the behalf of the tribals 
and untouchables, but he was a minority. Over time he was sidelined and in the end he 
quit the Congress to work full time on social reform. The nationalist elites sidelined the 
issues of caste and untouchability and their legacy continued to have an impact on 
Gujarati politics and society.  
 
I then showed that evidence of sidelining minority issues using the example of the 
Narmada Bachao Andolan (Mehta 2010). This was a struggle which was rooted in 
tribals seeking rehabilitation because of the construction of the Narmada dam. However 
in the media it was depicted as a struggle between pro- and anti-development forces. 
 142 
Development also became synonymous with nationalism. There has been much 
research on the topic of how Gujarati media has a strong anti-minority bias. Protests by 
tribals or in my case Dalits is often depicted in the media as anti-nationalist.  
 
The lack of elite support and a media which has been suspected of an anti-minority 
bias, do not allow for the use of a social movement perspective. From this I move to 
work done on different features of the political system which could be used to explain 
variation in caste discrimination namely, political competition (e.g., Posner 2004), 
system of reservations (e.g., Chauchard 2014) and colonial legacies (e.g., Verghese 
2016). For each one I list a few shortcomings. Without going into details of each, my 
central contention is that all of them view untouchability as a “political” problem to be 
solved. Those who root for political competition, believe that different castes will be 
forced to work with each for the purpose of winning elections. While alliances are not 
uncommon, we just do not know how political alliances affect social life i.e., the 
everyday lived experience of untouchability. Additionally, we do not know the length of 
the effects if there are any - do they last as long as the alliance lasts which is usually 
one term i.e., 5 years?  
 
Then there are others who argue that reservations bring the “law” to the village. What 
this means is that when the position of the village head is reserved for a Dalit candidate, 
other people living in the village become familiar with laws which protect Dalits and thus 
become less likely to engage in untouchability. The assumption here is people will not 
engage discrimination because of fear of the law. While fear of the law is a fair 
assumption to make, the problem is that the law does not define untouchability per se. It 
only delineates the spaces where behaviors can be perceived as discriminatory. 
 
And lastly those who root variation in discrimination to colonial legacies are sensitive to 
historical contexts but they overemphasize the role of history. Outcomes in the present 
become trapped in historical legacies. The subjects or citizens are assumed to be 
passive where history just happens to them. There is ample work which shows that this 
is debatable.  
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To address these issues I use insights from the work done on state-building and 
combine it with work from postcolonialism, distribution of public goods and social 
movements. I build a framework in Chapter 2 where the people have agency and their 
actions are not predetermined. In this framework, I emphasize the role of interpretation 
especially given the ambiguity in the laws surrounding untouchability.   
 
The different parts of the argument along with the implication for each part are displayed 
in Figure 6.1. In part 1, I locate the problem of caste and untouchability in the history of 
the struggle for Independence. I used postcolonial scholarship (Chatterjee 1993, 1995) 
to show that making caste and consequently a private issue was important for building 
the idea of nation. Privatizing caste severely restricted the ability of the state to 
intervene in the issue of untouchability. This however was to change with Independence 
when lawmakers allowed the state to intervene in caste affairs, namely untouchability, 
as its presence was antithetical to the idea of a nation where everyone, at least, in the 
eyes of the law, would be considered a citizen with equal rights.  
 
However, as I show in part 2, the manner in which this was done was ambiguous and 
thus leaving room for much interpretation. The most glaring ambiguity is that the 
lawmakers did not define untouchability. Instead they mentioned certain public spaces 
where behaviors can be argued to be discriminatory and thus punishable under the law. 
Both the efforts to private caste in colonial India and make certain parts of caste - 
untouchability in public spaces - come under the jurisdiction of the state in independent 
India led to opportunities which could be used to transform the social order or preserve 
it.  
 
And lastly, in parts 3 and 4, I show that this ambiguity provided space for 
reinterpretation i.e., what constitutes caste and what is untouchability. Caste and 
untouchability could be redefined and reinterpreted to suit the current situations. I 
argued that as the state did undermine some of the power of village-level caste elites, 
they had to do something. They could either engage in transformation or preservation. 
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Using research on state-building, I show that one of the ways that village-level caste 
elites remain in power is by mobilizing and demanding benefits and services from the 
state. This however is not enough. As we know from the work on social movements, 
external support for a movement needs to be coupled with internal support i.e., support 
from one’s own constituents (Lipsky 1968). The village-level caste elites need to make 
the changes (in this case a democratic political order) palatable to their own caste 
members in the village. And it is here that these elites use the ambiguity in the laws to 
redefine what constitutes “right” behavior. When the elites are successful in getting 
resources from the state and reinterpreting the role of caste in society, I expect a 
transformation in untouchability (i.e., less discrimination). And when elites are not so 
successful, I expect a preservation in untouchability practices (i.e., high discrimination).   
 
The implications of each of the 4 parts is displayed in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1: Parts of the Argument along with their Implications 
 
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 3), I tests the claims from part 1 and part 2 of my 
argument. I analyze the content of articles published in/around Gujarat by the Times of 
India using both automated manual coding and find that coverage on caste-based 
discrimination is relatively rare. I also find that the coverage is sensitive to search terms 
associated with the “untouchables”. For instance, prior to Independence, the terms 
“Depressed Classes” and “Harijans” was more common. Post-independence, “Dalits” 
and “Scheduled Castes” became more common. I do find some support  for my 
hypotheses. I find that in colonial India, untouchability was viewed as a “social” issue 
where untouchables are portrayed as helpless persons who need the benevolence of 
the state and the upper-castes. Post-Independence, however, there is a shift in the 
narrative. Untouchability is covered as a “political” issue in that the Dalits (former 
untouchables) are depicted as assertive.  
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In Chapter 4, I build a new measure of untouchability - vulnerability score. This score is 
for a particular form of untouchability and varies across villages. It tell us how vulnerable 
a particular form of untouchability is to influence. High vulnerability scores indicate that 
the practice is deeply embedded and thus less vulnerable change and low vulnerability 
scores indicate that the practice is easier to influence. In this chapter, I also provide 
evidence for variation in the experience of discrimination across Dalit groups. I choose 
to focus my quantitative analysis on Valmikis, who face the highest levels of 
discrimination in Gujarat. 
 
In Chapter 5, which is my last empirical chapter, I use the vulnerability score as a 
dependent variable in my regression analysis, with a focus on discrimination with 
respect to electricity distribution. I find some support for my hypotheses. I find that high 
levels of bargaining with the state (as indicated by early electrification) and high levels 
of within caste bargaining at the village level (as indicated by the proportion of “secular” 
neighborhoods), are associated with low vulnerability scores.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 147 
6.3.0 Contributions of the Dissertation 
6.3.1 Theoretical 
Given the colonial history of the country, I have shown that it is necessary to understand 
the context which led Ambedkar to say:  
 
“On the 26th January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions. In politics we will 
have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be 
recognizing the principle of one man one vote and one vote one value. In our social and 
economic life, we shall by reason of our social and economic structure, continue to deny the 
principle of one man one value. How long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? How 
long shall we continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny it 
for long, we will do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. We must remove this 
contradiction at the earliest possible moment else those who suffer from inequality will blow up 
the structure of democracy which this Constituent Assembly has so laboriously built up.” 
 
I have tried to show that variation in untouchability can be viewed as a struggle over 
understanding the role of state in society and interpreting the laws of the democratic 
political state. What this does it neither privileges a state-centric explanation nor a 
society-centric explanation. Instead, the implications of the framework are that 
untouchability is jointly produced by a combination of both top-down and bottom-up 
processes. To do this I combine insights from the literatures on postcolonialism, state-
building, distribution of public goods and social movements.  
6.3.2 Measurement 
Quantitative indicators of untouchability are rare (Dreze 2017). Chapter 4 is a modest 
attempt to address this lacuna. To begin the development of the model, I first 
demonstrated that the experience of untouchability is not uniform across all Dalit groups 
(Jodhka 2006). Some Dalits groups are better off as compared to others. While there 
are studies on the dynamics of single caste groups (e.g., Lobo (1995) on the Thakors of 
Gujarat), research on the variation in the experience of untouchability are hard to find. 
Using quantitative data across 1578 villages in Gujarat, I showed that the Valmikis 
report facing the highest levels of discrimination.  
 
Focusing on the experience of Valmikis, I then made a case for treating multiple forms 
of discrimination as dependent and not interchangeable. In order to model 
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untouchability where the practices are not assumed to be independent and 
interchangeable, I proposed a Jenga model of untouchability. What this model does is 
allow us to think of how vulnerable a practice is to influence. The idea of vulnerability 
comes from the game of Jenga where the goal of the player is to take out blocks and 
putting them on top of the stack without the stack falling. The player tried to figure which 
is the most vulnerable block. Similarly, I build a model of untouchability where the 
vulnerability of each practice is calculated. Low values on this score indicate that the 
practice is not deeply embedded and thus easier to influence (e.g., buying vegetables in 
a shop). High values on this score indicate that the practice is deeply embedded and 
thus more difficult to influence (e.g., inter-caste marriage). Each form of untouchability in 
my dataset - 98 - has a vulnerability score. It is calculated in two steps. The first is 
finding the joint probabilities of all possible pairs of the untouchability practices. And 
then using that matrix to calculate a weighted score for each village. 
 
Additionally, calculating a vulnerability score allows different forms of discrimination to 
have their own set of covariates. For instance, while it is plausible that an increasing 
supply of electricity will affect the distribution of electricity to Valmikis in the village, it is 
difficult to see how the same covariate - supply of electricity - will affect inter-caste 
marriage.  
 
It can be anticipated that a measure like this would help activists figure out what and 
where to target. While advocating for Dalits to enter public temples is a big task, the 
issue is that this is a deeply embedded practice which is resistant to change i.e., less 
vulnerable to activism. Thus it would make more sense for activists to focus on more 
vulnerable or less deeply embedded practices which I found to be mainly associated 
with public spaces. These are the easiest to target and there is a high chance of 
success.   
 
And it also would help activists and policymakers realize that all groups do not have the 
same requirements. For instance, it seems that while all Dalits are entitled to 
reservations, there are some who need it more than others i.e., Valmikis need it more 
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than the Vankars. Policies should reflect the varying experiences of Dalits instead of 
assuming one size fits all. 
6.3.3 Content Analysis 
Besides Wilkinson and Varshney’s Hindu-Muslim riot dataset, newspapers are an 
underutilized source of information for studying social and political change in India1. We 
were able to acquire the entire Times of India archive since its inception in 1838 to 2005 
through the University of Michigan’s Hatcher Graduate Library. Given the long time 
frame, I was able to test hypotheses about how the issue of untouchability was covered 
pre and post Independence.  
 
To do this I have written scripts in Python and R, which will be made public, to extract 
pieces of information from newspaper articles.    
6.3.4 Quantitative Analysis 
As mentioned in Section 6.3.2, quantitative indicators of untouchability are rare (Dreze 
2017). I developed a measure and also collected data on covariates to create the first 
village-level dataset on caste discrimination. A regression framework was used to 
analyze variation in the created measure. All this data will be made publicly available.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
1 Rikhil Bhavnani has some event data using the Times of India, however it is not publicly available.  
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6.4.0 Identifiable Shortcomings and Future Research Agenda                                    
What I have argued to be contributions to the study of untouchability, however, have 
their own shortcomings which will be discussed in this section along with ways of 
addressing them in the future. 
6.4.1 Theoretical 
Theoretically, there are two issues. First, village-level upper caste elites are central to 
my narrative of transformation or preservation of untouchability. Their incorporation into 
the political system and interpretation of the law are what I have argued to have 
observable implications for untouchability. This is especially the case in Gujarat where 
lower-caste mobilization has been minimal (as compared to other states like 
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, UP and Bihar). However I do not have much evidence to 
support my assumptions about their alleged behaviors. I have used work done outside 
India to make assumptions about their behavior but it would be a useful endeavor to 
actually probe deeper. I would like to conduct interviews with village-level upper caste 
elites to understand their perceptions of the state and their role as caste elites in the 
village. The goal of these interviews would be to create a metric which could measure 
their “bargaining power”.  
 
And second, I have not dealt seriously with “religion”. I have treated caste and 
untouchability as products of Hinduism without really delving into details of religiosity. 
Relatedly, I have used the word “secular”, but both these words - “religion” and “secular” 
- are loaded and their role in untouchability needs to be taken more seriously.  
6.4.2 Measurement 
While I argued for treating public and private as distinct domains, there are postcolonial 
scholars who have argued that the division between the public and private is not rigid, in 
fact it is rather porous. What was at one time public could become private and vice-
versa. This is seen in the work on feminist scholars such as Saba Mahmood who in her 
work on studying women in Islam finds that the division between the “religious” and 
“secular” are not as neat as believed to be (2004). She finds women clerics whose 
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interpretation of the religious texts promotes a discussion, debate and a healthy civic 
life. These are all ingredients for a well-functioning democracy. If it is to be believed that 
human beings, whether in Egypt or India, are meaning making creatures then 
separating the “spiritual” from the “material” or the “religious” from the “secular” is very 
problematic as it is just not possible. The public/private, material/spiritual or 
secular/religious are deeply entangled and I would like to devote more time and space 
to examine this entanglement. 
6.4.3 Content Analysis 
The goal of the content analysis was to test hypotheses about the narrative around 
untouchability both pre and post Independence. The argument implied that pre-
Independence, untouchability would be a “social” issue while post-Independence, it 
would be more of a “political” issue. I did find some support for this by looking at the 
distribution of words around the topic of untouchability/untouchables. This support was 
however limited. The values of any of the correlations were not very large and did not 
go above 0.4 and indicate suggestive evidence.  
 
There are two things that can be done - the first one in the short term and the other in 
long term. The first is to expand the area beyond Gujarat and cover all of India. It is 
plausible that as Gujarat has not experienced Dalit activism at scales such as those 
observed in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, the correlations are indeed weak. Including 
more states, could strengthen the correlations.  
 
The second is to think of other sources of data. For instance, during the colonial times, 
each State published its own Gazettes which were reports of what was happening in the 
state, where was it happening and who was involved. This practice continued until a few 
decades post-independence. What is good about these Gazettes as compared to 
newspaper data is that these were for the state and not for advertisers and the public. 
Given that these Gazettes were published exclusively for the state, an analysis of how 
caste and untouchability were covered in the Gazettes could give us a glimpse of how 
the administration's perceives these issues.  
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6.4.4 Quantitative Analysis 
I used data from the Navsarjan study to test hypotheses about the joint production of 
untouchability. The villages in the sample are drawn from a larger sample where 
Navsarjan engaged in advocacy work. While it may be possible to generalize the 
findings to Gujarat, it will be difficult to do so outside Gujarat. This is because every 
state in India has its own unique history and relationship with the government. In many 
aspects, Gujarat is an outlier. For instance, as compared to states like Maharashtra and 
Tamil Nadu, it has had a very weak Dalit movement. Also, no state or regional political 
party has been able to gain a stronghold in the state. The ruling party has oscillated 
between Congress and BJP. And lastly, over the past few decades, anti-minorities 
(primarily anti-Muslim) discrimination has been on the rise. Taken together the role of 
these factors on caste-discrimination need further investigation.  
 
However given the importance of the issue, a similar study (perhaps on a smaller scale) 
needs to be done in a different state. There is a dearth of quantitative studies on the 
operations of caste on a daily basis - that is how does it continue to shape outcomes on 
a routine basis? During my review, most of the work that I came across dealt with “caste 
and politics”. The political aspect of caste seems to have overshadowed the everyday 
lived experience of caste and untouchability. This is a serious issue as separating the 
political from the social presents a distorted view of the problem. The magnitude of the 
seriousness is witnessed frequently in Dalit protests which are almost always followed 
by anti-Dalit protests. There is a prevailing belief among non-Dalits2, that reservations 
have ruined the country and the only way to move forward as a country is to remove 
reservations and special protections for Dalits, and let everyone play the field equally. 
This again, is based on a sliver of reality. We need more studies that bring together 
different aspects of the minority experience in India to see that discrimination is not just 
a “social” or “political” problem. Rather it is a national problem. 
                                               
2 An empirical study is required to test this. 
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